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Pennsylvania Politics, 1854-1860
Director: Harry W. Fritz
Based heavily on the use of personal correspondence, newspapers, and political 
platforms, the following study covers the triumph of the Republican party in 
Pennsylvania between 1854 and 1860. As the failures of competing political 
organizations were fundamental to the success of the Republican party, the 
breakup of the Whig party, the rise and fall of the Know Nothing movement, and 
the disruption of the Democratic party also figure prominently.
Between 1856 and 1860 the Pennsylvania Republican party increased the expanse 
of its political precepts yet strengthened its centrifugal cohesion. Devotion to Free 
Labor principles, and a commitment to stopping the slave power were central 
principles of the party. The Democratic and American parties meanwhile, failed 
to maintain such a cohesive commitment to a core ideal. Throughout the era, the 
problems of the intensifying sectional schism-specifically the future of slavery- 
played a predominate role in political rhetoric and ideology. Though a 
combination of principles both economic and social also drew voters to the 
Republican party, the fundament commitment to antislavery precepts remained a 
central feature of the party in Pennsylvania. The victory of Lincoln in 1860 placed 
Pennsylvania firmly within the camp of northern sectionalism.
Table of Contents
List of Maps iv
Introduction 1
Chapter
1. The Keystone o f the Union 4
2. Our Party Has Been Made to Bare the Sin o f Catholicism 21
3. It Will Be the Rainbow o f Peace 46
4. You Know How Sensitive Our People Are About Slavery 75
5. We Will Seal the Doom o f Southern Tyranny, Over 104
White Men at least
Conclusion 128
Appendix 133
Bibliography 150
iii
List of Maps 
Located After Page 154
Figure
1. Pennsylvania Counties in 1860
2. 1848 Presidential Election
3. 1852 Presidential Election
4. 1854 Governorship Election
5. 1854 State Supreme Court Native American Vote
6. 1855 Canal Commission Election
7. 1856 Canal Commission Election
8. 1856 Presidential Election
9. 1856 Fillmore Vote
10. 1857 Governorship Election
11. 1858 Congressional Elections
12. 1860 Governorship Election
13. 1860 Presidential Election
iv
INTRODUCTION
Readers will quickly notice that the following study is heavily influenced 
by the looming prospect of the American Civil War. Knowledge that the election 
of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 ultimately produced the bloodiest conflict in 
American history could not be ignored. Furthermore, any examination of 
antebellum Pennsylvania politics must confront the reality that the Keystone State 
provided the final margin of victory for Lincoln. However, mid nineteenth-
century Pennsylvanians had no way of foreseeing such an outcome. Although
/
sectional issues, especially the debate over the future of slavery, were prevalent in 
politics during the years before the war, they were not the be all and end all. 
Voters confronted a host of political issues that had little to do with slavery 
throughout the 1850’s. Immigration, temperance, taxes, railroads, and religion 
were all hotly debated political items right up to the firing on Fort Sumter. Many 
recent historians have argued that state and local issues were more likely to bring 
a voter to the polls or keep him at home during these years.
Though this study in no way seeks to repudiate the works that have so 
illuminated the depth and nuance of antebellum politics, its most lasting
2
contribution may be to entrench the notion that antislavery rhetoric did indeed 
matter to the final triumph of Lincoln. That conclusion could not be denied as I 
examined rolls of newspaper microfilm and shifted through crumbling old letters. 
It was actually surprising to encounter the volume of antislavery and anti-southern 
propaganda that jumped out of Keystone Republican editorials, letters, platforms, 
and speeches. During the 1860 Presidential election the Republican newspaper of 
the state capital of Harrisburg printed more editorials on slavery than all but one 
topic; a trait shared by most Republican papers throughout the state.1 Only the 
most conservative Republicans tried to keep slavery in the shadows, and even 
they occasionally took positions that no southerner would publicly support. 
Pennsylvania’s other major parties also dealt extensively with slavery politics if 
often defensively. The slavery question was an inescapable feature of antebellum 
Pennsylvania politics.
Newspaper editorials, political correspondence and speeches, and party 
platforms have provided the bulk of primary sources for this study. Critical 
observers will note the lack of legislative roll-call analysis and voter regression 
estimates in this study. Though I fully adhere to the importance of these tools, the 
primary goal of the project was to discuss the development of party ideology and 
rhetoric as presented to the public. No statewide survey of Pennsylvania’s 
antebellum politics has yet addressed these critical themes satisfactorily. A full- 
length regression analysis is needed for Pennsylvania-and perhaps a future
1 Survey o f Harrisburg Telegraph, June through October 1860. The most common editorials were 
general attacks on the Democratic gubernatorial candidate. Sixteen articles dealt with issues 
related to slavery, twenty-four attacked the candidate. The next most common topic was the tariff 
with ten articles. Of papers surveyed only Philadelphia’s North American broke the trend.
Praising the moderation o f Abraham Lincoln was the top priority o f the North American.
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edition of this study will include one--but the following provides valuable and 
necessary background for future work.
CHAPTER 1 
The Keystone of the Union 
Pennsylvania Politics: Motivation and Heritage
The presses in the sleepy little village of Gettysburg, soon to be 
immortalized in American history, teemed with revolutionary political rhetoric 
during the summer and autumn of 1860. Recalling the perils and patriotism of an 
earlier era, the town’s Republican mouthpiece, the Adams Sentinel, called on all 
men who “desire to restore the Government to the purity of the Founder’s 
Republic,” to pledge their votes that year to Abraham Lincoln and the rest of the 
national, state, and local Republican ticket. Those in “favor of adequate protection 
[for] the languishing Industrial Interests of the country—who are opposed to 
extending the blightening {sic} curse of Slavery to the Free Territories of the 
Union,” and who wished to save the West for “White Freemen,” were duty-bound 
to expel the shameful Democratic administration from office. Such inflammatory 
anti-southern and antislavery rhetoric would have won scant support in 
Gettysburg, or the state as a whole, just a few years earlier. Many Pennsylvanians 
proudly proclaimed that their state stood in the middle of the two sections both 
literally and politically. Antislavery radicalism traditionally was not quite as
5
strong in Pennsylvania as it was in New England or New York. Abolitionists were 
denied access to a Philadelphia meetinghouse in early 1861, for fear they would 
provoke a riot. The Free Soil party had not been popular in the state in 1848 or 
1852. James Buchanan, the sitting President and a resident of Lancaster, was 
highly sympathetic to the fears that southerners expressed over the growth of the 
antislavery movement. Pennsylvania had rejected Republican radicalism in 1856 
by awarding a landslide victory to her favorite son; many felt the same was 
possible four years later. In 1860 however, the Adams Sentinel and the 
Republicans of Gettysburg had no place for reactionary policies or quiet 
submissiveness to southern braggadocio. The “supremacy of the Constitution” 
could crush any of the “conspiracies and threats of Secessionists and 
Disunionists.” If such talk could win converts in Gettysburg, which lay just miles 
from slave-holding Maryland, then perhaps the old Keystone State was no longer 
in the middle of the nation. The open demand for a revolutionary change in 
slavery policy across the state in 1860 indicates that Pennsylvania had become 
more like its northern neighbors than many of its residents would willingly admit.
While antebellum political parties approached each election as if the very 
survival of the republic depended upon the correct result, the excitement of 1860 
was quite different. An unknown number of Gettysburg’s citizens took an oath in 
the Republican Wide Awake organization, pledging, “to resist by all 
Constitutional means [slavery’s] further extension.” The paramilitary character of 
the Wide Awakes, who marched through Gettysburg nightly by torchlight and 
drilled with various weapons in support of their candidates, was quite ominous for
6
the future of the American Union. What were Pennsylvania’s southern neighbors 
to think of such matters?
Between 1856 and 1860 the Republican party won over the majority of the 
tiny town’s voters, even though they had never shown such a proclivity for 
antislavery politics. On November 7,1860, Abraham Lincoln received 259 of 
Gettysburg’s 484 votes, a large increase over the 1856 Republican candidate’s total. 
Adams County gave Lincoln an eighty-vote margin over the Democratic ticket. By 
1860 the vote in Adams resembled the counties of Massachusetts more than Carroll 
Country Maryland, which bordered it to the south. Carroll Country gave Lincoln 
only 59 votes, Democrats received 2,000 votes, while Constitutional Union 
nominee John Bell won the county with 2,295. Only twelve years earlier the vote in 
Carroll County and Adams County had been quite similar. Whig Zachary Taylor 
had won both counties in relatively close races. The situation in 1860 was 
drastically different.3 The goal of this study is to account for this change.
The partisan rhetoric of Gettysburg’s Republican newspaper editors and 
Wide Awake leaders cannot fully explain the turnaround in Adams County, or the 
state as a whole. The seemingly high-minded principles of Republicanism, 
especially opposition to the extension of slavery, have rightfully been emphasized 
in most studies of Civil War era politics. These principles were central to the 
establishment of the party’s identity throughout Pennsylvania, and will indeed be
2 The principles o f Republicanism, which headed all announcements o f public People’s party—as 
the Republican party was known—gatherings, can be found in all summer and autumn editions o f  
the Adams Sentinel. The Wide Awake constitution appears in the October 9, 1860 issue. The 
military nature o f the Wide Awakes receives revealing coverage in the Pittsburgh Gazette, June 
13, 1860.
3 Borough and township returns for Adams County are in the November 14th issue. All county 
Presidential returns are taken from Walter Dean Burnham, Presidential Ballots, 1836-1896 
(Baltimore, 1955).
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stressed in this study. But they cannot entirely explain why people voted for or 
against the Republican party. Attempting to discover the reasoning of even a 
negligible percentage of the state’s electorate would be an exhaustively futile 
undertaking; nonetheless, it is clear that countless voters made their decisions to 
vote for or against the antebellum Republican party for less idealistic reasons. The 
various issues associated with slavery were not decisive for every voter. One 
declared that he had helped elect the man whom he derisively referred to in 1864 
as “Leancom” simply because, “he had wanted change.”4 In antebellum 
Pennsylvania making the decision to vote for a party, whatever its principles or its 
platform, could come down to the crudest of all motivations.
In January 1857, Keystone Republicans were surprisingly confident that 
they could elect their man to the available U. S. Senate seat, despite their five- 
vote minority in the joint state assembly. Democrats, meanwhile, were panicking. 
Divided over the dictation of their senatorial nomination by President James 
Buchanan, they secretly feared that Republicans could defeat them with a not so 
secrete weapon. That weapon was Simon Cameron, a man with many friends and 
deep pockets. Democratic fears were justified. For with the help of three 
Democrats who bolted the party, Cameron was elected Senator amid much 
clamor. In many ways Cameron, who would come to dominate Pennsylvania’s 
Republican party, embodied the state on the eve of the Civil War.5
4 Isaac Metzler quoted in Arnold M. Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement, 1861- 1865 
(Cranbury, New Jersey, 1980), 186.
5 The coverage of the 1857 Senatorial election is based on many secondary sources, including 
Edwin Bradley, Simon Cameron: Lincoln's Secretary o f War (Philadelphia, 1966) and Alexander 
K. McClure, Old Time Notes o f  Pennsylvania, I (Philadelphia, 1905). Bradley’s work is the best 
and most thorough work on Cameron. Bradley gives Cameron’s career a much more positive spin,
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By 1857 Simon Cameron had already earned a reputation as an 
unscrupulous political schemer. Yet Cameron had also earned widespread respect 
and devotion from his followers and friends. Possessing the needed skills of any 
machine politician, Cameron used all his virtues and vices to gain control of the 
Republican party in Pennsylvania. Those who fell victim to Cameron’s power 
almost to a man despised him, but those who earned his confidence could hardly 
say they had a truer friend. Bom into poverty and orphaned at a young age, the 
tale of Cameron’s rise to power could probably top any Horatio Alger success 
story. By the 1850’s he was a wealthy ironmaster and held investments in various 
Pennsylvania industries and companies. The political empire that was in place by 
his second trip to the Senate—he had also served as a Democrat in the late 1840’s- 
-would last into the twentieth century. In many ways the personal success of 
Simon Cameron and the political success of the Republican party in Pennsylvania 
were linked. Pennsylvania had no leader comparable to William Henry Seward, or 
Salmon Portland Chase. When Lincoln selected a representative from 
Pennsylvania for his cabinet he chose Cameron, not Thaddeus Stevens, a vocal 
critic of slavery who also felt he deserved a cabinet position. Just as he had done 
so often in Pennsylvania, Cameron earned Lincoln’s trust, despite his stormy 
short-lived stint as Secretary of War. When Lincoln’s electoral fortunes looked 
dim during the summer of 1864, he turned to Cameron to work his magic once 
again in Pennsylvania. And as he had done so often, Cameron came through.
Even Alexander K. McClure, one of his political competitors readily saw the
especially compared to the treatment he has received from many historians including Allan Nevins 
and James McPherson.
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skills of Cameron. “He was far-seeing,” McClure admitted in his memoirs, “knew 
the precise value of men, would commend influences by the most circuitous 
methods, and was tireless in managing his organization.”6
Cameron’s 1857 election to the Senate resulted both from his adeptness as 
a political manager of his own flock and his notorious ability to influence those 
men whom he considered potential supporters. For whatever reason, Cameron 
was able to get three Democrats to risk their reputations and even their physical 
safety to vote him into the Senate. After meeting with Cameron at his Harrisburg 
hotel room, William Lebo, Samuel Manear, and G. A. Wagonseller declared their 
votes for Cameron. It was immediately alleged that the three had been bribed, and 
that may very well be the case, but there had been clear dissension in Democratic 
ranks leading up to the election. John W. Forney, whom Buchanan had practically 
demanded be elected, was an even more divisive character than Cameron.
Secretly, many Democrats felt his selection was a mistake; others openly admitted 
that they would not vote for him.
As the election approached Republicans knew that they might be able to 
count on Cameron’s legendary connections to turn the tide. Even former foe 
Thaddeus Stevens felt that Cameron was the right man in 1857. “I have every 
reason to believe,” he wrote E. D. Gazzam “that he can get enough of his old 
friends to elect him.” The late-night meeting the day before the election between 
Cameron and the three men merely provided the guarantee that these votes were
6 McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 436.
7 G. R. Barrett to William Bigler, January 14, 1857, Bigler Papers, HSP.
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coming. It only took one ballot to achieve Cameron’s victory--and that might
Q
have been his only chance—but the stunning result would not soon be forgotten.
The three ‘traitors’ were quickly read out of the Democratic party. No 
hotel in Harrisburg would grant them a room for the remainder of the legislative 
session. Their political careers were over; only Lebo continued to serve in the 
Cameron army after 1857. The vitriolic criticism annunciated by Democratic 
journals and politicians on Cameron was scathing, hardly letting up for weeks. 
William Bigler, who occupied Pennsylvania’s other Senate seat, called for a 
Congressional investigation of the election. However, to the outrage of most 
Democrats, Cameron was able to take his seat that autumn. The Senate Judiciary 
Committee could not find sufficient evidence to launch an investigation. 
Pennsylvania Republicans had won their first major victory.
Although it seems obvious that the motivations of those who attended the 
various Republican rallies mentioned in the Adams Sentinel, and the three 
Democrats who gave their votes to Cameron were not the same, both methods 
produced the same result, a victory that outraged Democrats. “Whether we view 
the result as an act of justice to you,” explained one of the many congratulations 
offered to Cameron that January, “[or] the repudiation of Fomey-the rejection of 
Presidential dictation-the endorsement of sound Americanism, or the expression 
of hostility to the extension of slavery, it cannot but be highly gratifying to every 
lover of our institutions.”9 Simply put, the accomplishment of Cameron’s victory
8 Stevens quoted in Bradley, Cameron, 116; Also see Pittsburgh Gazette, January 14, 1857; P. 
Hamman, November 18, 1856, J. Madeia, November 28, among many others, to Cameron,
Cameron papers, DCHS.
9 Stephen Miller to Cameron, January 13, Cameron papers, DCHS.
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encompassed a diverse array of political doctrines and interests. The same could 
be said of the other major Republican victories that followed. Yet despite its 
diversity, the Pennsylvania Republican party was able to achieve a cohesion 
cemented by a core devotion to a section-wide principle. Even if not all 
Pennsylvanians voted for the party because of this core belief, it cannot be 
forgotten that the opposition to the spread of slavery and its political agenda was 
what held the Republican coalition together in Pennsylvania.
Using a multitude of methods, and making a wide range of promises, 
denials, and attacks, the Pennsylvania Republican party was able in a relatively 
short five-year period, to win over the votes of a majority of the state’s electorate. 
Its eventual victory outraged Democrats who saw their defeat as the end of 
Pennsylvania’s position as a sensible bulwark between two extremes. In many 
ways the downtrodden Democrats were right. By 1860 it was hard to make the 
argument that Pennsylvania was still the Keystone of the Union. Instead, it had 
firmly placed itself along side of its northern neighbors. The history of 
Pennsylvania before the 1850’s had shown few signs that this development was 
inevitable. Pennsylvania’s path to the crisis of 1860 was in many ways unique- 
and in some ways unforeseen—but it shared with its peers the ultimate outcome of 
that change.
I
Pennsylvania was second only to New York State as the political and 
economic powerhouse of the Union during the 1850’s.10 Although the power and
10 The most recent general history of Pennsylvania is: Philip S. Klein and Ari Hoogenboom, A 
History o f Pennsylvania (New York, 1973).
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influence of the Middle Atlantic states was shrinking, as Midwestern states like 
Illinois began to assert their economic and political power, Pennsylvania still 
remained the second most significant state in the Union on the eve of the Civil 
War.11 As sectional tensions intensified, the politics of the Keystone State became 
even more crucial. Pennsylvania possessed twenty-seven electoral votes in 1860, 
a number large enough to attract close attention from national political leaders and 
organizers throughout the antebellum era. Securing the state’s Presidential vote 
was critically important to the election of most antebellum Presidents. By 1860, 
the outcome of the Presidential contest in Pennsylvania was critical to the survival 
of the Union itself.
Situated in the middle of the original thirteen colonies, Pennsylvania had 
earned its sobriquet the ‘Keystone State’ as a result of its ties with both of the 
country’s main sections. Lacking the evangelical tradition of New England and 
sharing much of the same ethnic and cultural heritage as parts of the South, 
Pennsylvania arguably resembled Virginia more than Massachusetts at the 
nation’s birth. Although the southern-born population of Pennsylvania had 
declined considerably by the 1850’s, the state had once been the destination of 
many southern emigrants. In 1860 Pennsylvania still contained a number of 
former Maryland and Virginia residents in southwestern counties of Fayette, 
Washington, and Greene. Philadelphia also housed a number of southern-born 
residents. One prominent Philadelphian, General Robert Patterson, who was the 
first in a long line of northern generals to fail in the Shenandoah Valley during the
11 Pennsylvania is technically a commonwealth, but I will forego using this term.
Civil War, owned a large number of slaves in the South. The city’s University of 
Pennsylvania Medical College yearly graduated more southern doctors than all of 
the South’s few medical schools combined. An undetermined number of 
Pennsylvanians, most with southern family ties, fought for the Confederacy 
during the Civil War. However, these examples emerge as little more than 
anomalies when Pennsylvania is compared with its northern and southern 
neighbors.
Pennsylvania was clearly a northern state by 1860. In 1780 the Keystone 
State passed the nation’s first abolition law. Although at least 6,000 slaves had 
once been held in Pennsylvania, there were none by the 1830’s. The state’s 
population of free blacks though remained relatively high, topping 50,000 before 
the Civil War. Some Pennsylvania blacks were escaped southern slaves, but most 
had been legally manumitted or were the descendants of freedmen.
In 1850 the state’s total population stood at 2,311,786. By 1860 it 
numbered 2,906,370, far surpassing any southern state. Over 400,000 of her 
residents had been bom abroad, mostly in Germany, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom. Germans, virtually unknown in the South, resided mainly in the rural 
southeast. The largest concentration of Irish was in Philadelphia, although their 
numbers were high in several eastern counties, especially Luzerne and Schuylkill. 
Many of the state’s northern tier inhabitants had moved there from New England
14
or New York. The New England and Yankee population easily trumped that of
1 ^
southerners by the Civil War.
Pennsylvania’s urban communities easily outclassed southern 
counterparts. Philadelphia was a world-class city with some 400,000 living in its 
environs by 1850, trailing only New York as the most populous city in the nation. 
Growth during the 1850’s was rapid, expanding the city’s population to 565,529 
on the eve of the war. Philadelphia was easily the most powerful community in 
the state, containing most of its financial and business interests. Reading, in 
neighboring Berks County, contained over 20,000 inhabitants, while Lancaster 
nearly approached that total. Although Pennsylvania’s population was heavily 
concentrated in the southeastern party of the state, smaller cities also dotted the 
western section. Pittsburgh, the west’s main city, had experienced stagnant 
growth during the 1850’s, but its industrial sector was on the verge of explosion.
In 1860 50,000 made Pittsburgh home, while nearly 30,000 lived in neighboring 
Allegheny City.
The rapid development of its industrial sector and the expansive reach of 
its transportation facilities further distinguished Pennsylvania from the South. 
Although the majority of the state’s residents dwelled in rural areas and made 
their living through agriculture, the rise of manufacturing was quite evident by 
1860. Although beaten to the punch by New York, Pennsylvania developed a 
canal system nearly its equal by the 1830’s. Railroad building began in earnest
t
12 Pennsylvania’s foreign-born population made up a smaller percentage of the population than in 
Massachusetts or New York. Population o f the United States in 1860, Joseph C. G. Kennedy, 
superintendent o f census (Washington, 1864).
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during the 1840’s. By 1860 2,598 miles of rails crossed the state. However, 
Pennsylvania was fiercely divided over their management, especially the selfish 
monopolization of benefits by Philadelphia interests. As the sectional controversy 
was raging, railroad politics attracted even more attention in several western 
locales.
While over 200,000 Keystone residents worked in some way with 
agriculture, the industrial sector was expanding rapidly. More than 130,000 men 
toiled as nondescript laborers, while slightly fewer than 4,000 men were 
employed in the iron industry, mostly in Allegheny County. Berks, Chester, 
Centre, Huntingdon, Lancaster, and Mifflin Counties also boasted iron 
establishments. Glass works employed smaller numbers of people in Philadelphia 
and Pittsburgh. The lumber industry was strong in the still heavily wooded north.
18,000 toiled in the coalfields of eastern Pennsylvania, especially in Schuylkill 
County. Philadelphia was mostly a manufacturing and mercantile city, where the 
manufacture of cotton goods was a leading source of income. Pennsylvania was 
also home to 4,500 lawyers and just under 20,000 clerks. The diversity of the 
state’s economy and workforce influenced the pattern of the state’s politics during 
the antebellum years, mandating an inclusive and progressive system of 
government, and guaranteeing that a wide array of politicians and political ideas 
would find a constituency.
II
The democratic principles of the Keystone State were of crucial 
importance to its character and political history. Pennsylvania’s 1790 constitution
16
very nearly established universal white manhood suffrage decades ahead of other 
states. As the state grew, its physical and ethno-cultural makeup contributed to the 
solidification of its allegiance to democracy and compounded its importance to 
the new nation. With its large open expanse to the west and wealth of resources, 
Pennsylvania developed a culture, which enhanced the democratic heritage that 
the state was imbued with after the Revolution. Suspicion of central authority, 
distrust of concentrated financial powers, and a sense of personal independence, 
were traits shared by many rural Pennsylvanians. These principles would deeply 
affect the political history of the state right down to the eve of the Civil War.
Pennsylvania was a stronghold of Jeffersonian Democracy. Outside of 
Philadelphia and Lancaster the Federalist party lost most of its following after the 
1800 election. However, as was the case in most states, voter turnout remained 
light despite the lack of constitutional restrictions. Turnout in Presidential 
elections remained at around thirty-three percent until 1828. However, the 
universal democratic movement and the development of popular parties with 
recognizable political philosophies vastly increased participation in politics.
These principles are clearly revealed in Pennsylvania’s 1838 constitution, 
which governed the state until 1874. The constitution set Pennsylvania’s state and 
congressional elections for the second Tuesday in October. Every year a new set 
of legislators would be chosen, while a third of the state senate would be up for 
election. One hundred legislators and thirty-one senators would assemble every 
January to start a new legislative secession that generally ran until April. Every 
three years a governor would be selected. In the event of his death while in office,
17
a new election would be held the following October. Shortly, seats on the state 
supreme court also became elective. Various other state offices were open for 
election, though the governor did have considerable appointive powers. Universal 
white manhood suffrage was the fundamental precept of the document.13
Andrew Jackson’s democratic crusade proved quite popular in the 
Keystone State. The first national party convention, designed to avoid the 
backroom wheeling and dealing associated with professional politics during the 
1810’s and 20’s, was held in Harrisburg in 1824. There, in truly democratic 
fashion, Jackson received the people’s nomination. In November of that year 
Jackson won an easy victory in that state, although he lost the election after the U.
S. House selected John Quincy Adams. Four years later, Jackson again defeated 
Adams in Pennsylvania, this time by a two-to-one margin amidst a much larger 
turnout.
Despite the rise of the Democratic party, devotion to personalities and 
cliques remained politically important well into the 1840’s. The Calhoun-wing of 
the Democratic party had a strong following under Samuel Ingham, an early 
member of Jackson’s cabinet, but it lost favor after Martin Van Buren's 
influence began to trump that of Calhoun. James Buchanan, Henry Baldwin, and 
George M Dallas helped rebuild the party around Van Buren who easily defeated 
William H. Harrison in 1836. Although often divided by both personal and policy
13 The Constitution o f the Commonwealth o f Pennsylvania, as Amended by the Convention o f 
1837-38 (Chambersburg, 1839).
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differences, the Democratic Party remained quite strong in the state until sectional 
rifts shook the party on the eve of the Civil War.14
The opposition to the Democratic party in Pennsylvania was slow to 
develop and in many ways unique to the state. Jackson’s attack against 
Philadelphia’s Bank of the United States began the process of forming a cohesive 
opposition. Old Hickory’s objection to federal improvements projects and support 
of free trade, which many Keystone businessmen argued would snuff out local 
industries, also fueled the opposition. It was Masonry though, that caused 
Jackson’s party the most problems during the 1830’s. The Anti-Masonic party 
was initially stronger than the Whig party, capturing the governor’s mansion 
while Democrats squabbled among themselves in 1835. However, the rule of 
Anti-Masonry proved short-lived as the party disgraced itself during an electoral 
dispute in 1838. Most Anti-Masons, including Thaddeus Stevens, eventually 
became Whigs. The principles of Anti-Masonry, especially the distrust of 
secretive organizations, persisted among former adherents and influenced the 
Keystone Whig party.
The panic of 1837 undercut the disunited appeal of Anti-Masonry and 
helped launch the growth of the Whig party. However, Pennsylvania’s Whig party 
never produced leaders that matched state’s Democrats. Nor did they measure up 
to Whig leadership in New York, Massachusetts or even Ohio. Perhaps the most 
notable Whigs were Senator James Cooper and onetime Democrat William F. 
Johnston, the only Whig to serve as governor. Cooper and Johnston represented
14 Pennsylvania politics from Monroe to Jackson are covered aptly by: Philip S. Klein,
Pennsylvania Politics, 1817-1832: A Game Without Rules (Philadelphia, 1940).
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different factions of the party, with Cooper being the more conservative of the 
two. Whig Presidential candidates won Pennsylvania twice—1840 and 1848-and 
in 1844 the party came up painfully short. In Pennsylvania, like most northern 
states, the majority of Republicans cut their political teeth as Whigs. Thaddeus 
Stevens, Andrew G. Curtin, Alexander K. McClure, and Russell Errett were the 
most prominent.
1848 was the high tide of Pennsylvania’s Whig party. That year the party 
triumphantly elected Zachary Taylor, sent William F. Johnston to the state house, 
and elected the majority of its congressmen. However, the seeds of the party’s 
downfall had been planted in Pennsylvania. Taylor’s attempt to form his own 
independent party through patronage offended Whigs affiliated with James 
Cooper’s conservative wing of the party. Furthermore, Taylor’s opposition to the 
compromise measures of Henry Clay, which Governor Johnston also opposed, 
further divided the party. Johnston’s opposition to the Fugitive Slave Act and the 
subsequent Christiana Riot of 1851 may have cost him reelection. A number of 
conservative Whigs defected from Johnston, and in October 1851 he lost to 
William Bigler by 8,500 votes.15 Disagreement over slavery though was not the 
main reason why the Whig party dissolved in Pennsylvania. The most serious 
threat, unbeknownst to many Whigs at the time, was the development of nativism.
Protestant outrage at the increasing Catholic presence in the state helped 
cause a bloody riot in Philadelphia during 1844. The Native American party,
15 Johnston’s vote in the northern and western sections of the state, where he gained control of the 
small Free Soil contingent improved on his 1848 total. Although Johnston won 10,000 new votes, 
Bigler drew 18,000 more than his Democratic predecessor. Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall o f 
the American Whig Party : Jacksonian Politics and the Onset o f the Civil War (New York, 1999), 
664-67.
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which attempted to impose a twenty-one year waiting period for an immigrant to 
become a voting citizen, won a small, though influential, number of converts in 
Philadelphia. Various other locales suffered occasional outbreaks of anti-Catholic 
or anti-immigrant violence and politics during the 1830’s and 1840’s. Many 
Whigs, who were suspicious and jealous of the Democrat’s near monopoly on the 
immigrant vote tended to support the nativist cause. Yet, most were unwilling to 
leave their beloved party as long as it made local concessions to nativists. The 
Native American party remained insignificant, as long as Whigs maintained their 
fealty to nativism. When the Whig party tried to disassociate itself from nativism 
during the 1852 Presidential campaign in a vain attempt to attract some of the 
quickly growing immigrant population, many nativists spumed them. Their 
decision not to support General Scott, the Whigs’ Presidential nominee, helped 
cause his defeat.16 Two years later the Whig party would pay the ultimate price 
for again alienating nativists. However, during the early 1850’s not all Whigs 
were willing to admit that nativism would remain a crucial issue. Some leaders 
wanted to reform the party on a sectional basis and attack the increasingly dough­
faced policy of the Democratic party. The revival of sectional tensions through 
the introduction of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, gave many Whigs hope that in 1854 
the party could be reborn as an antislavery party. Although such a party would 
eventually triumph in Pennsylvania, it would take six years for it to meet with 
complete success.
16 Scott’s weakness on nativism will be further discussed in the next chapter. The most notable 
effect o f this weakness was the 6,000 vote drop off o f the Whig vote in Philadelphia County—where 
nativism was strongest—between 1848 and 1852.
CHAPTER 2
“Our Party Has Been Made to Bare the Sin of Catholicism” 
Pennsylvania and the Destruction of the Second Party System, 1854-1855
On May 3, 1854 the Pittsburgh Gazette declared, “THE WHIG PARTY 
OF THE NORTH is, this day, stronger than at any former period.” The passage’s 
author William Larimer, a staunchly antislavery Whig, was convinced that the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act would revitalize his struggling party. Although Whigs had 
tasted defeat in Pennsylvania for five straight years, all the while suffering the 
same fate throughout most of the North, many northern Whigs felt quite confident
17during the early months of 1854. Rallies throughout Pennsylvania excoriated 
the Democratic submission to the autocratic demands of the slave-holding South, 
apparently portending a coming reversal of electoral trends. As spring emerged 
throughout the Keystone State in 1854, it appeared that the Whig party might also 
have a new life after a long cold winter.
Larimer originally expressed his confidence in a letter to his party rival 
James Pollock, shortly after the close of Whigs’ March state nominating 
convention. Pollock had defeated Larimer in the race for the gubernatorial
17Pittsburgh Gazette,, May 3, 1854. Quoted Holt, The Rise and Fall o f  the American WhigParty 
836.
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nomination. Larimer sent his letter on March 24th. At that moment Democrats in 
Washington appeared to be embarking on a suicidal path, reopening the wounds 
of sectionalism by way of Stephen Douglas’s mad Kansas-Nebraska bill. Larimer, 
who had once been a supporter of the Free Soil party, shared the confidence of 
many antislavery Whig leaders during the early months of 1854. Kansas- 
Nebraska was apparently just what the down-and-out party needed. Purged of 
doughfaces like Daniel Webster, the northern Whig party could now apparently 
claim to be the true defenders of northern antislavery principles. The apostasy of 
Democrats would not stand as long a vigilant Whig party stood firm. The 
Pittsburgh Gazette, one of the Whig party’s staunchest antislavery papers, used 
William Larimer’s words to assure readers that an anti-Nebraska position would 
bring victory in October. “Occupying as she now does, the true Republican 
ground, the policy of the opposition is making her a unit, and is doing more to 
render her invincible than all those efforts of her most astute political tacticians 
could accomplish.” Whigs like Larimer and Gazette editors D. N. White and 
Russell Errett worked into the early summer to strengthen the antislavery 
credentials of the party. Worried Democrats appeared vulnerable. Twelve 
Keystone Democrats, including Senator Richard Brodhead, voted for Kansas- 
Nebraska, but not all of the state’s Democrats agreed with the act. Summertime 
correspondents of Governor William Bigler--who had been re-nominated by 
Democrats in March-expressed concern that his apparent decision to quietly side 
with Douglas and the Pierce administration would cause defection and defeat. 
However, even as William Larimer’s letter was published, new political winds
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were blowing that would make his spring confidence appear nothing but 
ridiculous in the aftermath of fall elections. Indeed, by June even Larimer had for 
all intents left the party he had declared invincible just weeks earlier. As many 
Whig leaders were attempting to capitalize on the Kansas-Nebraska backlash, 
they failed to fully address the issue that would carry most fall elections across the 
North. That failure would destroy the Whig party and plunge Pennsylvania 
politics into disarray for years.18
II
Nativism arguably had a stronger tradition in Pennsylvania than in any 
other northern state. Embittered by the growing numbers of Irish Catholic 
immigrants, groups pledged to limit their influence upon society and politics first 
appeared in the 1830’s. Nativism was particularly pungent in Philadelphia and 
surrounding areas where the majority of Catholics lived. Most anti-Catholic 
voters there and throughout the North supported the Whig party during the era of 
the second party system. Nativist partisans often provided critical votes that 
helped Whigs obtain victories during the 1840’s. Political nativism began to play 
a crucial role in state Whig politics during the Taylor Administration. Taylor 
secured leading patronage positions for Philadelphia nativists, which angered 
some of the state’s older, more conservative Whigs like Senator James Cooper. 
The growing strength of the nativist movement exacerbated tensions existing
18 Most of the information for the 1854 election is based on two excellent secondary sources,
Holt’s wonderful The Rise and Fall o f  the American Whig Party and William E Gienapp, 
“Nebraska, Nativism, and Rum: The Failure of Fusion in Pennsylvania, 1854,” Pennsylvania 
Magazine o f History and Biography, hereafter PMHB, 109 (October, 1985), 425-71. Holt is 
extremely informative on Pennsylvania’s nativist tradition.
24
within the state Whig party. The rivalry between more conservative Whigs like 
Cooper and those who tended to be both supporters of nativism and opponents of 
appeasing the South on slavery matters disturbed the unity of the party during the 
Taylor years.
1852 was a crucial year for Whig/nativist relations in Pennsylvania. The 
campaign of Winfield Scott openly courted Irish immigrants to the dismay of 
nativists, and the party was badly defeated. Meanwhile, the increasing political 
prominence of Catholics coupled with the visit of the Papal envoy during 1853 
increased the draw of nativism. The appointment of James Campbell, a Catholic, 
as state attorney general by Governor Bigler and then as Postmaster General by 
President Franklin Pierce was particularly outrageous to Keystone nativists. The 
perceived cultural threat of Catholics also motivated nativists. Pittsburgh Catholic 
leaders outraged many Protestants in that city when they attacked the public 
school system for encouraging Bible reading. Moral reformers across the state 
often criticized the propensity of Catholics to indulge in excessive liquor 
consumption, especially during the Sabbath. Whigs usually cited such cultural 
‘outrages’ when they criticized Catholic power. Indeed, during the early months 
of 1854 Pennsylvania Whigs linked their outrage over Kansas-Nebraska with their 
traditional commitment to Protestant values.19 However, the perception that 
obtaining the entire anti-Nebraska vote would be the key to victory caused Whigs
19 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 20. The Party platform specifically cited Whig’s Protestant heritage. 
Interestingly, one nativist paper had no problem with Jews; apparently they were not a problem 
because they were not under the control of a transnational despot like the Pope, Harrisburg 
Herald, June 27, 1855.
For good examples o f Whig attacks on Catholics see Pottsville Miner's Journal, December 31, 
1853, March 18, and April 8.
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to largely ignore nativism during the prime campaign season. Whigs were not 
blind to the power of nativism; they just took it for granted in 1854.
It is not easy to castigate Whig leaders for their apparently myopic 
decision to de-emphasize nativism during the 1854 campaign. While many Whigs 
were confident that Douglas’s bill would be the issue which they could use to 
revitalize their party, the small Free Soil party was not ready to let Whigs steal 
their issue without due compensation. Responding quickly and with greater 
vindictiveness towards Democratic offenders, Free Soil leaders undercut the Whig 
position that they were the stoutest critics of Kansas-Nebraska. While the 
Pennsylvania state Whig convention in March had denounced the introduction of 
the hated bill, the meeting came before its passage and thus did not demand its 
repeal. Free Soilers quickly capitalized. Pennsylvania Whigs incurred the wrath 
of dissatisfied Free Soilers who pointed to Keystone Whig’s traditionally tepid 
opposition to slavery. The Washington National Era, the leading Free Soil paper 
declared, “Pennsylvania Whiggery is simply old fogeyism.”20 Thus Whigs would 
have to prove they were worthy of the Free Soil vote. Confident Free Soilers 
provided the critical balance for victory in October, Whigs struck bargains that in 
hindsight killed their party. Because they were scared Free Soilers would 
nominate the supposedly popular David Wilmot for governor, thus robbing them 
of an otherwise easy victory, many Whig leaders focused all their energies on 
appeasing him and his relatively small cadre of followers. Most Democratic Free 
Soilers were uncomfortable with Whig ties to nativism. Consequently, many 
antislavery Whigs played down nativism and other traditional Whig causes.
20Holt, Whig Party, 882.
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Pittsburgh Whigs like Larimer and Russell Errett were especially eager to dump 
all non-slavery issues. “We are not so wedded to the Whig organization or the 
name as to refuse to enter any better organization for the purpose of resisting the 
encroachments of slavery,” declared Errett’s Gazette 21 Candidate Pollock 
responded with an open letter in July strongly objecting to the repeal of the 
Missouri compromise and declaring that Congress had no right to establish 
slavery in the territories, which Kansas-Nebraska had apparently mandated. 
Allegheny County Whigs took the additional steps of nominating a Free Soiler for 
one of the county’s legislative seats and passing strong antislavery resolutions.
One declared, “in view of the dangers of the crisis—a crisis overriding all former 
party distinctions-we hereby pledge ourselves to the camp of Freedom-we 
inscribe Free Men to Free Labor and Free Lands upon our banner, and enlist for 
the whole war.”22 The re-emphasis of antislaveiy was not limited to Pittsburgh. 
Eastern journals also stepped up their attacks on Kansas-Nebraska. The state 
committee address issued during a July meeting in Harrisburg was much stronger 
in its denunciation of southern outrages than the March state platform.
There were some signs that the strategy of concentrating on Nebraska was 
working for Whigs. Although Wilmot never seriously considered running, Free 
Soilers had nominated a candidate for governor in May. After Pollock released his 
strong anti-slavery letter however, Free Soilers withdrew him. Wilmot also 
decided that he would permanently leave the Democratic party and gave his 
support to Pollock. The election cycle beginning in March was producing defeats
21Pittsburgh Gazette, April 19. Quoted in Holt, Whig Party, 882.
22Ibid. 883
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for Democrats throughout the North. Pennsylvania Democrats often blamed 
Kansas-Nebraska as they suffered defeats in summer municipal elections.23 Yet 
those elections revealed that nativism would be far more detrimental to 
Democratic fortunes in 1854. As Michael F. Holt explains, Pennsylvania’s Whigs 
had placed all their eggs in one basket, thus when the electorate decided that a 
different issue was paramount, the result was disastrous. Taking for granted their 
support and underestimating their strength, Whigs lost the nativist vote to a new 
movement which did not trust the party of Winfield Scott and his Irish brogue to 
protect them from the encroach of the ‘Catholic menace.’24
m
Protest movements across the state expressed disdain for both parties; 
several independent nominees appeared during the summer pledging to limit the 
influence of both immigrants and liquor in the Keystone State. A “queer 
temperance party” nominated candidates for office in Erie County and also 
appeared in York and Schuylkill Counties. Maine Law candidates appeared 
sparingly across the state, while pressure for prohibition led the legislature to 
prepare a referendum to be voted on in October that would consider a ban on 
liquor sales.25 Nativism though, proved to be the most crucial issue throughout
23 Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics o f the 
1850’s  (New York, 1992). Anbinder contends that Kansas-Nebraska crucial to the electoral 
misfortunes o f Democrats, but Holt’s conflicting opinion that slavery mattered but little in results 
of October especially, seems to bear more scrutiny. William Gienapp tends to take a similar 
position.
During an impromptu speech before the election of 1852, Scott had responded to the presence of 
some Irishmen in his audience that he ‘loved to hear that old Irish brogue.’ Such pandering cost 
him dearly.
25 Erie Observer, May 13, 1854; The referendum, if passed, would recommend that the legislature 
pass a law banning the sale of spirits. See Asa E. Martin, “The Temperance Movement in 
Pennsylvania Prior to the Civil War,” PMHB, 49 (July, 1925), 219-223.
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the state during 1854. The evidence came in as early as May when several 
municipal elections were held. Whig Robert T. Conrad, who was also a member 
of a secret nativist order soon to be dubbed the “Know Nothings,” routed local 
Democratic party boss Richard Vaux in Philadelphia’s mayoral election. Know 
Nothings triumphed with shocking regularity throughout the southeast. Democrats 
keenly blamed the organization they often euphemistically dubbed ‘SanT for their 
defeats. “At the bottom of this is a deep-seated religious question-prejudice if 
you please, which nothing can withstand. Our party is made to bare the sin of 
Catholicism [sic],” declared one astute Democrat.26 Governor Bigler began to . 
receive many worried notes. “In my opinion this [defeat in Philadelphia] is a 
direct result of Campbell-ism,” noted one Democrat in reference to the notorious 
Catholic Postmaster General. “If you are not alarmed, you must have very strong 
nerves,” he concluded.27
October’s results proved to be quite humiliating for Democrats. However 
the elections did not provide Whigs with the revitalizing victory William Larimer 
and others had gleefully predicted either. James Pollock won with the highest 
percentage of the vote obtained by any Whig ever in Pennsylvania. However, he 
was the only Whig to win a statewide race. Democrats overwhelming reelected 
Jeremiah S. Black to the state supreme court, while a Know Nothing, Henry Mott, 
won the seat on the state canal commission. The prohibition referendum failed by 
a few thousand votes.
26 E. A. Pennington to William Bigler, June 8, 1854, Bigler papers, HSP. Also quoted in Anbinder, 
54.
27 William E. Gienapp, Origins o f the Republican Party, 1852-1856 (New York, 1987), 101.
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The incredibly schizophrenic returns resulted from the Know Nothing 
pledge to vote for the candidate-usually a lodge member-who most fit their 
criteria regardless of party. Pollock had apparently joined a Know Nothing lodge 
during the summer, while Mott received both Democratic and nativist support 
because his Whig opponent had been bom in Scotland. The supreme court race 
conveniently revealed the true strength of the Know Nothing movement and 
spelled the doom of the Whig party. Know Nothings pledged to vote for a third- 
party nativist who subsequently received thirty-three percent of the vote, while 
Black won with forty-five percent, and the Whig candidate earned a pathetic 
twenty-one. Black drew nearly the same number of votes as Bigler who lost the 
gubernatorial election.28 Seemingly out of nowhere a new organization had 
turned keystone politics upside down.
While Democrats were solidly beaten, the Whig party was virtually 
obliterated in Pennsylvania. Fifteen of Pennsylvania’s new congressmen ran as 
Whigs, but twelve were Know Nothings. Know Nothings clearly backed four 
anti-Nebraska Democrats who triumphed-two of them independent of regular 
Democratic support-and elected the nativist Jacob Broom in Philadelphia. Broom 
was the Presidential nominee of the independent Native American party in 1852. 
Seventeen of Pennsylvania’s twenty-five Congressional seats belonged to Know 
Nothings of one sort or another. Across the state, disgruntled Whigs and
28The full returns were: Governor; Pollock 204,008, Bigler 167,001,a Native American nominee 
received 1,503. Canal Commissioner; Mott 274,074, the Scottish Whig received 83,331. Supreme 
Court Justice; Black 167,010, the Whig, Smyser 78,571, and Baird, a Know Nothing, 120,576.
The referendum failed 158,342 to 163,150 southeastern Know Nothings who did not support 
prohibition were apparently the difference.
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Democrats as well as first time voters left their parties to back Know Nothing 
candidates.
Decisions made in local Know Nothings lodges to back a candidate for 
office were not clearly documented, but they seem to have considered several 
interrelated issues. Alexander K. McClure alleged that Know Nothings had 
approached his friend, Whig state Chairman Andrew G. Curtin, pledging to 
support Pollock in return for patronage. Although Pollock apparently appointed 
some of the alleged bargainers, his reputation as a strident Protestant moralizer 
was likely much more important than any promise of jobs. Democrat Bigler 
meanwhile was strongly associated with Catholics and was known as somewhat 
of a heavy drinker. Although William Gienapp estimates that more Pennsylvania 
Democrats left their party for the Know Nothings than in any other northern state, 
Whigs had clearly been hurt the most by Sam’s rise.
Anti-Nebraska pledges provided Whigs with virtually nothing across 
Pennsylvania. Although those who voted for Know Nothing candidates were 
usually critics of Kansas-Nebraska, Whig attempts to capitalize on that 
dissatisfaction had obviously failed miserably. Nativism broke the strained ties 
that held the Whig party together. Factionalism was always a problem for the 
party, but the strength of the Know Nothing movement allowed disgruntled 
groups to obtain the fruits of election victories denied by party regulars. The 
notoriously antislavery Whig Thaddeus Stevens helped back a Know Nothing 
who unseated his anti-Nebraska replacement in Lancaster’s Congressional
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district. Stevens was upset that he had been spumed in 1852 and had no qualms
OQturning against the regular Whig party.
Philadelphia’s lone Whig Congressmen Joseph R. Chandler, who had 
voted against the Kansas-Nebraska Act, lost his fight to be re-nominated because 
Know Nothings controlled the district Whig convention. Chandler was a Catholic. 
Outraged regular Whigs then fatally split the party by running Chandler and other 
anti-nativists in local elections. The regular nominee, Job Tyson, picked up the 
support of Know Nothings and thus easily triumphed as Chandler finished a 
distant third. The Philadelphia North American concluded that the nativist issue 
was “more potent and pervasive in its influence, perhaps, than any or all others 
combined.” Philadelphia had once been a stronghold of Whiggery, but after 1854 
Whigs were rare even in the City of Brotherly Love.30
Even in the western part of the state, traditionally the strongest antislavery 
quarter, Know Nothings dealt a deathblow to Whigs. The Democratic Pittsburgh 
Post clearly discerned that the fall elections would be a referendum on Know 
Nothingism not Kansas-Nebraska. The Allegheny Free Soiler who appeared on 
the Whig’s county legislative ticket came in last place. However, all five Know 
Nothing nominees won assembly seats. Many of Pittsburgh’s antislavery leaders 
were outraged with the results. Subsequently, they spumed both the new Know
29 Fawn M. Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens: Scourge o f the South (New York, 1959). Regrettably 
Brodie fails to cover Stevens’s conduct during this election.
30Philadelphia North American, October 11. Quoted in Gienapp, Origins, 147; Frank Gerrity, “The 
Disruption of Philadelphia Whigocracy: Joseph R. Chandler, Anti-Catholicism, and the 
Congressional Election of 1854,” PMHB 111 (1987), 161-94.
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Nothing coalition and the rump of the Whig party. Pittsburgh Whigs fused with
• 11Democrats to defeat Know Nothings during spring municipal elections.
Pennsylvania’s Know Nothing leadership was composed of ‘second tier’ 
politicians, most of whom were former Whigs. Michael Holt notes that 
Pittsburgh’s “Know Nothing leaders were young men who generally came from 
the middle or lower classes.”32 State legislators’ incomes were noticeably less 
than those of their Whig and Democratic counterparts. And, while Whigs always 
attracted the support of wealthy merchants and factory owners, especially in 
Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, Know Nothings claimed virtually no wealthy 
businessmen. Know Nothings sent an inordinate amount of Protestant clergymen 
to the legislature~to the disgust of some Democratic journals- and apparently 
attracted considerably fewer farmers than Democrats or even Whigs. While some 
historians have argued that inadequate leadership contributed to the eventual 
downfall of the Know Nothings, a stronger argument contends that sectional 
pressures and continued friction among former Democrats and Whigs within the 
new coalition were more critical to the downfall of the movement.33
Know Nothings controlled Pennsylvania’s government after the 1854 
elections. It was not clear however that they could unite as a political force that 
was capable of achieving anything. Nor was it clear that they could establish 
themselves as the leading independent anti-Democratic party. Establishing a
31 For an excellent coverage of Pittsburgh politics during the era upon which much of my coverage 
of that city is based see, Michael F. Holt. Forging a Majority: The Formation o f the Republican 
Party in Pittsburgh, 1848-1860 (1969, reprint ed., Pittsburgh, 1990).
32 Holt, Forging a Majority, 155.
33 Anbinder, 131-33.
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government, filling offices, electing a Senator, and passing positive legislation 
that followed the principles that had elected them, proved much harder for Know 
Nothings in 1855 than winning office in 1854.
IV
The Know Nothing coalition in Pennsylvania, and indeed throughout the 
country, immediately faced a myriad of problems. Democrats had learned after 
1852 how quickly the fortunes of success could breed discontent and fracture 
even the most established political parties. Know Nothings, who now preferred to 
be called the American party, faced a daunting task as they attempted to coalesce 
the disparate masses that had elected them in 1854 into a coherent political party. 
Pennsylvania’s Know Nothing contingent included former Whigs, Democrats, 
Free Soilers, Native Americans, as well as prohibitionists arid antiparty men.
Their divergent views of what should be the priorities of the new party created 
great confusion and disagreement within the state Know Nothing coalition during 
1855. However, the intrastate squabbles among Know Nothings pale in 
comparison to the nation-wide struggle to define the character of the American 
party. While Democrats regrouped to face a new opponent whom they quite 
possibly hated more than they ever hated Whigs, Keystone Know Nothings had to 
cope with the problems associated with the attempt to create a new national party. 
That difficult process, coupled with developments in other northern states, would
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challenge their claim to the title of Pennsylvania’s leading anti-Democratic 
party.34
Although the elections of 1854 seem to have turned on nativist outrage 
throughout the nation, the question of how to approach the increasingly divisive 
slavery question quickly divided the Know Nothing coalition and muted the 
nativist issue. Conservatives like former President Millard Fillmore quickly 
determined to use the breakup of the Whig party and the rise of the Know 
Nothings to build a national anti-sectional party. Those Know Nothings who 
opposed the Fillmore faction of the Whig party during the 1850’s, like 
Massachusetts Senator Henry Wilson and Maine congressman Israel Washburn, 
hoped to forge a northern antislavery party. At the same time, many, though not 
all, Know Nothing-Democrats drifted back to their former allegiance. While some 
Know Nothing leaders were able to manipulate the party to their liking in a 
particular state, the attempt to create a national American party in 1855 was an 
unmitigated disaster.
With eyes focused on the 1856 Presidential race, ambitious politicians 
caused great strife within what had essentially been a populist movement. Many 
of those who had been attracted by the antiparty pronouncements of the Know 
Nothings were turned off by the machinations of those who took hold of the 
movement. A majority of first time voters who were attracted to the Know 
Nothings in 1854 quickly resumed their disinterest in voting after their movement
341 will use the term “American party” when referring specifically to the party that attempted to 
consolidate the Know Nothing uprising, but will continue to refer to members as “Know 
Nothings.”
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was taken over by the dreaded wire-pulling politicians. While the tensions 
between national leadership and local interests undermined the strength of the 
Know Nothing movement throughout much of the North, the situation in 
Pennsylvania was particularly detrimental to the long-term health of the new 
American party. While the potential for the Know Nothing coalition to gather 
strength in the state still existed, the external pressure to define the coalition with 
regards to slavery-which was not essential to the growth of the party in 
Pennsylvania-aborted the American party before it could take root in the 
Keystone State. Although the American party and nativism remained popular in 
1855 and afterwards, its viability as a national party was severely eroded by the 
search for an acceptable national platform. Due to the need to keep the state 
within the political mainstream, even the most devoted Keystone nativists were 
forced to abandon the American party when it was destroyed upon the rocks of 
sectionalism. Thus, the sectional pressures that fatally wounded the Know 
Nothing movement nationwide made its continued existence in Pennsylvania, 
where its strictures had been quite popular, virtually pointless.35 However, 
divisions in the new coalition appeared in Pennsylvania even before the sectional 
rift became apparent.
Y
The disunity of the American party in Pennsylvania revealed itself as soon 
as the legislature met in January 1855. The most important order of business was 
the election of a new Senator to replace the conservative Whig, James Cooper.
35 Again, to argue that antislavery was not essential to the 1854 Know Nothing victory is not to 
say that Pennsylvania Know Nothings were proslavery or even conservatives in sectional matters.
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Know Nothings claimed 91 of the joint assembly’s 133 seats, but they had no 
clear choice for Senator.36 A mere eight men resolutely attended the straight Whig 
caucus, but they nonetheless determined to run a candidate. Democrats, who also 
had little chance for success, united on Charles Buckalew. While Cooper tried in 
vain to obtain the votes of former Whig legislators who made up the vast majority 
of the Know Nothings, former Democratic Senator Simon Cameron emerged as 
the frontrunner for the seat. Cameron, who had been a critic of the Catholic 
influence upon the state’s Democratic party, had tepidly supported William Bigler 
in 1854. Behind the scenes he had also been a key proponent of the pro-Nebraska 
platform at that year’s state Democratic convention. Like many other ambitious 
politicians, including Thaddeus Stevens, Cameron joined a Know Nothing lodge 
after the election, expressing his availability to the American party. Others who 
attracted interest for the American nomination included former Whig governor 
William F. Johnston, David Wilmot, and Andrew Gregg Curtin, a leading 
member of the Pollock administration.37
The American caucus, which met on February 9, 1855, could not escape 
the lingering effects of old partisan battles. Many former Whigs could not 
swallow Cameron, while ex-Democrats, to a man, stuck to him. One noted, 
“democratic (Know Nothings). . . will not consent to Whigify so strongly their
36 C. Maxwell Myers “The Rise of the Republican Party in Pennsylvania, 1854-1860”
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University o f Pittsburgh, 1940), 50, lists 17 Democrats, 15 
Whigs, and 1 Native American in the state senate; 48 Whigs, 24 “regular” Democrats, 14 Nativist 
or Anti-Nebraska Democrats, and 3 Free-Soilers.
37 Tyler Anbinder asserts that Cameron’s weakness as an antislavery candidate was critical to his 
eventual defeat. I disagree. His coverage of the Senate race can be found in Nativism and 
Slavery, 150-55; For the involvement o f Cameron in supporting the Kansas-Nebraska act see 
Gienapp, Origins, 172; The fullest coverage of Cameron in 1855 is found in Erwin S. Bradley, 
Simon Cameron, 95-105.
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party after having so secretly elected a Whig Governor!” Four secret ballots 
could not produce a winner, with Cameron leading and Curtin trailing. On the 
fifth try Cameron obtained 46 votes, apparently giving him a one-vote majority. 
However, the total vote numbered 92, with the phantom vote providing the 
margin. Outraged Cameron opponents stormed out of the meeting and renounced 
his nomination. All of the bolters were former Whigs or Free Soilers and it may 
have been one of them who planted the extra vote to defame Cameron whom they 
could easily pin the corruption tag on.38
Those who remained in the American caucus supported Cameron when 
the joint assembly met a few days later, but he consistently fell about eight votes 
short of a majority. However, those Know Nothings who bolted from the caucus 
could not agree on a new candidate, nor could they fuse with holdout Whigs and 
Democrats. Balloting went on for two weeks without a nominee before the
i L
assembly adjourned, then resumed on the 27 before giving up the search as 
hopeless. Both pro and anti Cameron Know Nothings vilified each other for 
breaking up the coalition. A new Senator would not be selected until after a new 
legislature was elected in the fall. Cameron and Curtin, who had lately been one 
of Cameron’s most vocal critics, became lifelong enemies. More importantly,
38 W. F. Caplan to Simon Cameron, Anbinder, 150-51. Some of Cameron’s opponents were 
outraged at the adoption o f a secret ballot, which they charged would not allow them to determine 
who might be affected by Cameron’s dollars. Their outrage as his nomination, whatever the 
legitimacy of their claims—and I tend to doubt the totality o f Cameron’s corruption —can be 
summed up by the following line in the Harrisburg Telegraph, February 21, “Ask us not to support 
a nomination brought about, as we, believe, by the concentrated and cohesive power o f public 
plunder, and the superadded elements of shameless and wholesale private bribery ” Quoted in 
Bradley, 97. Clearly not all Know Nothings believed the charges against Cameron, as he obtained 
votes in the joint assembly from men who did not vote for him before his most vocal critics bolted 
the American caucus.
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with fall elections again looming Pennsylvania’s American party had suffered a 
humiliating setback.39
VI
Further divisions within the American party emerged as 1855 dragged on. 
Although the temperance referendum had narrowly failed in October 1854, Know 
Nothings turned most of their legislative attention to the liquor question. The sale 
of liquor on Sundays was outlawed and liquor license fees were tripled, now 
costing applicants $1,000. The most notorious bill banned the sale of liquor in 
quantities less than a quart. Democrats particularly vilified the “Jug law” because 
it discriminated against small-time operators. Know Nothings also received 
opposition from within their ranks especially in the southeastern part of the state 
where numerous Germans, who opposed temperance, resided. One Philadelphia 
newspaper declared that Know Nothing support for temperance had been “the 
supremest insanity.”40
After its final adjournment the Pittsburgh Gazette declared that the 
legislature had been a “blot on the good name of the people of Pa.” However, the 
problems of the American party were hardly limited to the divisive temperance 
question, or even to feuding party leaders; the situation for the party outside of the 
state was much worse. An attempt to form a conservative anti-sectional Know 
Nothings party crumbled at Philadelphia during June. Many northerners who 
attended the convention were outraged at the adoption of Section Twelve of the 
American party platform, which declared the current slavery laws-including the
39 The origins or the Cameron/Curtin feud are aptly discussed in Bradley, while the coverage by 
McClure in Old Time Notes is also thorough, if colored by McClure’s lifelong support for Curtin.
40 Philadelphia Times quoted in Anbinder, 182.
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hated Kansas-Nebraska Act—final. While statewide reaction revealed that 
Pennsylvanians were not yet prepared to renounce the American party, their 
almost unilateral condemnation of Section Twelve was quick and harsh. “To ask 
the members of the [Know Nothing] order in the Northern States,” declared the 
Harrisburg Herald, “to maintain the existing laws on the subject of slavery as a 
final apd conclusive settlement of that subject, in spirit and in substance is an 
insult to a wronged and injured people.” Even Democrats realized that 
developments in Philadelphia would disrupt the American party. “There are 
thousands in the new party,” declared the Pittsburgh Post, “throughout the state 
with whom the anti-slavery sentiment is stronger than all other political purposes, 
and they will leave the ranks of the [Know Nothings] for more congenial 
fellowship of the anti-slavery party, which is to be rendered more attractive under 
the ill-fitting name of Republican.”41 The Republican party, which had formed in 
Michigan and Wisconsin the previous year, made its first appearance in 
Pennsylvania during 1855, trying to capitalize on the disgust with the Philadelphia 
platform. Keystone Know Nothings however, were not quite ready to surrender 
their power to another organization.
VII
While Republicans in states like Massachusetts and Ohio used the strength
of their state’s old Free Soil parties to pry some Know Nothings away from the
♦
American party after the Philadelphia convention, Pennsylvania lacked such a 
core group of antislavery politicians who could entice such a split. David Wilmot
41 Harrisburg Herald, June 22; Pittsburgh Post, August 6, quoted in Holt, Forging a Majority, 160 
(misdated August 4).
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received very few votes during the senatorial race while Thaddeus Stevens 
covertly worked against the frontrunner, Simon Cameron, because as he told an 
ally, “I did not think him true to freedom.”42 If a strong Republican party was to 
be established in the state, Free Soilers would have to work with Know Nothings- 
-as well as with holdout Whigs--to build a new coalition. Antislavery elements 
would also have to have the strength to force some Know Nothings away from the 
American party and into a Republican party that would compete with both 
Democrats and the Americans. In New York, Ohio, and Massachusetts 
Republicans ran strong tickets against American party nominees, winning in the 
Buckeye State where Salmon P. Chase was elected governor. Pennsylvania 
though, possessed no strong antislavery leader who could compare with Chase, or 
New York’s William H. Seward, or Massachusetts’s Henry Wilson and Charles 
Francis Adams. In Pennsylvania, thanks to radical domination and Know 
Nothings interference, the Republican party did not get off the ground in 1855.
The Pittsburgh Gazette, which had so gleefully predicted an antislavery 
Whig victory in 1854, led the call for a Republican party. Editors Russell Errett 
and D. N. White proposed that Pennsylvania follow the example of Ohio and 
form its own antislavery party. Eventually, with the help of David Wilmot and 
Ohio Republican leaders, a convention to form a Keystone Republican party was 
set for Pittsburgh on September 5,1855. The convention’s platform denounced 
the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and declared that “FREEDOM IS 
NATIONAL AND SLAVERY SECTIONAL.” The antislavery zeal of the
42 Stevens to E. D. Gazzam, December 4, 1856, McPherson papers, LC. Also quoted in Anbinder, 
155.
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platform carried over to the nomination of Passmore Williamson-an abolitionist 
presently incarcerated for a violation of the Fugitive Slave Act-for canal 
commissioner, the only statewide race that fall. Alexander McClure, an attendee 
who still clung to the Whig party, decried Williamson’s nomination as a mistake. 
“A torch applied to a powder magazine could not have been more explosive,” he 
later stated 43
vm
Pennsylvania’s 1855 elections would only select a canal commissioner, a 
new legislature, and a third of the state senate. However, due to the uniqueness of 
the political situation, five candidates would compete for the almost totally 
symbolic canal commission seat.44 A few Whigs still determined to keep their 
party alive, although their sparsely attended September 11th convention consisted 
of disenchanted men without followers who lied “awake at night to decide 
whether they most hated Know Nothingism or Democracy.” Their nominee for 
canal commissioner, the last Whig to participate in a statewide race, ultimately 
received fewer than 2,300 votes. Democrats meanwhile, determined to win back 
their power so they could take the still vacant Senate seat. Despite their losses in 
1854, Keystone Democrats were reinvigorated by their outrageous defeat at the 
hands of an upstart group of bigots. Their apparently harmonious convention 
nominated Arnold Plumer for canal commissioner. “The sober second thought of 
the people will soon dispel the mists of prejudice by which they have been 
surrounded and vindicate that party and its principles, which to-day stands forth
43 McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 237-38.
44 The state Main Line canal was in the process of being sold to one of the states leading railroads.
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the confirmed defender of the constitution and the civil and religious rights of all 
men in this land,” declared Erie’s Democratic newspaper. “Thousands of honest 
Whigs, who have no sympathy with Know Nothingism or Abolitionism,” opined 
Gettysburg’s Democratic organ, “will desert those leaders who have hastily 
betrayed them, and will vote with the Democratic party.”45
Although troubled by the Philadelphia breakup and the rise of the 
Republican party across the North, Know Nothings declared their movement to be 
anything but dead. Sensing the potential of the new party to damage their control 
of the anti-Democratic vote, Know Nothings attempted to smother the 
Pennsylvania Republican party in its infancy. Covertly controlling the party’s 
central committee, which was created in the immediate aftermath of the 
September Republican convention, Know Nothings eroded the party from the 
inside. The subverted Republican committee mandated a new convention in order 
to fuse with the American party; uncommitted Whigs were also invited. Meeting 
in late September, the fusion convention had the support of Simon Cameron, 
Thaddeus Stevens, Governor James Pollock, and most anti-Democratic leaders. 
The original American party nominee was replaced with Thomas Nicholson, a 
member of the Pollock administration who falsely claimed that he was not a 
Know Nothing in order to gamer support from those who opposed that order. The 
Republican and Whig nominees were also formally withdrawn. However, 
Republicans who were disgusted with the infiltration of their state committee and 
rightly doubted Nicholson’s claim of independence, refused to give up
45 Erie Observer, October 21, 1854; Gettysburg Republican Compiler, October 8, 1855.
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Williamson. This small group of radicals, who mostly resided in western 
Pennsylvania, cast the first Republican ballots in state history.46
As the election approached American party editors turned their wrath 
towards holdout Republicans—whom they justifiably alleged were attempting to 
destroy the nativist movement-with just as much vigor as they defamed 
Catholics. Pittsburgh’s Know Nothing journal asked, “Does not everyone in 
voting the Republican ticket, vote foreignism as well as antislavery while the 
supporters of the American nominations in this country are placed on record as 
voting just as strongly antislavery, yet expressing themselves at the same time 
favorably to salutary changes in the naturalization laws?” After the election the 
Harrisburg Herald dejectedly explained: “We have never had a doubt that the 
Republican party was organized solely to defeat Americans and not to advance 
anti-slavery.”47
The results of the October election were mixed at best for fusion 
supporters. The Democratic canal commission candidate, Arnold Plummer, won 
election with 161,281 votes, slightly less than half of the total vote. Nicholson 
received slightly fewer than 150,000 votes, with forty-six percent of the vote. 
Republicans, meanwhile, could not capitalize on dissention within the American 
party that the infamous Section Twelve caused. Williamson received only 7,226 
votes. Although he had formally been withdrawn in September-a predicament 
that no doubt reducing his potential vote-his 2.6 percent of the vote was nowhere
46 Gienapp, Origins, 211-12; Myers, “Republican Party,” 62-71.
47 Pittsburgh Dispatch, quoted in Holt, Forging a  Majority, 165; Harrisburg Herald, October 12, 
1855.
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near the total for Republicans who competed against American party nominees in 
other northern states during 1855 48
Democrats were thrilled at the result. ‘“ Sam’ has retreated to his caverns 
. .. ‘Sambo’ too, with all the inspiration of mad fanaticism, has proved powerless 
to save his midnight brethren,” declared the Erie Observer. Although Democrats 
grouped ‘Sam’ and ‘Sambo’ together, many Know Nothings and Republicans saw 
them as competing, perhaps mortal, entities. “Sambo apparently don’t like Sam,” 
declared a leading Know Nothing organ. In 1855 they had clearly not cooperated 
in the Keystone State.49
Although Know Nothings could boast that they had quashed the 
Republicans in Pennsylvania, they had suffered across the board defeats. While 
Nicholson’s forty-six percent improved on the thirty-three percent of the vote that 
the Know Nothings state supreme court candidate received in a three-way race in 
1854, it fell well short of the fifty-five percent that James Pollock—who combined 
the Know Nothings and Whig vote-received. In addition to the canal commission 
victory, Democrats recaptured the legislature. In January they easily elected 
William Bigler to the Senate seat that Know Nothings had been incapable of 
securing the previous February.50
48 The total vote for canal commissioner, available in most October papers was: Plummer 
(Democrat) 161,281; Nicholson (Fusion) 149,745; Williamson (Republican) 7,226; Cleaver 
(Native American) 4,056; Henderson (Whig) 2,293; Martin (American) 678. Although the Whig, 
Republican, and American candidates were withdrawn at the September 27th fusion convention, 
ballots had been distributed beforehand and there was no way to stop those stubborn, or 
courageous, enough who wanted to vote for them.
49 Erie Observer, October 13; Harrisburg Herald, October 12.
50 The total vote for Nicholson was thirty thousand more than the 1854 supreme court nominee, 
but some 54,000 less than Pollock’s total. The total for Plumer, on the other hand was only 6,000 
less than that o f William Bigler.
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Republican leaders were generally despondent over the situation in 
Pennsylvania. “The short and the long of it,” wrote Pittsburgh’s Russell Errett to 
Salmon Chase, “is that, as things now are, I have no hope of Pennsylvania. I 
cannot see how all parties can co-operate here without a sacrifice of principle or a 
loss of votes sufficient to ensure defeat.”51 As the Presidential election of 1856 
approached there was little hope that Republicans could mount a serious 
campaign in the Keystone State no matter whom they nominated. Likewise, with 
their party on the ropes in many states only one year after their amazing victories- 
-and completely in a shambles as a national unit—Know Nothings also feared the 
worst. Although elated by their victory the Democratic party was not ready to 
declare the 1856 campaign over. Democrats knew that Pennsylvania, which 
looked like a potential lock at the end of 1855, would nonetheless be critical if 
they were to save the Union by electing their man and defeating sectionalism and 
bigotry. They would take no chances.
51 Russell Errett quoted in Holt, Forging a Majority, 213.
CHAPTER 3 
“It Will Be the Rainbow of Peace” 
The Election of James Buchanan, 1856
Pennsylvania played a critical role in the elections of 1856. Many 
observers could agree with the Philadelphian who opined: “As goes Pennsylvania, 
so goes the nation.” As southerners steadfastly insisted, the fate of the Union was 
at stake during the tumultuous contest; to the great relief of thousands, 
Pennsylvania helped provide the crucial victory that Democrats insisted would 
quiet sectional rumblings. Pennsylvanians presented a record vote to their own 
James Buchanan, proving to his partisans that the state still was the key to the 
unity of the nation. Yet Buchanan’s majority was not as natural or overwhelming 
as it may have seemed. Several circumstances that helped secure Buchanan’s 
victory would not be applicable four years later.52
In early 1856 the Republican party secured its first great victory. The 
election of Nathaniel P. Banks as Speaker of the House further split the American 
party, which had already had a bad year, and helped launch the Republican party 
towards dominance in the North. In February Republicans held their first national
52 Samual Peassor[?] to James Buchanan, May 29, Buchanan papers, HSP.
meeting in Pittsburgh, where the party organized to prepare a run for President. 
However, the party faced long odds in Pennsylvania. “The opposition to 
Democracy was not coherent, but was floating around promiscuously as old line 
Whigs, antislavery Democrats, Know Nothings and Republicans,” remembered 
Alexander K. McClure. At the time of the Pittsburgh meeting there existed 
virtually no party structure in the state, and almost no resident of the populous 
southeastern part of the state, including Philadelphia, claimed to be a Republican. 
However, the political situation was hardly set in stone as 1856 opened. Although 
the Republican party appeared stillborn after its first Pennsylvania campaign, an 
abrupt intensification of sectional tensions during the winter and spring won the 
party countless new devotees.53
I
The eruption of violence in Kansas—allegedly the direct consequence of 
dough-faced Democratic policy—added considerable fodder to the editorial 
arsenals of Republican spokesmen across the North. Violent rogues, mostly from 
Missouri, with the whole-hearted support of powerful southern slaveholders, 
invaded the territory in order to intimidate any who would oppose their intents. 
The South’s power structure had apparently determined that the fertile fields of 
Kansas would be infected with the plague of slavery, violently if need, be. 
Although northern Douglas Democrats had pleaded that fearing the possible 
spread of the peculiar institution onto the Great Plains was unreasonable due to 
the region’s dry climate, the so-called invasion of Kansas convinced many 
northerners that no natural obstacle would stop the spread of slavery. Bleeding
53 Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 245.
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Kansas was a golden campaign issue for the burgeoning Republican party. Instead 
of the rather hypothetical arguments over the possibilities of the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act that dominated the political debate in 1854 and ‘55, Republicans could point 
to actual physical assaults upon freedom. With the opening of the physical 
struggle for Kansas, Pennsylvania’s Republican party secured a critical base of 
supporters.
For the third consecutive year, the Pittsburgh Gazette was at the forefront 
of Pennsylvania’s political antislavery movement. The principles of the new 
party, which were laid down at the Pittsburgh meeting, filled the pages of the 
Gazette in early 1856. One of the three platforms of the Pittsburgh meeting 
declared: “we feel it our imperative and solemn duty not only to protest against 
this dangerous and arrogant assumption of power and perversion of the spirit and 
intentions of our Constitutional framers, but resist to the utmost of our abilities 
those high-handed acts of injustice, tyranny, and oppression of our rulers, who . . .  
are endeavoring to crush out the spirit of liberty in the Free State settlers in 
Kansas and elsewhere.” Enacting a political program that would protect the 
Kansas and Nebraska territories from the encroachment of slavery was the central 
concern of the Republican party. “We will support by every lawful means our 
brethren in Kansas in their constitutional and manly resistance to the usurped 
authority of their lawless invader,” the Gazette declared in March.54
The violence in Kansas, and the apparent culpability of the Democratic 
Pierce administration in the attempt to spread slavery, disgusted many
54 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 21, March 23. All newspapers and correspondence cited in this 
chapter are from 1856 unless otherwise noted.
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Pennsylvanians who had resisted the formation of a Republican party only the 
year before. During the early spring of 1856 the ranks of the new party swelled to 
include such notable politicians as Simon Cameron, Thaddeus Stevens, Andrew 
G. Curtin, and Galusha Grow among others. But the greatest breakthrough for the 
Republican party occurred during May when two virtually unprecedented 
incidents stunned the nation.55
On May 21, a party of proslavery Missourians raided the settlement of 
Lawrence Kansas, destroying property and harassing local opponents of slavery. 
Before reports of the raid reached the East, the news of the near fatal beating of 
Senator Charles Sumner by a South Carolina Representative named Brooks, 
outraged many northerners who had never supported Sumner’s radical antislavery 
positions. “It ill becomes any man,” the nonpartisan Philadelphia Public Ledger 
declared, “who respects the laws of the country, to lead his countenance to such 
outrages as that perpetrated by Mr. Brooks.” These dual offenses, which splashed 
across the pages of northern newspapers at virtually the same time, helped 
convince many Pennsylvanians that civil liberties were under assault from a 
brutish, undemocratic power that dwelled in their midst. “The brutal outrage on 
Senator Sumner,” opined a nativist paper, “and the pro-slavery ruffians of Kansas, 
have made in the North a hundred ffee-soilers, where yesterday there existed
55 Although Cameron apparently joined the Republicans sometime before the national contention, 
his shrewd silence left many correspondents guessing over whom he would support for President 
well into the summer. L. Rightmyer to Simon Cameron, January 24, June 13, Charles Kelly to 
Cameron, June 16, Levi Reynolds to Cameron, June 30, Cameron papers, DCHS.
56 Philadelphia Public Ledger, July 17; Pottsville, Miner's Journal, May 31, June 7 (quotation), 
also quoted in Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 214; The Erie Observer, May 31, placed most of 
the blame for Sumner’s beating on his offensive speech.
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Civil War scholars have long recognized the importance of Bleeding 
Kansas and the attack on Senator Sumner to the quick rise of the Republican party 
in 1856. The events of May helped cement a theory in many northern minds that 
became one of the Republican party’s core arguments. The slave power doctrine 
achieved unprecedented validity during 1856. According to its testaments, 
southerners, who were determined to enforce their view of labor throughout the 
nation, dominated the national government with the help of northern Democratic 
dupes, and were systematically attempting to ensure that the whole of the United 
States would be turned into a slaveholding empire. None of the allegedly 
proslavery bills recently passed by Congress could compare to the May outrages 
as an illustration of the extralegal ways in which southerners were attempting to 
ensure slavery’s future.
The slave power argument was ever-present in Pennsylvania Republican 
propaganda. Party founder David Wilmot clearly evoked this theory shortly after 
attending the Pittsburgh organizing meeting. “The slave-holders constituting less 
than one in fifty of the free population of the country, control all the functions of 
the General Government,” he declared. Even the North American, Philadelphia’s 
conservative Republican paper, could insist that the South wanted to make 
“slavery as wide as the national domain and as lasting as any mere human 
institution on earth.” Harrisburg’s new Republican paper wished to attract men to 
the party if only to battle the slave power. “A time has arrived in this country 
when all true patriots, all sound, conservative politicians, and all moral and 
religious men should stand shoulder to shoulder in opposition to the aggressions
51
of the slave-holders aided by Northern demagogues.” The increasing impudence 
of the South indicated that the North was losing the struggle for the soul of the 
nation. If a Senator could be nearly beaten to death to the applause of southerners,
57what line would not be crossed in order to serve the appetite of the slave power?
Northern Republicans could not accept the triumph of the slave power for 
many reasons. Most insisted that the slave power was in direct opposition to the 
principles of American democracy and republicanism. Wilmot explained that, 
“slavery assails those fundamental truths declared to be self evident in the 
Declaration of Independence.” The extralegal violence that the South had 
apparently resorted to in order to perpetrate slavery outraged many persons across 
the North. The South was additionally accused of openly assaulting the freedom 
of speech, brutally oppressing any local attempt to question its institutions. Many 
Republican leaders though felt that the slave power’s greatest threat was its attack 
on the northern labor system. An important aspect of Republican rhetoric 
involved convincing workingmen that stopping the slave power would benefit 
their welfare.58
Pennsylvania Republicans constantly evoked Free Labor principles. 
Republican leadership constantly attacked southerners who ridiculed northern 
workingmen and called them wage slaves. Former Democrat William Kelley 
declared that southerners “think it a great deal better that capital should own labor
57 Wilmot quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, March 28; Harrisburg Daily Telegraph October 7; 
Philadelphia North American, October 14, quoted William E. Gienapp, Origins, 364.
58 Pittsburgh Gazette, August 20; David Wilmot quoted in Charles B. Going, David Wilmot: Free 
Soiler (New York, 1924), 481. Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Men: The Ideology o f the 
Republican Party Before the Civil War (Oxford, 1970), is the best source on the Free Labor views 
of the Republican party.
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than hire it! Pray, will you not go and sell yourselves my fellow citizens.” 
Democrats had traditionally attracted the majority of the urban vote, where most 
laborers resided, but Republicans felt that they were now vulnerable. “The 
Buchanier Party of the North,” claimed the Pittsburgh Gazette, “is fast subsiding 
not only into the use of the southern slang about the workingman of the free 
states, but into the convention so frankly avowed in the South, that workingmen 
ought to be slaves.” Republicans generally also insisted that Free Labor could 
benefit the South as well. “In the great contest for Free Labor,” insisted the 
Gazette, “they have as much at stake as we [the North] have.”59
Although slavery was at the forefront of the sectional debate, the fate of 
the slave troubled only a minority of Republicans. Few Pennsylvania newspapers 
openly dwelled on the fate of those most clearly affected by the slavery debate. 
While overt racism was only occasionally expressed in most Republican sheets, 
attitudes towards African Americans were rarely unprejudiced. The Pittsburgh 
Gazette was on of Pennsylvania’s more radical papers, but it was not willing to 
make the plight of the slave a priority. “We do not suppose that any honest 
Republican desires to oppress the colored race or to inflict upon them further 
injustice, but we trust they would prefer to lighten their heavy burden. But the 
present contest is one which effects the colored race indirectly and remotely.” 
Republicans were concerned with winning elections. Egalitarianism was not 
popular in 1850’s Pennsylvania.60
59 Kelley quoted in William Dusinberre Civil War Issues in Philadelphia, 1861-65 (Philadelphia
1974), 34; Pittsburgh Gazette, September 13, 18, February 23.
60 Pittsburgh Gazette, September 17.
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Keystone Republicans also had to address continuing religious bigotry. 
Much of the Republican campaign in early1856 concentrated on capturing former 
Know Nothings who were increasingly disgusted with the dough-faced slant of 
the American party. “There is an earnest desire, prevailing men of all parties to 
have union on some terms,” declared the Pittsburgh Gazette in March. Most 
Republicans insisted that nativism had ceased to be the cause of the moment. The 
Gazette declared that Millard Fillmore-the leading aspirant for the American 
Presidential nomination, who had spent much of 1855 in Europe—was out of 
touch with the current political climate. “Had he been in the United States instead 
of on the balmy shores of the Mediterranean during the past six months, he would 
have seen and felt that the time for ignoring the question of slavery is past.” The 
American party had already lost supporters after the 1855 Philadelphia convention 
and House speaker election; the nomination of Fillmore made the party more 
vulnerable to defections.61
In March 1856 Pennsylvania’s Republicans took a giant stride towards 
capitalizing on the disruption of the American party. Members of both parties 
agreed to hold a joint nominating convention to form a “Union” ticket. Those 
attending the Union meeting at Harrisburg agreed that only one opposition ticket 
would be in the field, thus giving both groups a much better chance to defeat 
Democrats whom they both disliked. Combining antislavery rhetoric, which 
keyed on Kansas outrages, and nativism, the convention nominated three men for 
the statewide offices at stake for October. A conservative Whig was nominated
61 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 28, June 16. The problems o f the American party will be covered in 
the next section.
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for canal commissioner, a former Democrat for surveyor general, and a member 
of the American party for auditor general. Although some Republicans were
disappointed with the favors given to nativists, the Union convention seemed to
62bode well for the possibility of unified Presidential ticket for November.
The national Republican convention, as agreed upon after February’s 
Pittsburgh meeting, convened June 17th in Philadelphia. Although Pennsylvania 
Republicans were optimistic that the party could win the state’s Presidential 
electors, there was little consensus that a sure winner could be found among the 
aspirants for the party nomination. Many Pennsylvanians favored Supreme Court 
Justice John McLean, an Ohioan who maintained only a minimal adherence to 
Republican principles. McLean was the favorite of Thaddeus Stevens and several 
of Pennsylvania’s eighty-one delegates. However, most Republicans did not 
consider him a serious candidate. At the same time, few Keystone Republicans 
backed William H. Seward or Salmon P. Chase, two of the leading candidates.
After adopting a strong antislavery platform, the Philadelphia convention 
nominated John C. Fremont, a famous western explorer with little political 
experience, as the party’s first presidential candidate. New Jersey Congressman 
William Dayton received the Vice-Presidential nomination, although many 
conventioneers felt that William Johnston, the nominee of the breakaway North 
American convention, should have been chosen. Despite the somewhat surprising 
nominations, Pennsylvania’s leading Republican newspapers responded positively
62 John F. Coleman, The Disruption o f The Pennsylvania Democracy, 1848-1860 (Harrisburg,
1975), 89-90; Pittsburgh Gazette, March 26.
63 E. Joy Morris to John M. Clayton, May 11, Clayton Papers, LC; Thomas Allen to Thaddeus 
Stevens, June 4, Stevens papers, LC.
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to the convention. Confidence resonated from leading journals. The Harrisburg 
Telegraph insisted that Fremont’s election would “be a barrier against the 
encroachments of the slave-holding power, [success] will give a large and fertile 
territory to the ffeedmen of the North.”64
The Fremont nomination however, was met with some apprehension in 
Pennsylvania. It seemed clear that winning support in conservative Philadelphia 
would be difficult. “There is no doubt that McLean would have been a popular 
nominee in this city and that Fremont is just now devoid at that strength so far as 
[Philadelphia] is concerned.” 65 Although Pennsylvania Republicans still had a 
considerable task before them if they wanted to secure the full opposition vote, 
the difficulty of their quest was eased by the continued disintegration of the 
American party.
n
At the moment when the Republican party was forming in Pittsburgh, the 
American party was again coming apart--if not dying—across the state in 
Philadelphia. At a time when sectional tensions continued to rise, the American 
party was still hoping to ignore sectional problems as it limped into its national 
convention. Amazingly, the party had yet to come to an agreement on how to 
address the Kansas-Nebraska Act. When the party did try to take some kind of 
stand on pressing sectional questions, it tended to assume southern views. Across 
the North, including Pennsylvania, the American party was increasingly subject to 
Republican ridicule. After the division over section twelve of the 1855 platform,
64 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 7; Pittsburgh Gazette, June 21; For the Republican platform see, 
Philadelphia Public Ledger, June 18.
65 Pittsburgh Gazette, June 21.
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and the victory of Nathaniel Banks in the Speaker’s race, Republicans felt that 
many northern Americans would simply surrender to the younger party. After 
February 1856, it seemed that this scenario was quite possible.
Few observers felt that American party could survive its February national 
nominating convention intact. Some convention attendees felt that the party was 
too divided to even risk a nominee so early in the year. But most party members 
felt that dissolving the convention would only meet with disaster. “If we should 
dissolve [illegible] without nominating, the American party must become 
subservient to the Black Republican party,” fretted one supporter. The fears over 
the cohesion of the party proved quite valid as it again split.66
Only two men had a chance at the nomination as the convention opened 
on Washington’s birthday: former President Milliard Fillmore, and New York 
businessman George Law. To the disgust of many of the founders of the Know 
Nothings movement, and those who whished to include some antislavery 
principles in the party-most of whom favored Law-Fillmore received the 
nomination for President. Many within the old Know Nothing movement 
regretted the new conservative neo-Whig makeup of the American party, which 
the Fillmore nomination seemed to indicate. But those most upset by Fillmore’s 
victory were northerners who despised Fillmore’s role in the passage of the 
Compromise of 1850.67 “We infer,” concluded the Pittsburgh Gazette upon 
hearing of the nomination, “that Northern Doughfacism and Slavery have
66 G. P. James to John M. Clayton, [no date, but dispatched from Philadelphia, 1856] Clayton 
papers, LC.
7 Andrew Jackson Donelson, a nephew of Old Hickory, was chosen for the Vice Presidential slot. 
A sparsely attended Louisville, Kentucky convention o f holdout Whigs also nominated Fillmore.
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triumphed over the Anti-Slavery sentiment in the American party.” Even 
Democratic papers saw the nomination as a “southern triumph.”
The breakup commenced even before the nominating process began. A 
large number of northern delegates left the convention rather than see Fillmore 
receive the nomination. Calling themselves North Americans, the seceding 
delegates condemned the American platform for not opposing the Missouri 
Compromise repeal and called for their own nominating convention in June.
Many interested observers believed that fusion between the bolters and 
Republicans would occur easily, but North Americans wanted assurance that they 
could retain their nativist identity and receive due compensation from 
Republicans if they were to support their candidate in November. The failure to 
secure a smooth union between the two groups caused the opposition much grief 
in Pennsylvania.69
The North American convention met shortly before the Republican 
convention opened its doors. Agreements between Republican and North 
American leaders led to the nominations of Nathaniel P. Banks and William F. 
Johnston. As was apparently stipulated, Banks withdrew after Republicans 
nominated Fremont, but most North Americans thought that Republicans would 
drop William Dayton and accept Johnston as their Vice-Presidential candidate. 
The refusal to support the former Pennsylvania governor upset many who hoped 
to secure a relatively painless fusion between the two groups. But many 
Republican party leaders outside of Pennsylvania felt that they could not afford to
68 Pittsburgh Gazette, February 25; Gettysburg Republican Compiler, March 3.
69Pittsburgh Gazette, February 23, 26, 28; Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 238-40.
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be so closely linked with the nativist movement and they rejected accepting 
Johnston. Republicans counted on receiving a large number of German 
immigrants in key western states, but many Keystone voters were disappointed by 
the failure of Republicans to show more deference to the nativist movement.70
Meanwhile the fortunes of the American party continued to decline. Amid 
allegations of gross mismanagement over the course of their two-year reign in 
government, the party suffered defeat in Philadelphia’s city election where 
Richard Vaux recaptured the mayor’s office. Americans also preformed poorly in
   71
New England’s spring state elections. Nativism though retained a powerful 
interest in Pennsylvania that could prove costly if the national Republican party 
tried to distance itself too much. The anti-Catholic dogma of the Know Nothings 
was noticeable in many Pennsylvania Republican sheets. Editorials often 
combined anti-southern rhetoric with anti-Catholicism. “The elements of the 
Slave Power in this State,” complained the Harrisburg Telegraph, “comprise the 
entire Catholic vote.” Pennsylvania Republicans quickly learned to dislike 
Democrats for attracting the great majority of the Catholic and immigrant vote, 
consistently condemning the “thoughtless” fealty of Catholics. Moderate nativists 
could feel confident that some of their concerns would be addressed even if their 
original party dissolved.72 But many former-Pennsylvania Know Nothings were 
unconvinced by the actions of Republican leadership during 1856. The failure of
70Pittsburgh Gazette, June 19, 23, July 2; On the Vice Presidency controversy, T. Weed to Simon 
Cameron, November 12, Cameron papers, LC; Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 244; Gienapp, 
Origins, passim.
71 The result in Philadelphia was: Vaux-D, 29,534 Moore-A, 25,445. No Republican candidate 
competed. For New England’s Elections see Gienapp, Origins, 273-278.
72 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 25. The Philadelphia North American also had strong tinges of 
nativism.
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the Republican party to attract a larger percentage of support from former Know 
Nothings cost them the election in 1856.
Both Democrats and Republicans hoped to receive votes from the
T\disintegrating American party. Yet both parties also felt compelled to ridicule 
those Americans who choose to side with their enemies. The Democratic 
Pennsylvanian was quite tom in what attitude to adopt. Although the paper felt 
that the alliance between nativists and Republicans would not last, it was still 
disgusted to see the two groups working together declaring: “the bargain . .. 
between certain false Fillmore men, who profess to be for Fillmore, and are 
anxious only to get themselves into place at the expense of national principles, 
and the straight out Fremont leaders, is evidently a mere rope of sand, and will be 
blown into the air in a very short time.”74 Democrats were often placed in an 
awkward position as they saw the American party break up. They hoped to secure 
disillusioned members, but felt compelled to ridicule Republicans for seeking 
nativist support and often criticized those Americans who chose to side with 
Fremont as sellouts. The same Pennsylvanian, which seemed so upset at 
Americans who sold out Fillmore, could also insist that, “the object of the 
Fillmore leaders in Pennsylvania is to assist the Abolitionists to elect their State 
ticket in October.”75
73 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 11; For Democrats: Pittsburgh Post, November 1; George A. 
Crawford to William Bigler, August 9, Bigler papers, HSP; Benjamin Parke to James Buchanan, 
August 7, Buchanan papers, HSP.
74 Pennsylvanian quoted Pittsburgh Post, September 17.
15Pennsylvanian quoted, Gettysburg Republican Compiler, July 28. Jeremiah Sullivan Black was 
an especially harsh critic of Know Nothings even though other Democrats pleaded for their 
support. J. S. Black to James Buchanan, July 12, Buchanan papers, HSP; The Union-loving 
Fillmore often earned personal praise from Democrats see: Gettysburg Republican Compiler, 
October 6.
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Despite moments of schizophrenia when dealing with the American party, 
Democrats were wholly attuned to the seriousness of their position. As they saw 
one mortal enemy slip into premature decline another was threatening the very 
existence of the Union they loved so much. Pennsylvania Democrats entered 1856 
much stronger than the national organization. Consequently, many eyes turned to 
the old Keystone State for rescue. In March 1856 the Pennsylvania Democratic 
state convention recommended that the national party nominate James Buchanan 
for President. His experience, his integrity, his conservatism, and his availability 
all combined to make him the front-runner to rescue the Union from the dual 
demons of American party nativism and Black-Republican abolitionism.
m
Although Franklin Pierce still had support for a second term in the South 
and among some New Englanders, his troubled Presidency had earned him few 
devoted supporters in Pennsylvania. The old bachelor of Wheatland seemed to be 
the answer. “A refusal to nominate you,” insisted a Somerset Democrat, “would 
as certainly bring defeat to us in Pennsylvania.”76 Buchanan had a long record of 
national service and was generally well respected in most political circles. Unlike 
Stephen A. Douglas, another leading contender for the nomination, no direct link 
could be made between Buchanan and the Kansas trouble. Others felt that the 
sixty-five year old simply deserved a term as President for all his years of
77service.
76 Isaac Hangas to James Buchanan, May 5, Buchanan papers, HSP. “Wheatland” was the name 
of Buchanan’s Lancaster home.
77 Philip S. Klein, James Buchanan: A Biography (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1962).
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Although Democrats opened the year with apparently little to fear from 
the underdeveloped Republican party, the rise of sectional tensions worried many 
in Pennsylvania including Buchanan: “We shall, I firmly believe triumph in the 
conflict and save the Union,” he assured Virginia’s Henry Wise, “but . . .  we shall
78have a more bitter fight in front than we have ever yet encountered.” The 
Kansas turmoil was a serious problem for many Democrats, but party rhetoric 
focused on questioning the validity of Republican complaints. “We know not, 
when receiving Kansas news,” stated the usually nonpartisan Philadelphia Public 
Ledger, “whether we are getting real facts or only the exaggerated distortions of 
every crazy partisan.” After the ‘sack’ of Lawrence the Erie Observer scoffed, 
“the abolitionists wish these rumors true, because they make capital for their
” 79party.
Pennsylvania’s Democrats had to respond to Republican’s Free Labor 
arguments as well as the Kansas troubles. “Workingmen,” declared the 
Pittsburgh Post, “be not blinded to your own home interests by a senseless and 
lying clamor about a remote territory that will be a free State, and peaceably too, 
if the abolitionists let it alone.” Northern Democrats were continually 
embarrassed by comments coming from their southern brethren. Few were willing 
to defend southerners’ more outrageous acts. However, Democrats would not sit 
quietly and let Republicans agitate the slavery question. Many felt that
78 James Buchanan quoted, Myers, Republican Party, 113.
79 Philadelphia Public Ledger, May 26; Erie Observer, May 31; Also see, B. W. Lacey to William 
Bigler, August 19; W. Hutter to James Buchanan, June 9, and William Bigler to Buchanan, June 
28, Buchanan papers, HSP.
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Republicans opened themselves up to racist attacks when they criticized the 
institution.80
Even if slavery was not popular in the Keystone State, Republican 
antislavery commitments could still be a political liability with the state’s racist 
electorate. Racism was at the core of many Democratic attacks on the 
Republicans. The Pennsylvanian, based in Philadelphia, was arguably the most 
virulently racist Democratic organ in the state. “If free niggers are so elevated by 
the mere nomination of Fremont,” it stated in October, “their overbearing 
insolence would be insufferable if there was any probability of his being elected. 
White people would hardly be allowed to trespass upon the street by these 
odoriferous Republicans.” The Pittsburgh Post, which was more restrained in its 
racism than most Democratic organs nonetheless relied on it. “There is no 
disguising now the fact that the one practical element of the Black Republican 
party is to abolish slavery and elevate the negro race to an equal social and
81political condition with the white race,” it declared shortly before the election.
While Democrats nobly defended Catholics and European immigrants 
constantly, they could find few good things to say about African Americans be 
they slave or free. “Know Nothings and abolitionists—what a hideous 
amalgamation of treasons!” declared Jeremiah S. Black. Racism was a devoutly 
held belief for many Pennsylvanians, and Philadelphia was arguably the most
80 Pittsburgh Post, October 16 (quotation), September 15.
81 Pennsylvanian, October 11, quoted in William Dusinberre, Civil War Issues in Philadelphia,
1856-1865, 28; Pittsburgh Post, October 16; James Buchanan to William Bigler, August 19,
Bigler papers, HSP; For attacks on slavery from a Democratic pastor see Gettysburg Republican 
Compiler, January 14.
82 For one of the numerous examples of Democratic hatred o f nativism see: Gettysburg Republican 
Compiler, February 4.
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racist place in the North. The Dispatch, one of the city’s nonpartisan papers, 
succinctly summed up its opinions: “it would be beneficial for the country if the 
whole black population could be removed from the soil to some other clime.” 
Such attitudes help explain the power of the Democratic party in Pennsylvania, 
but racism was hardly the only weapon the party held.
The Democratic national convention completed its business relatively 
smoothly. Meeting in Cincinnati during the early days of June the convention 
preformed the party a considerable service by presenting a unified front. Even 
with the turmoil of the Pierce administration Democrats faced nowhere near the 
contentiousness that would plague them four years later. To the great delight of 
many in Pennsylvania, James Buchanan received the nomination. “I give Fremont 
all possible credit,” admitted leading Pittsburgh Democrat William Wilkins, “but I 
have no idea of placing him over such a man as Mr. Buchanan.”
Republicans were understandably less impressed with the nomination. 
“Buchanan is an Old Fogey of the worst kind,” declared the Pittsburgh Gazette, 
“but the battle will be fought on the great question of the day, on the issues 
between Freedom and Slavery.”85 Slavery remained at the center of Republican 
attacks upon Democrats. Even if Pennsylvania did not maintain the anti slavery 
passions of states like Massachusetts and Ohio, Republicans still used the 
campaign against the spread of slavery as the base of their arguments. What were
83 J. S. Black to James Buchanan, August 11, Buchanan papers, HSP; Dispatch, May 25, quoted, 
Dusinberre, Civil War Issues, 44-45. James Buchanan was not a demagogue; his racism could 
hardly be compared to that of Stephen Douglas.
84 Pittsburgh Post, June 10, August 29 (quotation); W. McLean, to William Bigler, June 28, Bigler 
papers, HSP.
Pittsburgh Gazette, June 9.
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perceived as the proslavery planks of the Cincinnati platform where constantly 
attacked. One placard at a Pittsburgh Republican rally reportedly read: “Wanted 
1000 Niggers for Wheatland. A plank from the Cincinnati platform.”
Pennsylvania Democrats however, constantly defended their party’s policies in 
Kansas, insisting that their party was not determined to expand slavery. “That Mr. 
Buchanan is in favor of extending slavery every one {sic} knows to be a 
falsehood,” insisted the Pittsburgh Post. “No man could assert a greater falsehood 
than to say that the Democracy of the Free States are in favor of Slavery in any 
shape or form,” declared Franklin County’s Democratic paper.86
The campaign of 1856 would take on revolutionary qualities in 
Pennsylvania. All parties did their best to alert voters to the seriousness of the 
political situation, frequently harkening back to the days when the nation 
struggled for its independence to make their point. Both Americans and 
Democrats cloaked themselves in the flag and insisted they could save the Union 
from radicalism. But it was Republicans who seemed to evoke the most stirring 
portraits of the Revolution. “Politically, we are now as much in a state of 
revolution as our fathers were in 1776,” declared the Pittsburgh Gazette.
“Freemen of Beaver County,” cried the Beaver Argus, “[the] words of Jefferson 
now appeal to you. Fremont is their representative—the representative of 
freedom. Buchanan is the representative of their opposite—the representative of
86 Rally reported on by Pittsburgh Gazette, September 18; Pittsburgh Post, July 28; Chambersburg 
Valley Spirit, quoted Gettysburg Republican Compiler, September 15.
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slavery.” Sectional tensions had created a very sharp atmosphere in the Keystone 
State. But Pennsylvanians still wanted a peaceful solution in 1856.87
IV
In addition to the threatening section tensions, the Presidential campaign 
was also quite vigorous due to the highly fluid nature of party membership.
Unlike the years before 1852 and after 1860, the chances that a voter would 
switch parties were high in 1856. For Republicans, and Americans dissatisfied 
with the nomination of Fillmore, the major struggle of the campaign was forming 
a unified Presidential ticket. At the outset of the year Republicans seemed to be 
operating from a disadvantage. A state committee that was more concerned with 
nativism than antislavery handicapped the party severely. But by the summer even 
William Jessup, who had helped undermine the party the year before, was ready 
to admit that the slavery question should be at the forefront of any unified 
opposition party. The reports after the first attempt to unify the anti-Democratic 
forces in the state were largely positive. The Gazette declared that the March 26 
Harrisburg Union convention proved that although the opposition in Pennsylvania 
was divided, “a large majority of the freemen of this State are agreed upon the 
momentous issues forced upon the country by the repeal of the Missouri 
Compromise.” Editor D. N. White, who had hesitated in his support for fusion 
with former Know Nothings, was pleased that Republican* principles apparently
87 Beaver Argus, October 17; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 4. The Gettysburg Star and Banner claimed 
Fremont sought, “to restore the National policy which Washington and his compeers inaugurated.” 
Quoted Gettysburg Republican Compiler, September 22.
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would find their way into the platform of the state’s opposition party, even if it 
would not be officially referred to as the Republican party.88
Although the American party’s support had dissipated considerably across 
the North, the party still retained a considerable and critical number of resilient 
supporters throughout Pennsylvania. Many observers felt that their votes would 
account for the difference at the polls. But even if the votes of former Know 
Nothings could provide the margin of victory in October, there was no guarantee 
that they would back Fremont in the far more important November election. 
Simon Cameron declared we must “convince the people that Fremont can be 
elected and that Fillmore, as is the truth, has not the shadow of a chance.” Some 
former backers of Fillmore were convinced; Republicans newspapers constantly 
printed the names of papers or notable persons who made the switch. The 
proslavery aggressions of the South were the most consistent reason for the 
change that papers cited. The Gettysburg Star and Banner explained as it 
announced its switch to Fremont that the, “fixed purpose of the Southern 
politicians to convert the National Government into an engine for the furtherance 
of the purposes of Slavery propagandists, can no longer be doubted.” 89
However, not all Fillmore men could be convinced. For as Alexander 
McClure later stated, “a large proportion of the Know Nothings of the North were 
strongly conservative on the slavery question.” Correspondents consistently 
pressed Simon Cameron, who had many connections with old Know Nothings, to
88 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 29; Stephen Mills to Simon Cameron, August 8, Cameron papers 
DCHS.
89 Simon Cameron to Edwin Morgan, and Gettysburg Star and Banner, June 27 both quoted in 
Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 239, 227; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 17.
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do what he could to play down the influence of Republicanism and create a 
unified Presidential ticket. “It would fully commit all the conservative 
Americans,” pleaded one such correspondent, “many of whom will not support a 
ticket selected by the Republicans alone.” No unified Presidential ballot existed 
despite the presence of a united state ticket. Consequently, pessimism began to set 
in on the Republican side. Pennsylvania Democrats on the other hand were 
confident that such holdouts would be enough to hand them victory.90
A core group of Fillmore supporters refused to form a unified Presidential 
ticket. These men usually despised the antislavery radicalism of the Republican 
party. Some of the leaders of the Fillmore group even secretly worked with 
Democratic chairman John W. Forney to assure Republican defeat. Even more 
outrageously, elements within the American party attempted to ‘slander’ John C. 
Fremont by claiming that he was a Catholic. Pennsylvania Republicans devoted 
scores of editorials and were forced to spend valuable campaign funds to account 
for this poisonous accusation. “I do not see that anything can be said with regard 
to Col. Fremont’s religion that has not already been said,” an exasperated Horace 
Greeley explained to Simon Cameron. Some Republicans countered these 
accusations by pointing out that a Catholic convent educated Fillmore’s daughter 
and that he had had a positive meeting with the Pope while visiting Rome.91
90 Alexander K. McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 245-46; Stephen Mills to Simon Cameron, August 
28, Cameron papers, DCHS; Nimrod Strickland August 11, to Bigler, John Veit to Bigler, August 
2, John C. Evans, September 7, to Bigler, Bigler papers, HSP.
91Horace Greeley to Simon Cameron, September 15, Cameron Papers, LC; Pittsburgh Gazette, 
July 21, September 6. A Catholic priest married Fremont and his wife Jessis, but he remained a 
Protestant.
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Most Republicans were outraged by the obstructionism of the Fillmore 
men. “The feud is now pretty bitter between the Fillmore and Fremont men,” 
noted Democratic Congressman J. Glancey Jones. But some Republicans would 
later admit that much of the blame for the schism rested with their state’s own 
party forces. “I do not know to what extent the straight ticket will injure us,” 
admitted Stevens. “Our fatal mistake was delaying to form our ticket until it is too 
late to smash the Sanderson Party,” he stated in reference to the straight-Fillmore 
leader.92
In addition to the difficulty attracting former Know Nothings, Keystone 
Republicans also had to deal with Democratic accusations that they were Union- 
threatening radicals. Most Republicans insisted that the Union faced no real 
threat from southern loudmouths. “As to treats of disunion and serration,” stated 
the Philadelphia North American, “they are simply nonsense. The South cannot 
exist without the North.” The North American insisted that if the South were to 
secede, the North would have to be called upon to rescue it from slave
94insurrections.
Both the Republican and Democratic camps exulted over their success in 
winning converts during the 1856 campaign. Democrats took particular pride in 
announcing the conversion of former Whigs to the Jacksonian standard. The most 
notable Pennsylvania Whigs who agree to support Buchanan were William B. 
Reed, John Randall, Joseph R. Chandler, and the Ingersoll family of
92 J. G. Jones to James Buchanan, July 20. Buchanan papers, HSP; Thaddeus Stevens to E. D. 
Gazzam, August 24, McPherson papers, LC.
93 Pittsburgh Post, July 19; James Buchanan to William Bigler, August 19, Bigler papers, HSP;
John W. Fomey to Henry Wise, July 8, Forney papers, LC.
94 Philadelphia North American, August 11, quoted in Dusinberre, Civil War Issues, 38.
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Philadelphia.95 Democrats also claimed to have secured the votes of former 
Know Nothings, some of who may have left the Democratic party temporarily in 
1854. Vying for the support of former Whigs was almost as important as the 
attempts to gain the vote of former American party supporters. The Whig vote 
may have been a decisive factor in the Democratic victory, especially in the 
southeastern part of the state. Most former Whigs though, either aligned with the 
Republicans, or left the electorate.96
While former Whigs made up the majority of the Pennsylvania Republican 
party, a sizable minority were ex-Democrats. Along with the former Free Soilers 
David Wilmot and Congressman Galusha Grow, Simon Cameron, John M. Read 
of Philadelphia, James K. Moorhead of Allegheny County, and former Treasury 
Secretary Samuel Ingham, came out in favor of Fremont.97 The biggest recruiting 
victories for Republicans however, came in the form of mass support from the 
state’s northern and western districts. Political observers, Democratic and 
Republican, predicted well before balloting began that Republicanism would win 
a majority in places like Pittsburgh, Erie, and Towanda. We must have some 
“help or we will sink,” pleaded one Potter County Democrat. “The people of 
Western Pennsylvania are against you,” insisted the Pittsburgh Gazette, “You 
cannot rally them to the Filibuster, Nigger-Driving, Slavery-Extending, Ten-
95 Gettysburg Republican Compiler, July 21, August 18.
96 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 24; Isaac Hangas to James Buchanan, May 25, Buchanan papers, 
HSP. The Pittsburgh Gazette, June 16, thought it was “absurd” that Whigs would vote for their old 
enemy Buchanan.
97 Myers, Republican Party, 111; Philadelphia Public Ledger, October 13.
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cents-a-day Standard.” 98 Overwhelming support in the north and west pleased 
many Republicans. But these successes were not enough to win the state.
Pennsylvania Democrats had one giant advantage over Republicans. Their 
organizing capabilities, especially the ability to raise money to support speakers 
and distribute propaganda, were far superior to those of the newly-organized 
Republican party. The skill of John W. Forney in managing the Democratic 
campaign was critical in the minds of many contemporary and historical 
observers. Although Republicans operated from a great disadvantage because they 
had to start virtually from scratch in organizing party machinery, their level of 
disorganization was hard to account for. Quarreling persisted between former 
Whigs and Democrats, especially between Simon Cameron, who was also the 
leading private financer for the party, and the ex-Whig state chairman. The 
shortcomings of the state’s Republican committee had forced Cameron to become 
more personally and financially involved. This was the beginning of Cameron’s 
influence upon Pennsylvania’s Republican party, which he would eventually run. 
But the effects of his leadership in 1856 were questionable.99
Out-of-state Republicans, who eventually had to assist their Keystone 
State brethren, were highly disappointed with the party’s organization. One 
leading party functionary expressed his disgust shortly before the election: “if we
98 D.W. James to William Bigler, August 18, (quotation), P. McCormic to Bigler, August 20,
Bigler papers, HSP; Pittsburgh Gazette, September 11 (quotation), July 14; John W. Forney to 
Buchanan, July 20, George W. Bacon to Buchanan, August 4, Christopher Ward to Buchanan 
September 10, Buchanan papers, HSP; J. Pones to Simon Cameron, September 15, Cameron 
papers, DCHS. Buchanan had long been accused o f stating that workers could survive on ten cents 
a day.
99 T. Weed to Simon Cameron, August 16, Simon Cameron, to T. Weed, November 9, Cameron 
papers, LC; Compare to: Nimrod Strickland, August 11, and A. Stahler, August 13, to William 
Bigler, Bigler papers, HSP; John W. Forney, September 10, and 26 to James Buchanan, Buchanan 
papers, HSP; Gienapp, Origins, 400.
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hope to carry Pa we must literally lift & carry it.” The highly pessimistic 
Thaddeus Stevens could simply add that, “the State is worse managed this 
campaign than I ever knew it.” Despite the tremendous strides that the party had 
made in less than a years time, few Pennsylvania Republicans seriously believed 
that victory would greet them at the polls.100
V
The October result was surprisingly close. Some Republican journals even 
declared that the Union ticket had prevailed, but they eventually had to admit a 
heart-wrenchingly close defeat. The three Democratic candidates defeated their 
Union ticket opponents by an average 212,700 to 209,400 tally. Democrats 
retained a six-vote majority in the state legislature and a three-vote majority in the 
joint assembly. Fifteen Democrats won seats in Congress while ten opposition 
candidates won election. As expected, Republicans had made little progress in 
Philadelphia. The one opposition man to win election to Congress, E. Joy Morris, 
had little tolerance for Republicanism, while the only real Republican to run in 
Philadelphia, William Kelly, received only 2,457 votes out of the 17,500 cast in 
his district.101
The statewide Union ticket vote improved on the Fusion vote in the off 
year election of 1855 by 60,000 and was even 8,000 higher then the combined 
Whig and Know Nothing vote that James Pollock received in 1854. Democrats
100 William B. Reed to James Buchanan, October 11, Buchanan papers, HSP; Henry B. Stanton 
and Thaddeus Stevens, quoted Gienapp, Origins, 397, 398; Myers, Republican Party, 127.
101 The full results were: Canal Commission, Scott-D, 212,925 Cochran-U, 210,172; Auditor Gen., 
Fry-D, 212,925 Phelps-U, 209,261; Surveyor Gen., Rowe-D, 212,623 Laporte-U, 208,888. 
Philadelphia Public Ledger, October 18; William Gienapp estimates turnout at 72.7 percent, 
Origins, 401. Newspapers were not clear on the legislative majorities, but the voting for Senator in 
1857 indicates these numbers.
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though, drew 50,000 more votes than they received in 1855 and 45,000 more than 
two years previous. Several Republicans declared that Democrats had only 
obtained victory through fraud, alleging that a large number of illegal ballots were 
cast in Philadelphia; accusations that Democrats steadfastly refuted.102
After the October defeat, Keystone Republicans attempted a mad 
scramble, trying to get all Fillmore voters to switch to Fremont. Even though 
Fillmore no longer even had a chance to throw the vote into the U.S. House, his 
staunchest supporters in Pennsylvania would not agree to the withdrawal of his 
ticket. But an agreement was reached with some elements of the Fillmore group 
and a joint electoral ticket was formed in late October. Twenty-six electors would 
be shared by the two parties, with the name of either Fillmore or Fremont 
rounding out the ticket. If this ticket won the state, the candidate with the most 
ballots headed with his name would win twenty-six electoral votes. However, 
most leaders of the state’s American party, including John Sanderson, would not 
support the fusion movement. And so, a straight Fillmore ticket remained 
available. The 26,303 men who cast ballots for the straight Fillmore ballot very 
nearly provided the margin of victory for Democrat James Buchanan.
Buchanan triumphed over the fusion opposition ticket 230,101 to 203,288. 
While fewer than 150,000 voters supported Fremont over Fillmore on the fusion 
ticket, he would have won Pennsylvania’s electoral votes under the terms of the 
October agreement if 30,000 more votes had gone to the dual ticket. Republicans 
quite reasonably cited the stubbornness of the straight Fillmore men for their
102 Harrisburg Telegraph, October 16; Pittsburgh Gazette, October 18; Philadelphia Public Ledger, 
October 20; McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 292.
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defeat. “What was the effect of the straight out ticket? To help BUCHANAN!,” 
concluded the Harrisburg Telegraph. The disagreement over the party’s Vice- 
Presidential choice was also cited in election postmortems. Others cited the 
popularity of native son James Buchanan.103
The closeness of the result in October and November belied the weakness 
of the Republican party in Pennsylvania. Although it had performed very strongly 
in the extreme western and northern sections of the state, the party was woefully 
underrepresented in several populous eastern and central counties. Buchanan 
received 30,000 more votes than Fremont in Philadelphia County alone. Millard 
Fillmore had considerably more supporters than Fremont in several southeastern 
counties. In York County Fremont was outpolled by the combined Fillmore vote 
by nearly 4,000. Fremont received less than thirty-three percent of the vote in 
thirty-three of Pennsylvania’s sixty-four counties including highly populated 
Philadelphia, Berks, Dauphin, and Schuylkill.
Despite their relatively poor showing, Pennsylvania Republicans held out 
great hope. “The campaign which concluded on the 4th of November in the 
temporary defeat of the great Republican party,” insisted the Pittsburgh Gazette, 
“disclosed nevertheless, such strength in various portions of the Republic, as is an 
excellent omen for the future.” Democrats also had great hopes for the future. 
Many pointed to both the October and November victories and the relative calm 
that had descended upon Kansas; mostly the result, they claimed, of another 
Pennsylvania Democrat John W. Geary. However, their predictions of a future
103 Harrisburg Telegraph, November 6 (quotation), October 20. T. Weed to Simon Cameron, 
November 12, Cameron papers, LC. The total vote in Pennsylvania was: Buchanan, 230,700 
50.1% Fremont, 147,510 32.0% Fillmore-fusion, 55,838 12.1% Fillmore-straight, 26,338 5.7%.
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blessed by serenity seem tragically ironic. “The Inauguration of James 
Buchanan,” declared Gettysburg’s Democratic paper, “will form a new era in the 
history of the country. It will be the rainbow of peace to the nation and tend to 
strengthen and consolidate the bonds of the Union, and add to the glory and 
perpetuity of the Republic.” James Buchanan’s administration would not meet 
these expectations. Nowhere would his party pay a higher price for that failure 
than in the Keystone State.104
104 Pittsburgh Gazette, January 6, 1857; Beaver Argus, November 12.
CHAPTER 4
“You Know How Sensitive Our People Are About Slavery” 
The Chaos of the Pennsylvania Democratic Party, 1857-1859
If the Republican party hoped to capture the presidency in 1860 winning 
in Pennsylvania was a virtual necessity. To achieve majority status in the 
Keystone State Republicans would have to absorb the greater part of the nativist 
and conservative Fillmore vote. Nativist principles and the American party were 
still formidable at the end of 1856. “We believe,” declared the Harrisburg Herald 
that “more than two-thirds in this State, who voted with the Republicans at the 
late election, on the grounds of expediency, are soundly American at heart.” It 
was clear to all but their most strident believers however, that the American party 
itself was mortally weakened after Fillmore’s defeat. One key question remained. 
Could enough of these nativjsts and conservatives accept the principally 
antislavery Republican party to swing the Keystone State away from 
Democracy?105
105 Harrisburg Herald, November 25, 1856. All primary sources in this section are from 1857 
until otherwise noted.
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In many ways, the solution to this quandary lay not with the Republicans 
themselves, but with their rivals. The four years of turmoil that ravaged 
Democrats after the election of Buchanan helped the Republican cause 
immensely. The American problem also resolved itself. After 1857 the 
Republican party was finally free from American competition for anti-Democratic 
votes. While many Fillmore voters never accepted Republican hegemony, the 
death of the American party only benefited the Republican alliance. The agonies 
of the Democratic party proved even more profitable. Eventually, the coalition 
that presented James Buchanan with an unprecedented vote in 1856 proved 
untenable. Slavery continued to splinter Democracy. Patronage squabbles and 
policy differences intensified long-welling internal fissures, and a lack of 
cohesive party policy on banking, railroads, and tariffs left Keystone Democrats 
unprepared for economic crisis. Voters deserted en masse; some to the sidelines, 
others to the Republicans. Ultimately, the years between 1856 and 1860 are best 
described as a period of Democratic and American failure.
I
The Republican party achieved its first major victory in Pennsylvania 
early in 1857. Even though his elevation was somewhat tainted by charges of 
bribery, the election of Simon Cameron to the U. S. Senate was a tremendous 
boost to the heretofore struggling party. At the same time, the failure of 
Democrats to hold their legislative majority during the electoral struggle harkened 
ill tidings for the future of the state party. The factional squabbling, which the 
Senatorial election exposed, would continue to plague the Pennsylvania
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Democratic party throughout James Buchanan’s presidency, consistently 
providing Republicans with an opportunity for victory. The internal 
decomposition-even if it was minor compared to other northern states—of the 
Keystone Democratic party was essential to Republican triumphs after 1856.
The humiliating setback to the control of his own party was a dark omen 
for James Buchanan. As the chief political officer in the nation Buchanan was 
tasked with addressing the nearly all-consuming desire for patronage. While 
cabinet officers filled the majority of patronage slots, Buchanan personally 
controlled the selections for Pennsylvania’s key positions. As he embarked upon 
his arduous task Buchanan not only had to be careful not to neglect or outrage any 
of the various cliques within the Keystone Democracy-as he was obligated to 
keep the party as cohesive as possible—but he also had to make sure his selections 
did not offend his powerful southern supporters. Finding a worthy reward for 
John W. Forney proved to be Buchanan’s most troubling task. Although he had 
been a valuable campaign manager in 1856, Forney had acquired many personal 
enemies in Pennsylvania and across the South. Thus Buchanan decided he could 
not have Forney in his cabinet nor could he edit the official national 
administration newspaper. Finally, Buchanan decided he would champion Forney 
for Pennsylvania’s soon to be open Senatorial seat.106
Richard Brodhead, who had little support for a second term, was due to 
exit the Senate in March.107 Pennsylvania’s Democratic leadership reportedly
106 John F. Coleman, The Disruption o f the Pennsylvania Democracy, 103-105; Philip Klein,
James Buchanan, 264-66; Robert Tyler to James Buchanan, January 23, 1857, Philip G. 
Auchampaugh, Robert Tyler: Southern Rights Champion, 1847-1866 (Duluth, 1934), 74-75.
107 G. W. Childs to William Bigler, January 3, Bigler papers, HSP.
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desired to replace him with former congressman Henry D. Foster of 
Westmoreland County. However, after failing to obtain a place in the cabinet, 
Forney decided that he would accept elevation to the Senate. Begrudgingly, the 
Democratic legislative caucus approved his nomination in early January. In the 
interim, Simon Cameron had secured the unified backing of Republicans and 
remaining American legislators. Rumors were now flying that he could secure at 
least three Democratic votes, which would overturn their slim majority.108
As revealed in the first chapter, Cameron did indeed receive the necessary 
three votes, thus securing his election. Democrats howled with acerbic incredulity 
at Cameron’s “treachery,” but much of the blame clearly rested.upon their own 
party.109 Eleven Democrats failed to heed the dictation of Buchanan and voted 
against Forney. Some western legislators were apparently upset that the 
Philadelphia resident Forney would replace Brodhead, who lived in New Jersey 
bordering Northampton County. Both of the Democratic candidates who received 
dissenting votes hailed from the western end of the state.110 Yet it seems that the 
unpopularity of Forney, along with the deft management of opposition forces by 
Cameron, were the leading causes of the stunning upset.111
108 P. Hamman to Cameron, November 18, 1856, J. Madeia to Cameron, November 28, 1856, and 
J. ? [West Chester], to Cameron, December 12, 1856, Cameron papers, DCHS; J. Kirkpatrick, to 
Cameron, November 22, 1856, Joseph Wilkens, to Cameron, December 12, Cameron papers, LC; 
For apprehension on Fomey’s candidacy see: G. R. Barrett to William Bigler, January 5, Bigler 
papers, HSP; John W. Forney to James Buchanan, January 10, 11, 13, Buchanan papers, HSP.
09 Pittsburgh Post, January 14, 15, 16, 17; Gettysburg Republican Compiler, January 26; H. M. 
North to William Bigler, January 15, Bigler papers HSP.
110 The full result was: Cameron 67 votes, Forney 58, Henry Foster 7, William Wilkins 1.
111 W. L. Hallowell to Simon Cameron, January 15, E. Kitchen, to Cameron, January 21, among 
many others, Cameron papers, DCHS; P. Martin to Cameron, January 13, George Lean, to 
Cameron, January 20, Cameron papers, LC. As a sop to his patronage needs, Forney eventually 
obtained the editorship o f the Philadelphia Press. J. W. Forney to Jeremiah S. Black, July 5, Black 
papers, LC.
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The Senatorial election was hardly the only grief that the new president 
would suffer during 1857. The “rainbow of peace” never materialized in the wake 
of the stormy Pierce administration. The corrosive forces of Buchanan’s 
administration took time to mature though. The Dred Scott decision outraged 
many Pennsylvanians, but it does not seem to have been as effective as the 
Kansas troubles of 1856 in mobilizing Republicans. Kansas itself seemed to offer 
no new issues in 1857. “The Kansas question, thank Heaven, will soon be put to 
rest,” assured the Pittsburgh Post in September.112 James Buchanan’s first year in 
office provided much controversy, but it would not produce the political 
convulsions that would plague his second year.
II
Pennsylvania’s gubernatorial contest was arguably the most critical
i
election of 1857. Yet, the race failed to arouse the interest or turnout of the 
preceding year’s presidential election, ultimately providing little more than the 
groundwork for future campaigns. While the Democratic party was able to lay 
aside its traumatic January Senate defeat and cruise to victory, Republicans 
instead focused on strengthening their political base. Winning-admittedly a tall 
order in light of the party’s shortcomings in 1856--was not their foremost goal. 
Keystone Republicans instead used the governor’s campaign to establish the 
ideological dominance of antislavery within the state’s anti-administration 
coalition.
Although the final margin of their defeat was disturbing, most 
Pennsylvania Republicans concluded in the wake of the election that they had
u2Pittsburgh Post, September 12. For Dred Scott: Pittsburgh Gazette, March 7, and 26.
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accomplished their broadest mission: independent nativism was finally crushed. 
Although a considerable number of American party holdouts refused to accept 
Republican hegemony within the anti-Democratic coalition for 1857, the 
gubernatorial election proved that their party was finished in Pennsylvania. Even 
if Republicans would have to yield some minor concessions in future elections in 
order to attract the most pliable American holdouts, they would be negotiating 
from a position of considerable strength after 1857. The Americans who objected 
to Republicanism too much to ever join its ranks, generally drifted out of the 
electorate after 1857.113
Although the failure to unite on John W. Forney for the Senatorial election 
suggested that Keystone Democrats were vulnerable to dissension, the party’s 
state convention passed harmoniously. William F. Packer, a well-respected 
veteran of state politics, received the gubernatorial nomination.114 The opposition 
‘Union’ convention was considerably more contentious as Republicans 
endeavored to dominate a coalition that still seemed too conservative to some 
antislavery men. Although the nominations for the two lesser state offices went to 
Americans, David Wilmot’s selection for the governorship offended many 
conservatives and nativists within the ‘Union’ coalition. Wilmot, a former Free 
Soil Democrat from Bradford County, had never openly joined the Know Nothing 
movement, instead moving directly into the Republican party. Combined with a
113 Coleman, 106-09; Alexander McClure, Old Time Notes I, 300; Charles Going, David Wilmot, 
496-514. Voters would also choose a canal commissioner and a state supreme court justice in 
October, as well as a new legislature and a third o f the state senate.
Many Democrats also looked forward to the death o f the American party. See: D. Weyands to 
Jeremiah S. Black, September 28, Black papers, LC.
114 Erie Observer, March 7;
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party platform that was heavy on antislavery and light on nativist issues, was 
Wilmot’s acceptance letter, which virtually ignored all issues not germane to the 
slavery question. In the letter he tersely quipped that: “I have not time to speak of 
the other topics.” Wilmot was a brazen choice for a party that was not yet 
united.115
It was all too much for those in the anti-Democratic alliance who had not 
fully accepted Republicanism, most of whom had voted for Fillmore in 1856. 
Disaffected American-coalitionists sent Wilmot a public questionnaire and 
attempted to have him affirm his nativist credentials. Although he complied, and 
convinced some hesitant Americans, Wilmot remained too radical and too 
unconvincingly nativist for many Pennsylvanians. American leadership now 
decided that they should select a gubernatorial nominee of their own.116 Isaac 
Hazlehurst, a Philadelphia American who had opposed the unified 
Fremont/Fillmore presidential ticket, was nominated to oppose Wilmot and 
Packer. This refusal by a core group of Americans to submit to Republican 
obstinacy virtually guaranteed that Wilmot would meet defeat. However, despite 
the high probability of defeat, Wilmot firmly believed that no further concessions 
should be made to the equally stubborn Americans. Most Pennsylvania 
Republicans seemed to agree.117
To no one’s surprise Wilmot’s campaign relied heavily on antislavery 
rhetoric. “Let the freemen of the North,” he declared in his acceptance letter,
115 Pittsburgh Gazette, March 4, April 22.
116 Wilmot’s letter is printed in full: Pittsburgh Gazette, April 22; For the questionnaire and 
Wilraot’s response see: Going, 732-33.
117Pittsburgh Gazette, June 6; Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery, 261-62; David Wilmot to 
Lemual Todd, August 8, James McPherson papers, LC; Pottsville Miners ’ Journal, July 4.
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“announce in language firm and unmistakable their purpose to resist the spread of 
slavery.” The now portly Wilmot toured the state with uncharacteristic vigor, but 
he seemed to add little to the political dialogue that had not already been debated 
in the bygone presidential race. Wilmot challenged Packer to join him in a series
of public debates—a strategy that Abraham Lincoln would turn to in 1858-but
118sensing that it would serve him no advantage, Packer declined.
Democrats concentrated on attacking Wilmot’s antislavery passions, all 
the while benefiting from the relative calm in Kansas. “Why even now,” scoffed 
Senator William Bigler, “Mr. Wilmot and his party will not say that they will be 
content with the decision of the people, and admit Kansas as a State unless that 
decision be against slavery.” Wilmot seemed to want to discuss nothing other than 
slavery. “We doubt,” declared the Observer after Wilmot’s stop in Erie, “there is 
one man in one thousand in the county that can call to mind a single thought, 
outside of the negro question, that he impressed upon the popular mind.” “He can 
be supported only as an Abolition agitator,” agreed Gettysburg’s Democratic 
organ.119 In spite of the admitted organizational goal of the election year, many 
Republicans became frustrated with Wilmot’s candidacy. Funding problems again 
plagued the party, forcing Simon Cameron to foot much of the campaign bill for a 
second time.120
118 Wilmot quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, May 5; William Packer to William Bigler, August 8, Bigler 
papers, HSP.
19 Erie Observer, September 19; Bigler quoted Pittsburgh Post, September 12; Gettysburg 
Republican Compiler, April 6.
120 A. B. Anderson to Simon Cameron, September 29, David Wilmot to Cameron, October 8, 
Cameron papers, LC.
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The gubernatorial race seemed outright boring to many casual observers. 
Even partisan leaders expressed frustration at the lack of contestable issues aside 
from the eternal slavery question. “The old issues which formerly entered into 
campaigns and made them interesting,” opined the Pittsburgh Post, “such as the 
tariff, banks, distribution of the proceeds of public lands, etc., are not now heard 
of... every other question swallowed by the one idea of slavery.” As autumn 
summoned the election many Pennsylvanians were more concerned with a 
worsening economic situation than a sterile governor’s election. “The financial 
troubles,” admitted the Philadelphia North American, “are of too engrossing a 
nature to leave room for much of public interest.” The North American, which 
had supported Fremont in 1856, did not even bother to mention the election until 
the last days of the campaign, a trait that was shared by many papers.121
Democrats never seriously doubted that victory would be theirs.122 In an 
election that drew only about the same number of voters as the 1851 gubernatorial 
election seven years earlier, Packer easily defeated Wilmot. Packer obtained 
188,846 votes, Wilmot 146,139, and the American Hazlehurst 28,168. The 
average margin of victory in the four statewide races--which Democrats swept-- 
was 16,000 votes. In perhaps a backlash from the election of Cameron to the 
Senate, Democrats rolled up an uncontestable majority in the legislative house
127
and senate.
121 Pittsburgh Post, August 31; Philadelphia North American, October 9 quoted in Stampp, 
American in 1857, 247; William Dusinberre, Civil War Issues in Philadelphia, 66; JohnM 
Kirkpatrick to Simon Cameron, August 24, Cameron papers, LC; Adams Sentinel, October 9; 
Pottsville Miners ’ Journal, July 4.
122 C. R. Buckalew, to Jeremiah S. Black, August 28, William Bigler, to Black, August 26, R. 
Greenhaus to Black, September 5, George M. Lauman, to Black, September 6, Black papers, LC.
123 Adams Sentinel, October 19.
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The voting pattern was largely the same as the previous year’s presidential 
race, with Republicans winning big in the northern and western sections of the 
state while performing poorly in the east. The greatest source of embarrassment 
was in Philadelphia, where Hazlehurst outpolled Wilmot. Although Wilmot 
attracted more votes than Fremont in several eastern counties, he distantly trailed 
in nearly all of them. Democratic turnout though was also down significantly 
from 1856. Although confidence in victory may explain some of the drop off, it 
also seems that former Whigs, who had helped to swell Buchanan’s vote, were 
hesitant to become full-fledged Democrats.
Most Pennsylvania Republicans though seemed satisfied that they had 
gained the result that they desired. “Such a defeat may have been needed to 
consolidate the party in the state,” admitted future congressman Edward 
McPherson. Alexander McClure deemed the campaign “all that the Republican’s 
leaders had hoped for. It practically eliminated the American organization as a 
political factor in the state.” Even David Wilmot saw a bright future. “We have 
the material for a triumphant party in the state,” he insisted. “Whenever it can be 
cordially combined in one organization, and this cannot much longer be 
prevented.” 124
In October 1857 though, the Republican party still remained a distinct 
minority in Pennsylvania. Some Democrats even claimed that the party would 
disappear in light of three years of seeming failure. Before the year elapsed 
however, a renewal of the Kansas controversy, and the deepening fiscal crisis
124 Edward McPherson to Simon Cameron, October 15, Cameron papers, LC; McClure, Old Time 
Notes I, 304; Wilmot quoted Stampp, 250.
■25 Pittsburgh Post,. October 17; Erie Observer, October 24.
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opened new opportunities for Republican growth. Just as they finally obtained 
dominance within Pennsylvania’s opposition coalition, fresh proslavery outrages 
in Kansas and continuing economic peril at home, propelled Republicans into 
power. Coupled with the expansion of state party doctrine to address both 
economic and local problems, the success of 1858 laid the foundation for the 
future domination of the Pennsylvania Republican party.
m
1857 was a difficult electoral year for Republicans throughout the North: 
Pennsylvania hosting only their most lopsided defeat. Salmon P. Chase barely 
held on to the governor’s office in neighboring Ohio, while the party suffered a 
shocking loss in New York. 1858 though would be a different story. Another 
round of Kansas turmoil fuelled by dough-faced Democratic cupidity helped 
reinvigorate Republicans, and so outraged many northern Democrats that a 
considerable number either switched their allegiances or refused to vote in the fall 
elections. Pennsylvania’s October elections were a startling reversal from the past 
three years of Democratic triumph.
The Lecompton controversy revolved around James Buchanan’s decision 
to accept the result of Kansas’s proslavery constitutional convention, which had 
assembled despite the boycott of free-soil settlers. Much to the dismay of 
Republicans, the proslavery Lecompton constitution stood before Congress in 
early 1858. “Should Congress... not refuse to admit the bogus State,” cried the 
Pottsville Miners ’ Journal, “a tempest will arise unparalleled in the history of the
United States.”126 Initially however, Pennsylvania Democrats seemed little more 
than irritated that Republicans were again trying to benefit from the well-traveled 
Kansas battleground. “The petty negro issues upon which the Kansas troubles are 
based,” moaned the now Democratic Harrisburg Herald, “have for more than ten 
years been forced upon the attention of the country by fanatics and demagogues, 
for selfish and unpatriotic purposes.” Many other Pennsylvania Democrats 
simply accepted the position of the national leadership and supported the 
admittance of Kansas as a slave state. Senator William Bigler swallowed some of 
his personal disapproval of Buchanan and became one the strongest northern 
supporters of Lecompton. New Attorney General Jeremiah S. Black and the 
majority of Pennsylvania Democratic leaders also agreed to support the
■I 2 '7
administration.
But dissatisfaction with the administration’s Kansas policy began to 
surface in some Democratic newspapers and correspondence. “You know how 
sensitive our people are about slavery,” warned one correspondent of Senator 
Bigler. “I sincerely hope some plan will be carried through that will allay the 
prevailing alarm.” The questionable circumstances of Lecompton’s adoption 
made many Keystone Democrats balk at supporting another slave state. Yet most 
upsetting was the attempt of the administration to dictate congressional policy; an 
outrage that Illinois’s Stephen Douglas also refused to accept. “At this time, a
126 Pottsvill o, M iners’ Journal, November 22, 1857; Pittsburgh Gazette, January 8, 1858.
127 Harrisburg Herald, February 9, 1858; Erie Observer, July 17; Lecompton supporters seemed 
considerably more numerous in my survey of Democratic correspondence see: B. Crawford to 
William Bigler, December 19, T. Livenford to Bigler, December 21, N. Strickland to Bigler,
March 3, 1858. W. F. Boone to J. S. Black, February 8, John L Dawson to Black, April 4, Black 
papers, LC; James Buchanan to Robert Tyler, February 15, Auchampaugh, Robert Tyler, 232; 
Hereafter all years in this section are 1858, until otherwise noted.
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large majority of Democrats here [agree] with Douglas and Walker,” warned a 
cadre of Indiana County Democrats.128
A Douglas faction appeared in Pennsylvania soon after he spilt with the 
administration as a consequence of the English Bill. To hardly anyone’s surprise,
1 ? QJohn W. Forney led the new Democratic opposition. Forney had been a 
headache while a party insider in early 1857, but his agitation from the fringes of 
the Democratic party would be a persistent thorn in the side for the rest of 
Buchanan’s term. Governor Packer also moved towards opposition to Lecompton, 
but he, unlike Forney tried to hold the Keystone Democracy together.130
As Buchanan and Bigler pressed their fellow Democrats to fall in line, the 
resentment against the national administration-first evidenced in the Cameron 
election—began to intensify. The overt support of extreme southern positions 
outraged anti-Lecompton Democrats. The Harrisburg Herald asked if Buchanan’s 
‘official’ state organ, the Pennsylvanian, would denounce all “who oppose some 
of the measures recommended by him? Or will it boldly take the ground it really 
maintains, and insist that northern Senators must blindly follow the lead of the 
President, while southern Senators may think for themselves?” 131
Sensing they had a golden campaign issue, Pennsylvania Republicans let 
forth their sharpest anti-administration attacks yet. “The Policy of Mr. Buchanan’s
128 T. J. Keenan, to William Bigler January 6, J. Alexander Fulton to Bigler, January 29; Joseph 
Thousou ? Et. All to William Bigler, December 12, 1857, Bigler papers, HSP. Walker was the 
Pennsylvania-born territorial governor of Kansas who came to oppose Buchanan; Jacob Crassell 
to Jeremiah S. Black, February 1, W. A. Smith to Black, February 26, Black papers, LC.
129 J. W. Forney to Simon Cameron, May 25, Cameron papers, LC; J. W. Forney to Henry Wise, 
May 25, Forney papers, LC.
130 On Packer see: F. W. Hughes to William Bigler, March 7, Thomas C. MacDowell to Bigler, 
March 23, Bigler papers, HSP.
131 Harrisburg Herald, February 22.
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Administration upon this subject,” declared congressional nominee Edward 
McPherson “was probably the most flagrant violation of the fundamental 
principles of American Liberty known to our history.” Conservatives--who had so 
far been hesitant to embrace Republicanism--also railed against Lecompton. “Not 
one in a thousand of the people cares much whether [Kansas] be a slave state or a 
free state!” exclaimed Philadelphia businessman Sidney G. Fisher. “But millions 
do care whether slavery is to be forced upon it against the wishes of the people.” 
Finally Philadelphians seemed ready to accept the fundamental faiths of 
Republican antislavery positions. The North American could testify that “the 
Kansas business... [had driven] thousands on thousands of intelligent and upright 
men into the ranks of the Republicans.”132
In March 1858 the Democratic state nominating convention endorsed 
Buchanan’s course, adopting a pro-Lecompton report by a vote of 109-21 that 
also fiercely defended popular sovereignty. Although a minority of the convention 
put forward a stem anti-Lecompton resolution, it appears that no more than a 
quarter of Keystone Democrats openly opposed the administration’s handling of 
Kansas. Although such dissent could critically impair the electoral fortunes of 
Democrats, party leadership was still confident that the disturbance would be 
minor. In an apparent sign of harmony, both Governor Packer and Administration 
leaders received praise in the platform. To further quell the dissent, the state
132 McPherson quoted Adams Sentinel, August 30; Fisher quoted Philadelphia North American, 
February 24, 1858, also in William Dusinberre, Civil War issues in Philadelphia, 76; North 
American, August 2, September 4.
89
supreme court nomination was granted to an opponent of Lecompton. However, 
the damage to Democratic cohesion had already been done.133
IV
The Lecompton controversy was not the only political landmine to injure 
Keystone Democrats in 1858. Democratic weakness on industrial protection, 
which had once benefited Whigs, reemerged as a partisan issue. Congressional 
tariff policy had faded from importance in Pennsylvania after the California Gold 
Rush and the breakup of the Whig party, but in 1858 Philadelphia economist 
Henry C. Carey and Senator Simon Cameron helped bring it back into 
prominence. Using the tumult of the Panic of 1857, which was especially 
detrimental to the state’s mining, manufacturing, and iron interests, many 
Republican leaders and newspapers added calls for a protective tariff to the 
party’s banners.134
“Co-equal in importance and interest with the Kansas question, is the 
subject of protection,” insisted the Pottsville Miners ’ Journal. “The Free Labor of 
the Country,” explained Edward McPherson, “needs, deserves, and must have 
Protection.” Philadelphia’s leading Republican newspaper was particularly 
vehement in its demands for protection. The North American felt “the foremost 
practical question in the next Congress [will] be the enactment of such a tariff as 
will save the interests of Pennsylvania from destruction.” Editor Morton 
McMichael’s paper continued to espouse the Whig economic policies that seemed 
to have disappeared from political debate after the breakdown of the second party
133Harrisburg Herald, March 3; Jeremiah S. Black to William A Porter, February 2, Black papers, 
LC.
134 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men, 202-03.
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system. Demands for protection spread throughout much of industrializing 
Pennsylvania, winning strong support from most Republican leaders. Simon 
Cameron tirelessly called for higher tariffs in the Senate and implored voters to 
send pro-tariff men to Congress. “In place of gentlemen who sneer when we talk 
of protecting, they must send men here who know something of the usefulness of 
the laboring men.”135 Although many Pennsylvania Democrats claimed to support 
higher tariffs--with their congressional votes usually supporting those claims--the 
Republican adoption of the protectionist cause troubled not a few Keystone 
Democrats.136
Protection would remain a Pennsylvania Republican standard for years to 
come. Although the importance of the tariff to the Republican victories of 1858 
and 1860 has been considerably inflated by several historians, the demand for 
protection no doubt deepened the disadvantages suffered by Democrats as a result 
of the economic downturn, and helped win over a few old protectionist Whigs 
who balked at antislavery politics in key eastern counties. Simon Cameron 
especially received many letters from men who claimed that they did not care 
about slavery or hated blacks, who nonetheless supported his campaign for higher 
tariffs. Protection however, was often combined with nativist and antislavery 
appeals. Nor did the Lecompton controversy or other Buchanan scandals 
disappear from the editorial pages. Stopping the spread of slavery and dismantling
135Pottsville Miners ’ Journal, May 5; McPherson quoted Adams Sentinel, August 30; Philadelphia 
North American, August 2; Cameron quoted Crippen, Simon Cameron, 184;Pittsburgh Gazette, 
June 16; James Davis to Simon Cameron, July 31, Cameron papers, DCHS; John W. O’Neile to 
Cameron, May 13, Cameron papers, LC.
136 Louis Reeser ? to William Bigler, May 10, G. W. Scranton to Bigler 5-18, Bigler papers, HSP;
J. W. Forney to Henry Wise, May 25, Forney papers, LC.
137 W. D. Lewis to Cameron, May 22, Cameron papers, LC; James Davis to Cameron, July 31, G. 
R. Shaw to Cameron, February 2, 1860, Cameron papers, DCSH.
91
the hated slave power remained a fundamental principle of the Pennsylvania 
Republican party.138
Pennsylvania politics were hardly limited to national issues during 1858. 
For the first time Keystone Republicans profited from local politics, forming a 
more effective and coherent program than Democrats in several instances. Even 
more important, Pennsylvania Democrats failed to cultivate state and local issues 
that could divert attention from their troubling national situation. The inability of 
Democrats to agree on a response to the Panic of 1857 in either the state 
legislature or on the campaign trail was crippling when combined with the 
Lecompton disorder. Bruce Collins, who has completed the fullest study of the 
Pennsylvania’s 1858 elections, has concluded that the inability of Democrats to 
maintain a cohesive state economic policy—especially on banking reform—was 
even more detrimental than Lecompton or the Republican adoption of the tariff; 
with no positive policies to project, Democrats could hardy expect to escape the 
negative ramifications of economic distress and internal party turmoil.139
The sale of the state Main Line canal garnered almost as much political 
attention as Lecompton and the tariff during 1858, but Democrats could not 
harness it as a great campaign issue. Pennsylvania’s canal system, which never 
came close to the economic profitability of the Erie canal, had long been a source 
of patronage and corruption. By the mid 1850’s though, its continuing operation
138 Philadelphia North American, September 27.
139 Bruce Collins, “The Democrat’s Loss of Pennsylvania in 1858,” PMHB, v. 59 (October, 1985), 
499-536; At their nominating convention Democrats added a plank on banking reform, meekly 
declaring: “we particularly recommend such a revision of the system of Banking, as may prevent 
in the future the troubles and difficulties that the people of the State have lately encountered.” 
Harrisburg Herald, March 6; G. W. Scranton to William Bigler, May 18, Bigler papers, HSP.
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was largely unnecessary. The state desired to sell the canal system, but few 
acceptable buyers approached. Finally, the Main Line was unloaded to the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, which obtained questionable tax breaks to sweeten the 
deal. By 1858 the rest of the canal system was sold to a competing railroad. Some 
Democrats tried to attack the sale to the Pennsylvania, but they could not maintain 
party cohesion to either block the transfer in the legislature or make it a campaign 
issue in either 1857 or 1858.140 Most Republicans gave hearty support to the sale, 
seemingly suffering little backlash.141
Dissatisfaction with the development of Pennsylvania’s railroads also 
attracted political attention in the 1850’s. In few places was disgust with railroads 
more apparent than in Pittsburgh.142 Fears were prevalent that Pittsburgh would 
be reduced to unimportance by a diversion of the state’s key line. But it was the 
obstinacy of railroads that seemed to hold the public hostile to their demands that 
galled Pittsbughers the most. When one such ill-managed and unfinished road 
forced Allegheny County government to raise property taxes in 1857 the revolt 
began. County Democrats in turn came out against the new taxes. Although they 
had established themselves as the majority party in Allegheny County,
140 Collins, “Democrats’ Loss,” 508; McClure, Old Time Notes, 1 223; Jeremiah S. Black was 
particularly outraged by the sale of the canal system, launching a lawsuit that eventually outraged 
many o f his Democratic colleagues. J. S. Black to Samual J. Randall, June 30, and November 15, 
Black papers, LC.
141 Pittsburgh Republicans were more hesitant in approving the sale. In 1857 the Gazette 
commented: “we are convinced that the Pennsylvania Road ought not to have been permitted to 
buy it.” June 27, 1857, also June 17, 1858.
142 My coverage of the railroad issue in Pittsburgh is based entirely on Michael Holt’s excellent 
Forging a Majority, especially pages 228-36 and 245-53.
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Republicans suffered when they failed to counter the new Democratic tactic. 
David Wilmot’s vote was little more than half of Fremont’s tally in 1856.143
By 1858 however, Pittsburgh Republicans were ready to meet the 
challenge. Democrats again tried to exploit anti-tax feelings, recruiting the leading 
anti-tax Republican to run for one of Allegheny County’s congressional seats. 
Republicans though led a much more assertive campaign than they had in 1857, 
pounding the hypocrisy of Democrats for assailing railroads that they had helped 
create. Democratic hands were proved to be hardly spotless in Pittsburgh’s 
railroad debacle. At the same time, the strong calls for repudiating the taxes upset 
some Democrats, especially the editor of the Pittsburgh Post William Barr. It all 
guaranteed that strong Republican majorities would return to Pittsburgh and 
Allegheny County in 1858.144 To their unquestioned advantage, Pennsylvania 
Republicans now tackled state and local issues with much greater cohesiveness 
than they had in the past two election years. Democrats could claim no such unity; 
defeat now stared them in the face.
Y
As it often did, Philadelphia’s May mayoral election forecast October’s 
results. For the first time since 1854, the anti-Democratic candidate was able to 
triumph. Alexander Henry, a former Whig who embraced nativism and mildly 
antislavery Republican principles, defeated Richard Vaux, the well-respected
143 Pittsburgh Gazette March 9, June 5, 11, 12, 20, September 9, 17, 21, 1857; While Fremont won 
over 13,000 votes, Wilmot obtained only 7,687, which was also less than the totals for James 
Pollock in 1854, and William F. Johnston in 1851 and 1848.
144Pittsburgh Gazette September 9, 1857, September 3, 9, 7, 20, 1858; For criticism from 
Democrats for the anti-tax movement see the Post July 21, August 19, 20, 24, September 4, 13; 
Holt, 253-255.
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Democratic incumbent. The victory was further significant because it proved that 
Americans and Republicans could unite in the locality where it was most needed. 
Henry’s vote easily surpassed the paltry totals previously obtained by 
Philadelphia Republicans. He received almost 10,000 more votes than the 
combined tally of Wilmot and Hazlehurst the previous October. Although their 
conclusions are questionable, Republicans and Democrats alike cited the 
Lecompton controversy as a key reason for the upset. Regardless, the victory 
delighted Republicans who were preparing to cement the union of Pennsylvania’s 
opposition forces at June’s state nominating convention.145
After deciding in early spring to delay the nomination of their state ticket, 
Republicans who surveyed the chaos in Democratic ranks and the successful 
combination with Americans in Philadelphia, could easily conclude that they had 
made the correct decision. A former Know Nothing garnered the soon to be 
defunct canal commission nomination, while Philadelphian John M. Read, a 
former Free Soil Democrat, headed the ticket as the state supreme court nominee. 
The platform embraced both the standard antislavery and nativist planks, and 
added calls for the protection of American industiy. At the behest of Philadelphia 
North American editor Morton McMichael, the opposition would run under the 
moniker of the ‘People’s party,’ which was supposedly more inviting to former 
Americans than ‘Republican.’146
145 The mayoral vote was: Henry-R 33,771; Vaux-D 29,068; Pottsville Miners ’ Journal, May 8; B. 
H. Brewster to James Buchanan, May 7, Buchanan papers, HSP; Robert Tyler to Henry Wise,
May 5, Auchampaugh, 238. Tyler, the state Democratic chairman, believed that national issues 
played no part in the election. Tyler was the Virginia-born son of former president John Tyler.
46 Coleman, 115-16; Pittsburgh Gazette, July 17; Pittsburgh Post, July 16.
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The most critical races of 1858 were for Pennsylvania’s twenty-five 
congressional seats. Separate district or county conventions chose the nominees 
for both parties; often the selections reflected local concerns or electoral 
composition more than national legislative issues. Key opposition congressmen E. 
Joy Morris of Philadelphia, Galusha Grow from David Wilmot’s district, and 
John Covode of Westmoreland County, were re-nominated; Democrats re­
nominated eleven incumbents, running new candidates in three other districts that 
they held. Select new Republican/People’s nominees however, proved to be 
highly significant. These candidates demonstrated how the party had grown since 
previous elections, and helped draw critical votes in a number of key districts.
Some opposition nominees were familiar names, having previously served 
in various political positions as Whigs, Americans or Democrats. Candidates were 
often selected to highlight Republican support for protective tariffs and economic 
development. George W. Scranton, a former Whig, and a Democrat for the past 
four years, was one of the leading industrialists of northeast Pennsylvania.
Midway through 1858, Scranton left the Democratic party-citing his concurrence 
with the emerging pro-tariff policy of the opposition—and accepted the 
congressional nomination for the twelfth district, which was centered in Luzerne 
County. John Schwartz, a sixty-five year old iron manufacture and former 
Democrat, was called upon in heavily Democratic Berks County. Manufacturers 
and businessmen ran in at five other districts on the People’s party ticket. 
Democrats boasted considerably fewer pillars of the economic community. Yet 
vigorously antislavery politicians were not absent from Republican tickets.
96
Thaddeus Stevens and Edward McPherson, who both vehemently attacked the 
Lecompton ‘fraud,’ were chosen to run in the southeastern ninth and seventeenth 
districts.147
Few could argue with the wisdom of their nominations or the expansion of 
the Republican platform. The extent of the People’s/Republican victory in 
October was stunning. The Pennsylvanian declared the race a “complete 
prostration of the Democracy in the old Keystone.” The statewide races were 
decided by a margin of more than 20,000 votes, with Read winning his seat on the 
supreme court 198,117 to 171,130. More importantly, twenty-one People’s party 
congressional candidates were victorious. Only two pro-administration Democrats 
were returned to office: four term Philadelphian Thomas Florence and William 
Dimmick from the northeastern thirteenth district. Two Democratic opponents of 
Lecompton, William Montgomery, and John Hickman-who soon joined the 
Republicans-also returned to Washington. Perhaps the most shocking 
People’s/Republican victory occurred in Berks County, which encompassed the 
eighth district. There, Johan Schwartz unseated Buchanan floor leader J. Glancy 
Jones. According to the Republican who finished Jones’s un-expired term, both 
support for protection and racist antislavery reaction to Lecompton had 
transformed the usually pro-Democratic Berks voters into opposition men. “They 
hate negroes, and have no affection for slavery,” concluded William Keim.148
147 Collins, “Democrat’s Loss,” 522-27; Congressional Biographical Dictionary, 
bioguide, congress.gov.
148Pennsylvanian quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, October 13; Keim quoted in Collins, “Democrat’s 
Loss,” 522.
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Most Keystone Republicans stressed both the Lecompton disturbance and 
the economic downturn in post-election commentaries. “The hard times caused by 
the free trade policy of the democracy,” affirmed the Pittsburgh Gazette, “have 
had a great part in arousing the people to the assertion of their power and rights.” 
The North American concluded that Pennsylvania had “been ‘redeemed’ from the 
despotism of sectional and tyrannical managers.” The “shameful conduct” of the 
Democratic party had been repudiated elated party newcomer Sidney George 
Fisher. The election “shows that there is a healthful and sound moral sentiment 
left among the people.”149
Democratic explanations for the defeat varied. “The Kansas humbug,” 
insisted the Erie Observer, “has had no effect upon the Democracy of Erie 
County. It has not divided us as in counties east of the mountains.” A Fayette 
County Democrat could counter: “the election has resulted disastrously as was 
clearly foreshadowed by the course of the Anti-Lecompton Democrats.” The 
Pittsburgh Post meanwhile bemoaned the attempt to turn the Allegheny 
Democracy into an anti-tax movement. In light of it all, few Pennsylvania 
Democrats could deny that their party was badly divided. Many Democratic 
voters had responded by simply withdrawing their support from the party 
ticket.150
An investigation of Pennsylvania’s congressional races reveals that the 
election of 1858 was not so much a People’s/Republican triumph as a Democratic
149Pittsburgh Gazette, October 16; Philadelphia North American, October 12, 13 [quotation]; 
Adams Sentinel, September 20; A Philadelphia Perspective: The Diary o f Sidney George Fisher 
Covering the Years 1834-1871, ed. Nicholas B. Wainwright, (Philadelphia, 1967), 308.
150 Erie Observer, October 23; J. B. Sian to William Bigler, October 18, Bigler papers, HSP; 
Pittsburgh Post, October 13.
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defeat. “We have met the enemy and we are theirs,” grumbled President 
Buchanan.151 Republicans did expand on their totals from the previous two 
elections, obviously winning over a sizable number of former Fillmore voters. Yet 
they seem to have gained few Democrats, and exceeded the ‘Union’ vote in 
1856’s congressional races in only a few districts. Most districts actually saw a 
drop-off in the opposition vote between 1856 and ’58. Significant gains were 
made in the fourth and fifth districts, which bordered Philadelphia. While former 
Democrats George Scranton and John Schwartz also vastly improved on the 
previous opposition totals, scoring tremendous upsets.
Democrats though lost voters in every single district. Incumbents in the 
third, fourth, fifth, and seventeenth districts lost more than a quarter of their 1856 
supporters, all meeting defeat. Five other Democratic seats passed into the hands 
of the People’s party coalition. In Schuylkill County William Dewart drew 4,000 
fewer votes than he had two years earlier. Dewart was undercut by an anti- 
Lecompton challenger who provided the margin of defeat in a three-way race. But 
his eleventh district was the only one where such a challenge played in so directly 
to an administration defeat. An anti-Lecompton Democrat failed to alter the race 
in Thomas Florence’s first district, while John Hickman brushed off both a pro- 
Lecompton Democrat and a People’s party challenger. In Butler and Allegheny 
Counties’ twenty-second district the former Republican anti-tax candidate drew a
1 ^9dismal thirty-nine percent. Although the crisis of 1856-with the possibility of 
secession looming-helped draw an artificially high Democratic vote in both
151 Buchanan quoted in Crippen, Simon Cameron, 190.
152 The best source for congressional elections is: The Congressional Quarterly Guide to US 
Elections, 4th edition, John L. Moore et. all editors, (Washington DC, 2001)
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October and November, the drop-off in 1858 bore an eerie resemblance to the 
recent demise of the Whig party. Hardly a comforting thought to say the least.
It was once standard to anoint the reappearance of the tariff as the end-all 
cause of the 1858 turnaround.153 But this conclusion can hardly be sustained 
anymore. Multiple causes contributed to the all-important decline in Democratic 
votes in Pennsylvania. Clearly Lecompton was one reason while the Republican 
adoption of the tariff was another. Additionally, state and local issues failed to 
unite the party and could not serve as a distraction from the noticeably 
floundering Buchanan administration. Republicans had obviously been the 
beneficiaries of the disorder. They now held a majority of Pennsylvania’s elected 
offices, having finally absorbed a critical amount of former Fillmore voters. It was 
not guaranteed that they could hold that coalition though. The American party had 
served as a tragic example between 1854 and ’56. Pennsylvania Democrats still 
had an opportunity to return to their position. A large number of voters sat out the 
1858 election, many of them Democratic.154 If Democrats could somehow heal 
their divisions or reawaken the sprit of ’56 their cause was far from hopeless. The 
possibility of recreating the crisis-induced swelling of the Democratic vote—as 
had happened in 1856-still existed. That possibility though was a tall order.
The fissures in Pennsylvanian’s Democratic party only widened in 1859; 
although only minor state offices-along with state house and senate seats—were 
being contested in the year’s elections, many politicos were already preparing for
153 See especially John Coleman, Disruption o f  Democracy, and also C. M. Myers, “The Rise of 
the Republican Party in Pennsylvania,” as well as works by Allan Nevins and Roy Nichols.
154 Turnout is estimated at only 60.8% for 1858’s elections. William E. Gienapp, “Politics Seems 
to Enter into Everything,” Essays on American Antebellum Politics, 1840-1860 Stephen E.
Maizlish and John Kushama ed. (College Station, Texas, 1983), 19.
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the next year’s presidential election. A failure to heal party schisms could harm 
any chance at victory in that all-important election. While Keystone Democrats 
spent much of 1859 trying to address the convulsions created within their party by 
the Lecompton disaster, Republicans could enjoy their first year as the majority 
party, ail the while keeping up a constant attack on the floundering Buchanan 
administration. In October they would cruise to their first predicted victory. 
However, in that same month abolitionist crusader John Brown descended out of 
Pennsylvania and into infamy, engendering the toughest test yet to antislavery 
political power in the state. His raid raised the specter of civil war, outraging most 
of Pennsylvania’s population, and again raising doubts about the future of the 
Republican party.
VI
In March 1859 Pennsylvania’s Democratic party set about smashing its 
anti-Lecompton dissent. Spurred on by both James Buchanan and William Bigler, 
strongly pro-administration resolutions were passed; Buchanan’s course on 
Lecompton was sustained. The biggest loser in the convention was governor 
William Packer, who was practically read out of the party. “He refused to meet 
with WILMOT upon the everlasting negro question,” complained the Erie 
Observer, “but the moment he was elected he commenced agitating that very 
question himself. The sooner we get rid of all disorganizes the better for the 
purity of the party.”155 Dissent would no longer be tolerated. John W. Forney 
continued to curse his former patron from his Philadelphia Press editor’s office,
155 Erie Observer, March 26; Harrisburg Patriot and Union, March 24, 25, 1859; Pittsburgh Post, 
March 19, 23 : the Post was much more supportive o f governor Packer. All newspapers and 
correspondence for the rest o f this chapter, unless otherwise noted, are from 1859.
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but it was clear that the Buchanan/Bigler faction of the party now dominated 
Keystone Democracy.156 Republicans convened again as the People’s party, 
presenting perhaps their strongest platform yet. Although former American party 
men continued to find places in the coalition, antislavery rhetoric and mild Whig 
economic planks now dominated party ideology.
The season’s political campaign did not attract much attention or 
enthusiasm. Once again Democrats failed to cultivate state or local issues that 
could take away from their troubling national record.158 Although turnout was 
light, the People’s/Republican victory was still impressive. Both state candidates 
won by more than 20,000 votes, while the coalition gained control of the state 
senate-winning ten of eleven contested seats-and increased its majority in the 
legislative assembly. In the aftermath of the election Pennsylvania Republicans 
seemed most concerned with launching the Presidential campaign of their 
favorite: Simon Cameron.159
Before Republicans could start celebrating their imminent Presidential 
victory though, they faced a horrifying predicament. After making his final 
preparations in Chambersburg Pennsylvania, abolitionist John Brown led his 
small group of devoted followers on a crusade against slavery, storming the 
Harper’s Ferry arsenal on October 16,1859. Brown’s raid represented all that the
156 A sparsely attended anti-Lecompton convention made no nominations and did not recommend 
leaving the Democratic party. Congressman John Hickman was the most prominent attendee. 
Pittsburgh Post, April 16; Erie Observer, April 23.
157 Adams Sentinel, June 13. The Pittsburgh Post still attacked Republican nativism: “The Know 
Nothing Republicanism has been concealed, but it exists strong and proscriptive as ever.” May 14.
158 Harrisburg Patriot and Union, January 12.
159 The full result was: Auditor General: Cochran-R 181,835 Wright-D 164,544; Surveyor 
General. Keim-R 182,227 Row-D 163,877. For a Cameron recommendation see: Pittsburgh 
Gazette, October 18.
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South feared about northern abolitionist agitation. Although Republicans were, 
almost to a man, not abolitionists-indeed Pennsylvania Republicans often pointed 
with pride to abolitionist criticism of their polices-southemers and most northern 
Democrats did not take care to delineate between their antislavery doctrine and 
abolitionism. In the aftermath of Brown’s raid most Pennsylvania Democrats tried 
to blame Republican antislavery agitation for the attack. “The teachings of their 
leaders have been the cause of the outbreak at Harper’s Ferry,” insisted the 
Pittsburgh Post. “Brown was no more insane than hundreds of others who are 
leaders of the Republican party,” declared the Erie Observer. “If these friends of 
the Negro should at last produce a dissolution of the Union or a civil war,” the 
Harrisburg Patriot and Union assured, “the Democracy will be loudly able to 
declare the whiteness of its hands from the stain of complacency.”160
Although Republicans all demanded that Brown’s actions should be 
punished, many newspapers brazenly asserted that his raid was in large part the 
fault of the South. Franklin County’s Republican press blamed southern ruffians 
for turning Brown into a murderer. There was little sympathy with southern 
attacks on Republicanism. The Philadelphia North American simply felt that 
“Virginians should quiet themselves.” Brown’s execution especially offended the 
Pittsburgh Gazette, which charged: “the execution of the old man at Charlestown 
yesterday was a plain admission on the party of Slavery that they dare not spare a 
brave man’s life, and that magnanimity is impossible to a system based on wrong
160Pittsburgh Post, October 25; Erie Observer, October 29; Harrisburg Patriot and Union, October 
13. The Post dared to express some admiration for Brown, admitting after his execution:
“Although his courage, sincerity, and disinterestedness may be conceded, all honest and just men 
must condemn his acts.” Post, December 3.
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and upheld by violence.” Republicans sincerely believed that they were not 
radicals; it was the South that was now dominated by radicals. “We have no 
sympathy with fanatics, whether they are John Brown and his confederate 
traitors... or the plotters of disunion in the legislative halls of Charleston S.C.” 
assured the Harrisburg Telegraph,161
Democrats now seemed to have a national event that could be used to their 
advantage. A belief developed that Democrats would have won the elections of 
1859 if they had been held after Brown’s raid. Democrats did in fact make gains 
in New England’s spring elections, quite possibly benefiting from the Harper’s 
Ferry outrage. But Brown’s raid would only be a temporary setback for 
Republicans. More importantly, it could not heal the schisms in the Democracy. 
The attack on Harper’s Ferry may well have made them worse. Southern 
Democratic demands on their northern partners in 1860-somewhat prompted by 
Brown’s raid—threw the party into chaos. Pennsylvania’s Democratic party 
arguably suffered more turmoil than any other as a result of the ensuing spilt. The 
chaotic state of the Democratic party, helped Pennsylvania Republicans secure a 
surprisingly large and historically critical victory. 1860 marked the end of the 
Keystone State.
161Franklin Repository and Transcript, October 26; Philadelphia North American, October 21; 
Pittsburgh Gazette, December 3; Harrisburg Telegraph February 24, 1860; Adams Sentinel, 
December 6.
CHAPTER 5 
“We Will Seal the Doom of Southern Tyranny,
Over White Men at Least”
The End of the Keystone State: The Elections of 1860
The Pittsburgh Gazette, like most politicized newspapers, was wont to 
make grand declarations. In early 1860 editor Russell Errett assured readers that 
“No party ever organized in this country, not even excepting the good old Whig 
party, could boast purer principles or more legitimate or patriotic objects than the 
Republican party.” His words, though pure propaganda, nonetheless reveal the 
sense of legitimacy that the Pennsylvania Republican party now held. Errett, an 
erstwhile Whig, could not escape the reality that new principles had triumphed. 
Whiggery was dead, but Republicanism was vibrant and attractive.162
By 1860 the Pennsylvania Republican party was a united and diverse 
organization; appealing to a wide range of political interests, yet devoted to set of 
fundamental principles that it shared with parties in its sister states. Capturing the 
governor’s office and securing the state’s crucial electoral votes for the party’s 
Presidential candidate now seemed well within reach. Holding together the 
coalition of 1858 and picking up a few of the traditionally apathetic voters who
162 Pittsburgh Gazette, February 22.
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only turned out for Presidential contests would likely be enough to hold off the 
stumbling Democratic party. In sharp contrast to Republicans, Keystone 
Democrats were burdened with a party in national chaos. As the year progressed, 
conditions only worsened.
Pennsylvania’s 1860 elections turned on the inability of the Democratic 
party to present a unified conservative alternative to Republicanism. Instead, the 
disunited state of Democracy, combined with the radical pronouncements that 
emanated from southern party leaders, convinced many Pennsylvanians that the 
Republican party was a moderating and conservative force. Consequently, the 
great moderate, Abraham Lincoln, rolled up a vote that trumped even James 
Buchanan’s 1856 total. Lincoln’s conservatism though would not assuage the 
South. Indeed, despite protestations of conservatism, Pennsylvania’s Republican 
party would not forgo the fundamental principle that had formed the party in the 
aftermath of Kansas-Nebraska, opposition to slavery. The contextual radicalism 
of opposing the spread of slavery never disappeared from Keystone 
Republicanism. This principle was fundamental to party identity. In 1860 
Pennsylvania joined with its sister northern states in rejecting the course of 
sectional conciliation as heretofore practiced by native son James Buchanan and 
his predecessors. The result was civil war.
I
By 1860 Pennsylvania’s Democratic party stood in an unenviable position. 
James Buchanan, .who had been counted on to save the Union, was now the target 
of unrelenting criticism. Andrew Jackson’s “place is now filled by an old
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federalist, who cares more for the interests of southern slaveholders than for the 
welfare of his native state,” jeered the Pittsburgh Gazette. That Republicans now 
claimed to adhere to the principles of the Union-saving Democratic founder 
Jackson, was a humiliating prospect. With southern Democrats continuing to 
threaten secession Republicans seemed to have a better claim to Jackson. At times 
in 1860 it appeared as if John C. Calhoun, and not Jackson had won the struggle 
for Democracy.163
The situation within the state party was far from harmonious. Both the 
sitting governor William Packer and John W. Forney, the powerful campaign 
chairman from 1856, now sulked on the fringes of the party. Of even greater 
concern was the sense of alienation that festered among party loyalists. Turnout 
had fallen off by a disquieting amount in 1858, while opposition totals had largely 
held steady or increased. Reinvigorating and reuniting the party’s base in time for 
the Presidential election was a must.
Hopes appeared bleak as Democrats assembled in Reading for the party’s 
state nominating convention. In addition to formulating a platform and naming a 
gubernatorial candidate, Presidential electors needed to be selected. It was also 
possible that the convention would recommend a Presidential nominee. To its 
credit, the convention passed off relatively smoothly. Recent disagreements 
appeared to be largely resolved. Even Governor Packer garnered support for his 
state policies. The platform repudiated the right of Congress to exclude slavery
163 Pittsburgh Gazette, January 23, 1860. Republicans often claimed Andrew Jackson as a hero; 
amazingly former Whig papers, like the Gazette, evoked Jackson just as much as other sheets. “No 
man is more imbued with the sprit o f resolution and determination of Andrew Jackson than 
Abraham Lincoln,” insisted the Harrisburg Telegraph, October 25, 1860. Hereafter all dates for 
this section are 1860.
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from the territories, but maintained a commitment to the Cincinnati platform. 
Support for a protective tariff was also reaffirmed. Former congressman Henry D. 
Foster received the governor’s nomination to almost universal acclimation. 
Finally, the convention named a slate of electors, but made no recommendation 
for the Presidency. Ominously, the platform pledged to “accept the nomination of 
the Charleston convention.”164
The Charleston convention, which opened April 23, proved to be a 
disaster for the Democratic party. After failing to obtain their desired platform, a 
group of radical southerners walked out of the convention. The remaining rump 
assembly could not secure the necessary votes to nominate the favorite 
‘moderate,’ Stephen A. Douglas. Instead, the convention dissolved without a 
nominee, as the delegates agreed to reassemble in Baltimore during June. Most 
Pennsylvania Democrats were shocked and disgusted by the breakup. “Our 
Democratic brethren of the South are permitting their action to be governed by a 
sprit of sectionalism,” wailed the Pittsburgh Post. “The Democratic party at the 
North have heretofore stood by the Constitutional rights of the South,” 
complained the vociferously pro-Buchanan Erie Observer. In editor B. F. Sloan’s 
view, the Cincinnati platform of 1856 should have been adequate. “Everything 
looks bad,” moaned President Buchanan, “not only for the party, but for the 
country.”165
164Pittsburgh Post, March 5, 6; Erie Observer, March 3; Coleman, Disruption o f Democracy, 123- 
25.
165 Pittsburgh Post, April 30; Erie Observer, May 5; Pittsburgh Gazette, May 5; Buchanan to 
Robert Tyler, June 13, Auchampaugh, Robert Tyler, 300.
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The Baltimore convention did not produce a healthier result. Radicals 
again showed up and then bolted the convention—among them twelve 
Pennsylvanians-eventually nominating Vice President John C. Breckinridge on a 
slave code/states’ rights platform. The Baltimore holdouts settled on Douglas. 
Subsequently both candidates claimed to be the legitimate nominee of the 
Democratic party, a development that divided party leadership in several states. 
Pennsylvania Democrats were particularly tom over who deserved their support. 
“The extra ordinary movements at Baltimore,” worried a Crawford County 
Democrat, “have created here, as elsewhere, great excitement among our friends.” 
Lancaster’s Democratic organ bluntly concluded, “disaster and defeat stares us in 
the face.”166
Although most northern Democratic state organizations quickly decided 
that Douglas was the official nominee, Pennsylvania’s Democracy faced a 
different situation. The personal influence of President Buchanan upon state party 
leadership likely guaranteed that Douglas would not obtain an official blessing 
from the central committee. Although Buchanan eventually admitted that he 
would vote for Breckinridge, his public pronouncement that “every Democrat is at 
perfect liberty to vote as he thinks proper,” more aptly typified the 
counterproductive lack of leadership that had plagued his Presidency. The refusal 
of Buchanan and his lieutenants to admit that Douglas was the favored candidate 
of Pennsylvania Democrats only fueled party infighting. Instead, a lack of stem
166 J. E. McFarland to William Bigler, June 28, Bigler papers, HSP; Lancaster Intelligencer quoted 
Harrisburg Telegraph, June 29; Chambersburg Valley Spirit, June 27; Pittsburgh Post, June 25.
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national leadership helped plunge local organizations into chaos, a condition best 
revealed by the lack of a unified voice from leading Democratic newspapers.167
Editors sometimes supported Douglas, sometimes Breckinridge, or more 
often tried to avoid choosing sides. If a county’s paper selected one candidate, 
opponents would start an opposing paper to champion the other. From the fringes 
of the party, John Forney’s Philadelphia Press provided the fiercest opposition to 
Breckinridge. A typical Forney harangue read: “NO TRUE FRIEND of 
DOUGLAS in Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, can touch an electoral ticket which 
contains upon it the single name of a Breckinridge Disunionist.”168 Most pro- 
Douglas organs were less acerbic than the Press, usually claiming only that they 
preferred the Little Giant, while often failing to place his name officially within 
their banner. But passions were running high. The campaign was going to be 
malicious, even within the Democratic party itself.169
II
The situation for Pennsylvania’s Republican party had changed 
dramatically since its first Presidential campaign. “Our party is now consolidated 
by four years active and ardent service in the field,” commented the Pittsburgh 
Gazette m  Old and new Democratic outrages combined to keep Republicans
167 Buchanan quoted in Klein, James Buchanan, 348; Buchanan’s two top Keystone allies, 
Jeremiah S. Black and William Bigler apparently were quiet Breckinridge supporters. See: A. 
Whitaker to William Bigler, July 31, Bigler papers, HSP; Robert P ? to Jeremiah S. Black, 
September 28, Black papers, LC.
168 Press quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, July 11.
169 The Pittsburgh Post and Chambersburg Valley Spirit gave mild support to Douglas. The Press 
and the Harrisburg State Sentinel were the most avid Douglas sheets. Pro-Breckinridge papers 
included, the Reading Gazette, Columbia Democrat, Norristown Register, Philadelphia Argus, and 
the Pennsylvanian, as listed in Harrisburg Telegraph, June 30. The Valley Sprit later switched to 
Breckinridge.
170 Pittsburgh Gazette, May 28.
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animated and united. Democrats, with solid southern support, had blocked an 
increase in the tariff and a homestead bill during spring’s congressional session. 
Both measures had received ardent support within Pennsylvania. Meanwhile, the 
corruption of Buchanan’s administration—though limited by later standards-was 
proving to be worse than any other in history. Westmoreland County Republican 
congressman John Covode led the investigation of Buchanan in the House. His 
investigation claimed to have exposed an unprecedented amount of executive 
waste. “The details of the extravagance of the national administration are 
hideous,” concluded Simon Cameron. With Buchanan and company to kick
171around, Keystone Republicans never ran out of campaign fodder.
Adversity though did not completely evade the Republican party. 
Pennsylvania Republicans faced their own internal disorder during 1860, as 
personal rivalries threatened to divide the party. The intensifying feud between 
two of the party’s leading men, Simon Cameron and Andrew G. Curtin, came 
center state during 1860. According to most accounts, the feud was bom out of 
the struggle to elect a Senator in 1855. During that race Curtin, a former Whig, 
and Cameron, a former Democrat, both endeavored to capture the support of the 
American party, but the newly-formed movement could not agree on either man 
and no candidate won election. Both men blamed the other for the failure and 
made accusations of bribery. For the next five years the feud festered as 
Cameron’s role in the Keystone Republican party steadily increased.172
171 Cameron quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, September 22.
172 For the origins o f the feud see: Bradley, Cameron 96-105, and McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 
passim.
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Now Cameron was attempting to gain a complete stranglehold on the 
party. Already favored to receive the official Presidential recommendation of the 
state nominating convention, Cameron hoped to control state-level leadership,
17̂including the pending gubernatorial nominee. Curtin and his allies were 
horrified at the prospect. In turn they hoped to combine with enough non­
committed People’s party backers to keep Cameron from achieving his goal of 
controlling the 1860 campaign.
Try as he might, Cameron could not dictate the results of the People’s 
party convention. Cameron’s favorites went down to defeat as Curtin received the 
gubernatorial nomination. To satisfy the Cameron group, their boss was tabbed as 
the state’s favorite for the Presidency, although few politicos believed that his 
questionable background would allow him to be nominated. Meanwhile; the 
platform again committed to halting the spread of slavery, but it also claimed to 
“hail the people of the south as brothers, in whose prosperity we rejoice.”174
Curtin’s allies also obtained the leadership of the all-important state 
central committee, meaning they would control the financing and management of 
the campaign. Curtin’s closest advisor Alexander McClure was named committee 
chairman. McClure had run up against Cameron in 1859 when he was defeated in 
the race for state assembly speaker through Cameron’s interference. Having 
McClure in charge of finances, which he had so recently controlled was a direct 
threat to Cameron’s leadership. Throughout the summer Cameron’s allies bitterly
173 A. Reeder to Cameron, January 4, Russell Errett to Cameron, January 8, David Taggart to 
Cameron, January 10, Cameron papers, LC.
174 Harrisburg Telegraph, February 24; J. R. Hendrickson to Simon Cameron, February 28, 
Cameron papers, DCHS; Pittsburgh Gazette, February 24, 25.
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attacked McClure’s handling of the campaign. “Unless McClure is forced out of 
his position,” complained Pittsburgh Gazette editor and Cameron lieutenant 
Russell Errett, “Curtin cannot be elected.”175
Cameron’s supporters planned to unseat McClure at a July meeting of the 
campaign committee, but a night of excessive drinking forced many Cameron 
men to miss an early morning session that subsequently allowed McClure to 
remain in place. Eventually, the squabbling caught the attention of national 
leadership in Springfield. Lincoln in turn sent an advisor to Pennsylvania to 
determine if McClure, or perhaps Cameron, was derailing the campaign. Cameron 
was apparently able to convince Lincoln that he had the campaign under control, 
though no action was taken against McClure. Ultimately, the effects of the feud 
on the party’s electoral fortunes appear to have been minimal. To the eternal 
fortune of the Republican party, the Curtin/Cameron row did not interfere with 
the strength of its platform or its ideological appeals.176
in
Spring’s key municipal elections mostly went Republican, though their 
closeness in several locales was a cause for concern. Although Philadelphia’s 
mayoral election returned moderate Republican Alexander Henry to office, his 
majority was down from 1858, heightening Republican concern that conservatives 
might desert them if the party’s Presidential nominee proved too radical. Even the
175 Errett quoted in William H. Russell, “Alexander K. McClure and the People’s party in the 
Campaign o f 1860,” PMHB, 28 (October, 1961), 340; Errett to Cameron, June 23, Cameron to 
Alexander McClure, August 1, J. P. Sanderson to Cameron, October 1, Cameron papers, LC; On 
the 1859 speaker’s race see: McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 346-49.
176 Simon Cameron to Abraham Lincoln, August 1, Cameron papers, LC; The problems o f the 
feud during 1860 are covered in Bradley, Cameron, 154-57, and Bradley, Triumph o f Militant 
Republicanism, 81-85; the only public comment on the internal problems of the Republican 
campaign that I came across was in the Harrisburg Telegraph, August 6.
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ardently Republican Pittsburgh Gazette worried that conservative concerns would 
not be heard. “If we are to succeed in carrying Pennsylvania this fall,” it warned, 
“some attention must be paid to this call, which is numerous not only in 
Philadelphia, but throughout the eastern part of the state.” The impending 
Republican national convention would have to account for the concerns of 
Pennsylvania. “Chicago must understand that conservatism is necessary,” 
remarked the Philadelphia North American. Because of these fears the leading 
Republican contender for the Presidential nomination, William H. Seward, 
garnered stiff resistance from Pennsylvania leadership. “Great and talented as is 
Wm H. Seward,” warned the Adams Sentinel, “we fear his nomination would 
bring defeat.” Instead, a number of Keystone Republicans backed the most 
conservative candidate that they could, with Missouri’s Edward Bates and Ohio’s 
John McLean receiving support. Even radical Thaddeus Stevens backed McLean, 
whom almost nobody else favored.177
Chicago took care to mollify Pennsylvania. Although Simon Cameron was 
the first choice for most Keystone conventioneers, the nomination of Abraham 
Lincoln proved acceptable to all of Pennsylvania’s factions. Lincoln’s record as a 
moderate, as well as the inclusive nature of the party’s platform won widespread 
aplomb. “We believe that Abraham Lincoln and Hannibal Hamlin are 
conservative enough for every useful purpose,” concluded the North American. 
Even though the tariff plank was not very specific, its mere inclusion brought 
Pennsylvania’s delegation to euphoria. Spirits were quite high amongst
177Pittsburgh Gazette May 5; Philadelphia North American, May 11; Adams Sentinel, May 14; 
Harrisburg Telegraph, May 12; Seward’s life-long opposition to nativism also hurt his chances in 
Pennsylvania. McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 399.
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Republican ranks; some could feel the impeding revolution in the air. Shortly 
after the close of the convention the Westmoreland Country People's party 
resolved that by the election of Lincoln “we will seal the doom of southern 
tyranny, over white men at least.”178
IV
Lincoln was not the only ‘conservative’ candidate to enter the Presidential 
field. Although it was hardly warranted, the nomination of John Bell by a cadre of 
aging Whigs created an amount of apprehension, especially in Philadelphia 
Republican circles. Democrats meanwhile, were confident that they could secure 
the votes of the mostly ex-Whig Bell patrons. William Bigler wrote President 
Buchanan with a great deal of wishful thinking “if we can get the Bell men to 
cooperate .. . Lincoln will lose the state.” Although New York’s Democratic 
party formed a joint Presidential ticket with Bell’s supporters, no such agreement 
could be reached in Pennsylvania. Ultimately the Constitutional Union party 
made no state nominations, although the party’s lone newspaper eventually 
supported Foster for governor. However, excluding Philadelphians, most 
Republicans came to view the Bell movement as a non-entity, which it indeed
179was.
In Pennsylvania the Republican campaign rested on a combination of 
progressive economic planks and opposition to the aggressively proslavery 
policies of the Democratic administration. The party’s principles were according
178 Philadelphia North American, May 28; Westmoreland Country resolutions quoted Pittsburgh 
Gazette, June 19; For general convention commentary see: Adams Sentinel, May 28; Pittsburgh 
Gazette, May 19, 21; Wainwright, Diary o f Sidney George Fisher, 353.
179 William Bigler to James Buchanan, August 13, Buchanan papers, HSP; Philadelphia North 
American, July 14, 27; Pittsburgh Gazette, May 12, August 22.
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to the Harrisburg Telegraph “free territory for free labor, protection for home 
industry, and homes for the homeless.” The Pittsburgh Gazette expressed the dual 
nature of the Republican party in a comparison of the gubernatorial candidates: 
“Curtin represents national ideas-and is the advocate of freedom for the territories 
and protection of American industry. Foster represents a Southern policy for the 
country, prominent among which are the nationality of Slavery and Free 
Trade.”180
The tariff issue again played a prominent role in the Republican campaign. 
“It is our nigger,” quipped Simon Cameron to an amused Congress. National 
Republican leadership was well aware of the intensifying demands of 
Pennsylvanians for a protective tariff But just in case they might need a reminder, 
key editors stepped up their demands on the eve of the national convention. The 
North American demanded that Chicago pay “due respect to the interests of 
American labor.” Although disappointed that their favorite candidate had not been 
nominated, Pennsylvania’s staunchest protectionists were apparently happy with
I  Q 1
the nomination of Lincoln and the adoption of a pro-tariff platform.
In response Democrats challenged the national record of the Republican 
party on the tariff, especially questioning Lincoln’s commitment to protection. 
“Mr. Lincoln is held up as the friend of protective policy,” observed Henry Foster, 
“yet you cannot find a vote he ever gave, or a speech he ever made, wherein he 
favored the doctrine of protection at all.” The Pennsylvanian asked, “if Mr.
180 Harrisburg Telegraph, September 13 (quotation), August 22, October 5, 8, 16; Pittsburgh 
Gazette, March 5.
181 Cameron quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, May 24; Philadelphia North American, May 11; Bradley, 
Triumph o f Militant Republicanism, 68-69.
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Lincoln is a Protective Tariff man, where in the evidence of it?” Democrats had a 
legitimate case. In Congress Pennsylvania Democrats had supported the Morrill 
Tariff Bill. William Bigler was one of only two Democratic Senators to vote for 
its passage, while Henry Foster had traveled to Washington to try and lobby for 
additional Democratic support. Centre County’s Democratic sheet took notice 
claiming, while “Foster is at Washington advocating the passage of the tariff bill 
and the interests of the white people of Pennsylvania, Curtin is stumping it in 
Pennsylvania in behalf of niggerism and the nigger.”182
While numerous historians have concluded that Democratic efforts to 
neutralize the tariff in 1860 were crucially ineffective, some contemporary 
Keystone Republicans insisted that demands for higher tariffs were not vital to 
their successes. Alexander McClure reported to Lincoln that “the tariff is regarded 
as of no greater importance than slavery aggression: and in the [northern section 
of Pennsylvania] the tariff is but tolerated, and the greatness of Freedom 
overshadows all others.” In Pittsburgh, historian Michael Holt argues that the 
tariff hardly registered on the political radar. Economically, Pittsburgh iron 
manufactures may have actually benefited from lower tariffs. Across the state the 
political draw of the tariff may have very well played itself out by 1860. The 
panic of 1857 had proved to be short lived. By 1860 most displaced industrial 
workers were again active in the workforce.
182 Foster quoted Erie Observer, June 10; Pennsylvanian quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, September 7; 
Bellefonte Watchman quoted Harrisburg Telegraph, June 15; Erie Observer, June 10; William 
Bigler’s support o f the Morrill Tariff drew widespread aplomb from Keystone Democrats. See: J. 
Lawrence Getty to Bigler, June 21, John M. Marcy to Bigler, June 21, S. S. Halderman to Bigler, 
June 28, Bigler papers, HSP.
183 McClure quoted in William Russell, “Alexander K. McClure,” 33. McClure did speak out 
against Democratic claims that they were in favor o f higher tariffs proclaiming: “Henry D. Foster
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In addition to the crusade for a protective tariff, Pennsylvania Republicans 
now consistently championed ‘progressive’ initiatives geared at dispersing 
northern free labor principles. Representative Galusha Grow was the leading 
proponent of a homestead bill. Allegheny County congressman James K. 
Moorhead insisted that spreading industry to the South would guarantee sectional 
harmony. “Let us spread and diffuse manufacturing skill throughout the states 
North and South,” he declared on the floor of the House, “and we will soon find
1 O A
that sectional disunion will disappear.”
Nativism though was one issue that refused to disappear from the political 
landscape. The People’s party state platform protested the importation of foreign 
paupers and criminals, and criticized the prevalence of naturalization frauds at the 
ballot box. Meanwhile, Douglas’s Catholic wife made him an easy target for 
nativists. The most strident nativists warned that a Douglas Presidency would be 
bound to the wishes of Rome. “If the Pope adopts a bad cause,” insisted the 
Harrisburg Telegraph, “the Catholic is bound to sustain that cause.” The 
consistent support that Catholics gave to Democrats continued to gall 
Republicans. “The whole power of the Catholic Church is thrown into this contest 
. . . against free principles and in favor of locofocosim,” howled the Pittsburgh 
Gazette.1*5 By 1860 however, nativism cultivated far from universal acceptance 
among Pennsylvania Republicans. Most newspapers insisted that Republicanism
is the deadly foe of protection!” Harrisburg Telegraph, September 29; Holt, Forging a Majority, 
277-79.
184 Moorhead quoted in, “Western Pennsylvania and the Morrill Tariff,” WPHM, 6 (April 1923), 
113; Pittsburgh Gazette, March 21, June 25, 27; Philadelphia North American, May 23.
185 Harrisburg Telegraph, June 14 (quotation), July 27; Pittsburgh Gazette, April 13. Nativism was 
particularly strong in the Gazette during 1860; McClure, Old Time Notes, 421-22; For Democratic 
attacks on Republican nativism see: Chambersburg Valley Spirit, October 31, Pittsburgh Post, 
October 9.
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had nothing to do with Know Nothingism and some even took to attacking 
Democrats for their treatment of Catholics.186
Although local and state issues did occasionally surface during 1860, none 
seem to have factored greatly into the final result of the campaign. In Philadelphia 
Republicans praised the work of mayor Henry in improving the city’s waterworks 
and parks in sharp contrast to his do-nothing Democratic predecessor. Railroad 
relief bills won praise from Harrisburg Republicans, while Pittsburgh’s 
Republican party seemed to now be the champion of the anti-tax movement. 
Thomas Williams, who had bolted the party in 1858 over the tax issue, returned to 
the fold. Democratic attempts to capitalize on western resentment against eastern 
Pennsylvania railroad companies in Erie and Franklin Counties do not seem to 
have had much benefit. Though local issues most likely played a crucial role in 
bringing some voters to the polls, national issues predominated platforms, 
newspapers, and political correspondence during I860.187
In Pennsylvania the sectional crisis was never far from the general 
political discussion. “While I deprecate, as much as any man, all unnecessary 
agitation of the slavery question,” a former Democrat told a Harrisburg audience, 
“I cannot close my eyes against the influence of that question.” Northumberland 
County’s Republican convention summed up the principles of the state party in 
one resolution. It read: “We condemn the niggardly course of the so-called
186 Adams Sentinel, September 5, 12, 19; Philadelphia North American, September 28; Pittsburgh 
Gazette, October 10. A local Pittsburgh Republican convention went as far as to state: “our 
people, whether native or foreign by birth may depend upon us to advocate their right to secure 
this country as a market for the product of their skill and labor against foreign competition.” 
Gazette, March 9.
187 Philadelphia North American, April 19; Harrisburg Telegraph, April 4, October 4, Holt,
Forging a Majority, 275; Erie Observer, October 20, Chambersburg Valley Spirit, July 25.
119
Democratic party on all the great measures of the day. Their course in favor of 
free trade; extension of slavery over territory now free; their sympathy in favor of 
a censor, as now practiced in the South over the press opinions and free speech of 
the people.” The undemocratic principles of the slave power could no longer be 
tolerated in Pennsylvania. “It is time for the Northern people to consider well how 
far the south have a ‘right’ to infringe on the prosperity of free labor,” demanded
I S Sthe Harrisburg Telegraph.
Attacking the pro-slaveiy ties of the Democratic party remained the most 
effective negative tactic employed by Keystone Republicans. “The extension of 
negro slavery into the territories of the United States has become a settled policy 
of the Democratic party,” proclaimed former Democrat John Hickman. “Millions 
of scores of fertile lands . . .  are filched from our industrial classes . . .  to be 
turned into barren wastes by those who have already blasted more than one half of 
our soil as with an avalanche of fire.” Yet Hickman’s remarks reveal the subtleties 
of the antislavery campaign. It was not the fate of the slave that resonated most 
among Pennsylvania Republican converts, but the future of the nation.189
Republican attitudes about race had changed little since the Fremont 
campaign. The Philadelphia North American maintained an extremely negative 
impression of blacks remarking, “they are, unquestionably at present of a type far 
inferior to ours in the scale of humanity, and will require many ages of culture and 
development to raise them to our level.” “We fight the battle of Free White 
American Labor,” insisted the Harrisburg Telegraph. Southerners were warned to
188 William Dock quoted Harrisburg Telegraph, September 27; Northumberland resolution quoted 
Telegraph, June 20; Telegraph, August 13.
189 Hickman quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, July 30.
120
“keep your negroes at home.” Even the muted concern that some Republicans 
expressed for slaves angered some Pennsylvanians. A correspondent of Simon 
Cameron complained of radical Republicans who “think more of the nigger than 
they do the poor white man.” Although Keystone Republicans never allowed 
slavery and the sectional problem to disappear from public discussion, they were 
almost always careful to portray them as conservative or racist causes. “I am not 
asking you to liberate the slaves,” insisted future Senator Edgar Cowan, “it is the 
poor white men we want to liberate first.” Although Cowan and other 
Pennsylvania Republicans did not claim to support slavery like some Democrats 
did, white men always came first.190
As the campaign progressed conservatism seemed to be the order of the 
day. Philadelphia and Harrisburg Republican leaders in particular claimed that 
their party represented conservative views. More importantly, enough 
Pennsylvanians had convinced themselves that the Republican party was 
conservative to place it on the threshold of victory. “The Republican party, should 
it triumph,” wrote diarist Sidney George Fisher “will do nothing to injure the 
rights and interests of the South.” Almost no southerner could agree with this 
conclusion. For, in spite of the protests of noninterference and the outbursts of 
racism, the revolution had indeed come to Pennsylvania. The demand that the 
spread of slavery be halted in denial of Dred Scott was radical. “Of course slavery
190 Philadelphia North American, August 31; Harrisburg Telegraph, June 18; G. R. Shaw to 
Cameron, February 2, Cameron papers, DCHS; Cowan quoted in, Joseph Wolstoncraft, “Western 
Pennsylvania and the Election of 1860,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 6 (January, 
1923), 31; William Bigler overtly supported slavery in a letter to Pittsburgh’s David Lynch, Bigler 
to Lynch, December 23, 1856, Bigler papers, HSP; Meanwhile, racism remained very pungent in 
almost all Democratic newspapers. See especially, Chambersburg Valley Spirit, July 25,
Pittsburgh Post, November 5.
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is an evil to be endured where it exists by law,” reminded the Harrisburg 
Telegraph early in 1860, “but [it should] be resisted where it has no legal 
existence, and can have none until it be legalized by the people of a sovereign 
state.” “We have permitted a miserable, sectional minority too long to override 
and insult the majority,” concluded Franklin County’s Republican organ. Such 
pronouncements as these, and not the assurances of Sidney Fisher or 
Philadelphia’s conservative North American caught the attention of 
southerners.191
V
As the Republican party built upon its new found respectability,
Democrats continued to come apart, virtually guaranteeing Lincoln’s victory. The 
struggle to decide which Democratic Presidential nominee was running in 
Pennsylvania was never quite resolved. Throughout the campaign solid evidence 
existed that most Keystone Democrats favored Douglas. Western Pennsylvanians 
in particular tended to favored Douglas. “There is but one Democratic candidate 
in the field” protested the Greensburg Argus, “and that is Stephen A. Douglas.” 
Such devotion impeded both attempts at unity and the growth of the pro- 
Breckinridge faction. Although Breckinridge men were numerous, and enjoyed 
the quiet support of the administration, an outright choice of the Vice President by 
the state committee would have alienated thousands of Democratic voters, most 
likely ending the still reasonable hopes that October’s state race could be won. 
“Would we then sacrifice all because there exists a difference of opinion on the
191 Wainwright, Diary o f  Sidney George Foster, 355; Harrisburg Telegraph, January 30; Franklin 
Repository and Transcript, August 8; However even the Pittsburgh Gazette insisted that the 
Republican party represented conservative issues. May 21, June 26.
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subject of the presidency?” asked Franklin County’s Democratic organ. “We must 
learn to tolerate this difference.”192
Forming a joint electoral ticket that welcomed supporters of both 
candidates was the only hope, but some Douglas men could not accept any such 
recognition of the southern bolters. Douglas himself made no effort to secure a 
fusion, instead he impeded it. The Little Giant included Pennsylvania in his 
unprecedented speaking tour, attacking Breckinridge wherever he stopped. The 
Erie Observer, which had usually been critical of Douglas since his break with 
Buchanan, approved of little in the speech that he delivered during a driving Erie 
hailstorm. “If demagogues would leave us alone,” concluded the Observer “we
1QTwould give a good account of ourselves in October and November.”
If only the party could hold together for the governor’s race there might be 
hope. Henry Foster tried to leave the presidential race out of his gubernatorial 
campaign. Foster, who was a distant cousin of Breckinridge, never publicly 
revealed who had his support. “The question is sometimes asked,” explained 
Bucks County’s Democratic organ “is Foster a Douglas or a Breckinridge man? 
We answer that outside of the Presidential question, there is no such distraction in 
the Democratic party.” Democrats could hardly deny though that the Presidential 
question was a giant distraction.194
192 Argus quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, July 11; Chambersburg Valley Spirit, August 22. Franklin 
County’s Democratic organization officially backed Douglas, the Valley Spirit though aligned 
with Breckinridge during September.
193 Erie Observer, September 29; Harrisburg Telegraph, September 8. Republicans took great 
pleasure at Douglas’s decision to attack Breckinridge.
194 Doylestown Democrat quoted Pittsburgh Post, August 10.
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The state campaign committee met twice before the October election in an 
attempt to resolve the Presidential question. While a July Philadelphia gathering 
accomplished little, an August meeting in the tiny mountain town of Cresson was 
able to produce a compromise fusion ticket. Under the agreement Democratic 
voters could stipulate their preferred candidate, but the man who had the best 
chance of winning would get Pennsylvania’s electoral votes in the event of the 
ticket’s triumph. Breckinridge men and moderate Douglas supporters seemed 
satisfied, but not every Democrat agreed to support the Cresson compromise. 
Shortly after the fusion ticket appeared, a group of Douglas backers produced 
their own ticket that only included the Little Giant.195 Increasingly it all seemed 
pointless; the Presidential squabble had already noticeably sapped party strength. 
On the eve of state elections all but the most resolute Democrats could see the 
handwriting on the wall. An Indiana County Democrat bluntly asserted, “if we are 
defeated in October, it will be our own fault.”196
VI
October did indeed bring defeat for the Democratic party. Andrew G. 
Curtin defeated Foster by over 30,000 votes. Curtin drew an incredible 100,000 
more votes than David Wilmot in 1857, earning the support of more than 260,000 
Pennsylvanians. Foster’s vote was nearly equal to James Buchanan’s total four 
years earlier, but accounting for the growth of the electorate, Democratic turnout 
had dropped considerably. In addition to losing the governorship, Democrats
195 Henry M. Philips to James Buchanan, July 13, Buchanan papers, HSP; For the Cresson meeting 
see: Pittsburgh Post, August 10, 11; Bradley, Triumph o f Militant Republicanism, 80-81; Thomas 
MacDowell to William Bigler, August 10, Bigler papers, HSP.
196 J. Coulter to William Bigler, August 4, Bigler papers, HSP.
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dropped 71 out of 100 assembly seat races and ten of twelve state senate contests. 
The overwhelming Republican majority was thus able to retire Senator Bigler in 
early 1861. Congressional contests provided a relative bright spot, as the party
I  Q 'J
won six seats, defeating two incumbents.
Nonetheless, Democratic spirits were crushed. Pittsburgh’s Democratic 
organ laid the blame on the sitting President. “As poor old Mr. Buchanan has been 
accused of all the crimes in the calendar, we may as well make the last entry and 
place to his credit the destruction of the Democratic party.” John W. Forney 
conquered: “Who is responsible [for the defeat]?” he asked in the Philadelphia 
Press. The answer was a resounding “James Buchanan!” The Pittsburgh Post was 
so crushed by the defeat of Foster that it pondered dissolving. Yet the most
■I Q Q
upsetting prospect was the now imminent election of Lincoln.
Immediately following the defeat the Democratic central committee 
scrambled to form yet another unified electoral ticket. What became known as the 
Reading ticket would make no distinction between Douglas and Breckinridge. If 
the ticket should somehow triumph, the state’s electoral votes would go to the 
candidate who had the best chance of winning election. With his near sweep of 
the South, that would have meant Breckinridge. Yet few people seriously believed 
there was any chance that Lincoln would not win easily. Adding to the nearly 
insurmountable obstacles that faced Keystone Democrats, some Douglas backers
197Coleman, 140; The full vote was: Curtin-R 262,353, Foster-D 230,239. Henry Longnecker and 
Benjamin Junkin went down to defeat in the normally Democratic seventh and sixteenth districts. 
Berks County’s eighth district also passed back into Democratic control.
198 Pittsburgh Post, October 11 (quotation), 12, 15; Press quoted Pittsburgh Gazette, October 12.
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still refused to agree to the compromise and instead continued to circulate a 
straight Douglas ticket.199
In an anticlimactic result Lincoln crushed his combined opposition and 
secured the Presidency. Lincoln actually drew an even-higher vote than Curtin, 
while the Reading ticket lost 50,000 Foster voters. The straight Douglas ticket 
drew only about 16,500 votes, more than half of which came from Philadelphia. 
Bell won 7,000 votes in Philadelphia, but drew insignificant support elsewhere. 
Lincoln had made tremendous gains over Fremont in the southeastern section of 
Pennsylvania, while his vote in he north and west was similar to Fremont’s. 
Continuing a trend that would be a near constant during the era of the third party 
system, Democrats obtained the vast majority of immigrant and Catholic voters. 
Turnout was estimated at 75.2 percent.200
The magnitude of the victory quickly resonated with Republicans. “The 
great North has for the first time in the political history of the country vindicated 
its honor, and has shown that it despises the threats of traitors as readily as it 
condemns their dangerous principles.” These words of the Pittsburgh Gazette 
reveal that the election of Lincoln meant more than just a simple changing of the 
guard. The Republican triumph was a victory of ideology and principle. It was a 
refutation of the dough-faced Buchanan and his cronies. “‘Honest Old Abe’ and
199 Pittsburgh Post, October 10.
200 The Presidential vote was: Lincoln-R 268,030, Reading Ticket-D 178,871, Douglas Straight 
16,765, Bell-CU 12,770; Turnout from Gienapp, “Politics Seems to Enter into Everything,” 19. 
The governor’s race produced a turnout o f 77.7 percent.
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correct principles have crushed our opponents,” concluded a Gettysburg 
Republican.201
Post-election commentaries however did not always agree on the causes of 
the Republican triumph. The strength of the antislavery vote was often debated. 
The Philadelphia North American felt “slavery was not the dominating idea of the 
Presidential contest.” While many Republicans claimed the tariff to be their most 
effective weapon, doubters existed in both parties. Philadelphia’s leading 
Republican paper even saw the election as a referendum on Whiggeiy. “The old 
Whig sprit yet lives, and it is roused .. . against the same corrupt and insidious 
enemy.” Attempting to determine what issues entered the minds of voters more, 
seems an impossible goal. As it were, the lack of a uniform postscript to the 
election has perpetuated an unproductive argument over the motives of the 
electorate of 1860.203
Regardless of the motivations of the individual voter, the implications of 
the Republican victory were revolutionary. “Fifteen states are without a 
President,” grimly reported the Chambersburg Valley Spirit. The rise of the 
Republican party had introduced an element of northern militancy into 
Pennsylvania. While the strength of the Republican pseudo-militia group the 
Wide Awakes may have been innocent, the explicit rejection of the recent course 
of the national government was not so innocuous. As the first steps towards 
secession were undertaken Pittsburgh’s leading Republican paper stood resolute.
201 Pittsburgh Gazette, November 8; Robert L. Harper to Thaddeus Stevens, November 9, Stevens 
papers, LC.
202 Philadelphia North American, November 7; William L. Hirst to James Buchanan, October 12, 
Buchanan papers, HSP.
203 Philadelphia North American, October 2; See also Franklin Repository, November 14.
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“The election of Lincoln, will we venture to predict, lay the ghost of disunion; but 
if it should not, there will be power enough in the general government when he is 
inaugurated, to crush out any insane attempt at rebellion.” Pennsylvania had made 
its decision.204
204Chambersburg Valley Spirit, November, 14; Pittsburgh Gazette, October 23.
CONCLUSION
“The North can never consent to the universal dominion of Slavery in this 
nation and nothing less will satisfy the South.” In this way Alexander K. McClure 
grimly summed up the secession crisis in mid-December 1860. Yet McClure, 
along with most Pennsylvania Republicans, were not ready to accept any of the 
pending compromises that promised to sooth the South, but would most likely 
wreck the Republican party. If we compromise, he concluded, “our present 
victory would be fruitless.” Most Keystone Republicans agreed with McClure and 
refused to support any of the reactionary measures that attempted to assuage the 
South during the winter of 1860-61. Once war began Pennsylvania Republicans 
gave nearly unbroken support to the military effort.
Although they had usually supported the various compromise measures, 
most Keystone Democrats backed the war effort in the aftermath of Fort Sumter. 
But the war only intensified the divisions within the party. By 1863 the 
copperhead/peace faction of the party predominated. Pennsylvania’s Democratic 
party included some of the most reactionary antiwar activists in the North. They 
came perilously close to controlling government. Yet when military victory
205 McClure to James McPherson, December 14, McPherson papers, LC.
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eventually came, the record of opposition seriously hurt Democrats. After 1865 
Democratic victories in Pennsylvania were few and far between.
Despite suffering a setback in the 1862 congressional election and losing 
control of the legislative assembly for two years, the Republican party—which 
continued to run under the moniker of People’s or Union party—for the most part 
maintained its power during the Civil War. Andrew G. Curtin secured a narrow 
reelection in 1863 and provided able leadership throughout the War. Simon 
Cameron served a stormy tenure as Secretary of War—David Wilmot replaced 
him in the Senate—and then labored as Minister to Russia, before returning to 
Pennsylvania to help in Lincoln’s reelection in 1864. Ultimately, Cameron 
secured firm control over Pennsylvania’s Republic party. Curtin lost his feud with 
Cameron and was eventually forced out of the party. By then the sectional issues 
that ignited the Civil War had faded from the headlines, however, the Republican 
party now dominated Pennsylvania politics.206
Between 1854 and 1860 the second party system came to an end in 
Pennsylvania and the third party system was bom. A myriad of forces combined 
to terminate the old condition and create the new pattern of politics. Nativism, 
temperance, slavery, and voter apathy, helped destroy the Whig party and 
destabilize the Democratic party. Over the course of two years two separate 
national organizations struggled to create a new anti-Democratic party.
Democrats, on the other hand, sought to reestablish their base and secure alienated
206 For coverage o f wartime politics see: Erwin S. Bradley, Triumph o f Militant Republicanism, 
and Arnold M. Shankman, The Pennsylvania Antiwar Movement.
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former Whigs. At first the Know Nothing movement and the American party were 
more successful than Free Soilers and Republicans in forming an opposition 
party. However, the American party was tom asunder by its transformation from a 
nativist/antiparty organization to a national conservative anti-Democratic party. 
Although the original precepts of Know Nothingism remained vibrant, the 
American party proved a stagnant ephemeral force. Though initially burdened by 
the state’s lack of a stridently antislavery electorate, the Republican party 
eventually benefited both from American party erosion and Democratic 
blundering. The intensification of the sectional crisis brought the Republican 
party instant credibility.
Yet, Republican victory came relatively late to Pennsylvania. The strength 
of the Fillmore movement in southeastern and central Pennsylvania, combined 
with the inflated performance of the Democratic party under state-favorite James 
Buchanan, resulted in a lop-sided defeat in 1856. The party’s first gubernatorial 
race the next year served only to establish the party as the uncontested opposition 
to seemingly entrenched Democracy. However, the almost perpetual tumult of the 
1850’s left Democrat’s hold on power tenuous at best. Economic malaise, placid 
leadership, and dough-faced submission to increasingly outrageous southern 
demands marred the Buchanan Presidency. Meanwhile, Republicans had finally 
crushed their conservative/nativist competitors and secured a more coherent 
response to local and state issues. Republicans-reinvented in the guise of the 
People’s party-additionally expanded into economics, grabbing hold of the 
protectionist cause. The expansion of the Republican identity helped produce just
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enough new converts in 1858 to overwhelm a now stammering Democratic party. 
The drop in party turnout between 1856 and 1858 resulted in the worst defeat in 
Keystone Democratic history. The unity of ’56 would never quite return.
Although Democrats regrouped admirably by 1860, the bitter national 
breakup of the party that year all but guaranteed defeat. In a surprising reversal of 
1856, the Republican Presidential candidate crushed a divided selection of 
opponents. While the Pennsylvania Republican party maintained an unwavering 
opposition to the spread of slavery, it insisted that such a position was 
conservative. The well-chosen slate of officers combined with the inclusive nature 
of the new party platform convinced many Pennsylvanians that the South would 
accept Republican victory. Yet the party’s own rhetoric belied such reasoning. As 
Alexander McClure observed, the North would not stand to see slavery thrive, but 
the South could accept nothing less. In 1860 Pennsylvania, wittingly or not, chose 
its side. Thus a tradition of looking both ways, of refuting radicalism, and serving 
as a bulwark of Unionism came to an end. The means were varied compared to 
other northern states, but the result was the same.
Antebellum politics encompassed a wide array of ideologies and interests. 
An incredible range of passions and prejudices motivated the electorate and drove 
them to the polls. Some voters were moved by self-interested economics; others 
sought to produce an imposition of their own values on others, while many voted 
only to ‘throw the rascals out.’ It is impossible to know for sure why a majority of 
Pennsylvanians voted for the Republican party in 1860. Yet party ideology does
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give us some basic insights. The words of politicians and editors and the 
principles of official platforms mattered much more during the Civil War era than 
in today’s cynical world. The vast majority of antebellum political historians 
continue to insist that voters followed their party because they believed in its 
principles. Although religious and ethnic groups tended to stay loyal to certain 
parties, their loyalty was heavily tied to the supportive ideology of that party. 
Catholics supported Democrats because of their commitment to religious freedom 
in the face of opposition bigotry. Evangelical reformers tended to support Whigs 
and later Republicans, because they shared many of the same goals. Thus, 
ideology remains central.
During the 1850’s the majority of the electorate of Gettysburg switched its 
allegiance from the Whig party to the Republican party. In the process they broke 
with their Maryland neighbors. Though possessing virtually identical economies 
and harboring a very similar population, the two communities had one major 
difference, their willingness to accept the fundamentally antislavery Republican 
party. Though the personal feelings of Gettysburg voters will never be fully 
known, the ideology of their party of choice is undeniable. Support of a 
progressive tariff, or agreement with railroad legislation, perhaps even anti- 
Catholic prejudice, may have been the primary motivators during those critical 
elections of October and November 1860, but the resulting blow against the slave 
power and the Union proved more lasting.
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APPENDIX
Electoral Returns by County
1854 Supreme Court Election Black-D 167,010 
Smyser-W 78,571
Adams
Armstrong
Bedford
Blair
Bucks
Cambria
Centre
Clarion
Clinton
Crawford
Dauphin
Elk
Fayette
1,952
914
1,932
783
2,053
1,228
1,445
487
5,148
2,818
1,705
761
2,133
349
2,183
95
948
305
2,609
1,663
2,292
missing
344
11
2,354
73
1,343 Allegheny 
1,663 Beaver 
836 Berks 
2,205 Bradford 
2,366 Butler 
810 Carbon 
2,341 Chester 
1,981 Clearfield 
1,182 Columbia
2,553 Delaware
373 Erie
3,377 Franklin
5,351
4,313
1,460
1,107
8,256
2,474
2,701
2,014
2,374
1,656
1,229
231
4,564
3,726
1,391
382
2,147
1,660
Baird-KN 120,576
5,705
1,744 Cumberland 2,651
1,401
1,581
1,379
2,389
1,494
2,761
1,457
1,290
2,794
1,885
1,189
784
2,670
900
966
2,018
886
1,694
2.144
134
Fulton
Huntingdon
Jefferson
Lancaster
Lebanon
Luzerne
McKean
Mifflin
Montgomery
Northampton
Perry
Pike
Schuylkill
Sullivan
Tioga
Venango
Washington
877 387 Greene 1,972 1,325
308 204
1,416 1,997 Indiana 1,223 1,140
585 1,356
945 1,497 Juniata 1,176 359
120 814
4,738 5,564 Lawrence 996 902
5,676 1,566
1,590 1,209 Lehigh 3,092 1,251
1.401 1,725
4,297 3,572 Lycoming 2,274 2,440
1,030 260
469 30 Mercer 2,513 851
284 1,514
1,292 940 Monroe 1,894 223
641 213
5,530 1,954 Montour 948 388
3,140 295
3,758 2,241 Northumberland 2,185 945
679 806
1,464 1,893 Philadelphia 25,446 22,104
143 5,872
631 51 Potter 538 214
88 460
5,377 3,451 Somerset 1,451 1,118
896 1,406
407 169 Susquehanna 2,133 1,308
114 1,069
1.402 1,474 Union 1,842 707
782 2,010
1,413 1,259 Warren 1,048 543
285 722
3,509 2,322 Wayne 1,769 709
1,931 515
135
Westmoreland 3,297 2,433 Wyoming 857 765
1,096 237
York 4,612 4,044
731
136
1855 Canal Commission Election Plummer-D 161,281 Williamson-R 7,226
Nicholson-A 149,745 Misc. 6,383
Adams 1,784
1,679
Allegheny 6,740
5,877
2,357
Armstrong 1,633
2,148
121 Beaver 1,334
1,107
581
Bedford 1,667
1,791
Berks 6,948
3,264
Blair 1,465
2,392
Bradford 2,476
4,173
Bucks 5,328
4,123
Butler 2,182
2,582
120
Cambria 2,063
1,437
Carbon 1,187
519
Centre 1,851
2,033
Chester 4,460
4,668
Clarion 2,154
1,508
Clearfield 1,409
1,018
Clinton 934
996
10 Columbia 1,635
984
Crawford 2,015
2,091
791 Cumberland 2,399
2,660
Dauphin 2,292
3,021
Delaware 1,581
1,379
12
Elk 350
236
14 Erie 1,698
2,113
471
Fayette 2,620
2,312
12 Franklin 2,411
2,860
Fulton 822
609
Greene 1,997
1,393
Huntingdon 1,194
1,920
Indiana 667
2,315
586
Jefferson 1,089
1,043
Juniata 837
1,023
Lancaster 5,099
5,301
0 Lawrence 864
1,197
Lebanon 1,865
2,256
0 Lehigh 3,394
2,633
Luzerne 3,957
3,571
0 Lycoming 2,266
2,034
McKean 265
455
0 Mercer 1,635
1,808
Mifflin 1,310
1,382
0 Monroe 1,327
531
Montgomery 5,207
3,573
4 Montour 920
438
Northampton 3,738
2,443
0 Northumberland 1,983 
1,041
Perry 1,332
1,539
0 Philadelphia 28,384
25,770
Pike 614
64
8 Potter 436
634
Schuylkill 5,012 
. 1,775
0
2,082
Snyder 819
1,090
Somerset 1,481
2,050
0 Sullivan 347
292
Susquehanna 1,579
2,164
0 Tioga 1,381
1,723
Union 793
1,500
0 Venango 1,501
1,468
Warren 717
958
122 Washington 3,182
3,214
Wayne 1,594
1,420
0 Westmoreland 3,547
3,200
Wyoming 529
794
0 York 4,349
4,138
138
1856 Congressional Elections
I
Florence-D 9,495
Knight-U 7,275
n
Morris-U 6,411
Marshall-D 6,018
HI
Landy-D 7,933
Millward-U 6,753
XII
J. Montgomery-D 10,442 
Smith-U 7,657
XII
Dimmick-D 11,235
Dimk-U 5,065
XIV
Grow-U 13,325
Sheward-D 5,361
IV
Phillips-D 9,279
Forts-A 6,560
Kelley-R 2,457
V
O. Jones-D 9,674
Mulvany-U 7,961
VI
Hickman-D 8,024
Bowen-U 7,851
vn
Chapman-D 10,321
Bradshaw-U 8,789
VIE
J. Jones-D 9,951
Yoder-U 3,947
IX
Edwards-U 10,001
Heister-D 8,320
X
Kunkel-U 9,227
Eyer-D 7,360
XI
Dewart-D 8,959
Campbell-U 6,418
XV
White-D 9,980
Irwin-U 9,450
XVI
Ahl-D 11,191
Todd-U 9,670
XVII
Reilly-D 10,224
Pumroy-U 9,715
XVIII
Eddie-U 8,792
Pershing-D 8,508
XIX
Covode-U 10,409
McKinely-D 8,724
XX
Montgomery-D 10,256 
Knight-U 9,411
XXI
Ritchie-U 7,647
McCams 5,944
XXII
Purviance-U 6,840
Gibson-D 4,854
XXIII
Stewart-U 8,552
Cunningham-D 5,467
XXIV
Gillis-D 9,785
Myers-U 9,114
XXV
Dick-U 8,944
McFadden-D 4,215
139
1856 Presidential Election Buchanan-D 230,700 Fillmore-A 55,838-26,338 
Fremont-R 147,510
Adams
Armstrong
Bedford
Blair
Bucks
Cambria
Centre
Clarion
Clinton
Crawford
Dauphin
Elk
Fayette
Fulton
Huntingdon
Jefferson
2,837
1,120
2,458
306
2,760
788
1,485
618
3,093
1,614
676
265
3,554
2,889
970
149
24-1,225 Allegheny
2,680 75-113
3,076
6-944
34-648
3,891 41-4
5,360
7-45
6-561
2,164 737-908
926
Beaver
152-1,784 Berks
2,080 667-1,853 Bradford
445
6,517 316-419 Butler
4,682
2,987 107-867 Carbon
804
2,895 552-1,400 Chester
390
Clearfield
Columbia
106-2,330 Delaware
Erie
45-1,228 Franklin
1,463
1,163
32-683
Greene
Indiana
Juniata
9,062
13,671
I,905 
2,658
II,272 
1,037
2,314
6,933
2,648
3,401
1,868
692
6,333
6,308
1,678
756
2,888
1,139
Cumberland 3,437 
1,472
2,005
1,000
2,584
5,157
3,469
2,336
2,447
l'321
1,762
2,625
1,565
480
898-608
183-103
304-3,282
71-30
67-14
156-309
828-620
93-550
6-214
14-1,565
791-319
252-37
16-1,327
14-272
32-218
160-597
Lancaster
Lebanon
Luzerne
McKean
Mifflin
Montgomery
Northampton
Perry
Pike
Schuylkill
Somerset
Susquehanna
Union
Warren
Wayne
Wyoming
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8,781 977-3,616 Lawrence 1,220 86-11
6,608 3,067
2,393 41-648 Lehigh 4,428 21-91
2,348 2,237
6,791 563-305 Lycoming 3,824 70-1,700
4,850 934
526 40-7 Mercer 2,899 103-16
812 3,686
1,491 61-989 Monroe 2,276 12-67
216 560
7.134 1,778-492 Montour 1,271 11-138
2,846 666
5,260 1,994-644 Northumberland 3,059 244-1,090
1,168 566
2.135 657-750 Philadelphia 38,222 11,860-12,218
521 7,892
862 5-10 Potter 667 2-4
270 1,264
7,035 367-2,315 Snyder 1,265 49-1,404
2,188 943
1,763 1-1,404 Sullivan 538 5-33
1,458 309
2,548 43-8 Tioga 1,368 20-7
3,861 4,541
1,092 15-171 Venango 2,157 7-65
1,429 2,041
1,231 47-2 Washington 4,288 128-137
2,091 4,237
2,259 113-69 Westmoreland 5,172 66-283
2,059 4,202
1,171 57-17 York 6,879 1,001-3,300
1,138 512
141
1857 Governorship Race Packer
Wilmot
188,887
146,136
Adams
Armstrong
Bedford
Blair
Bucks
Cambria
Centre
Clarion
Clinton
Crawford
Dauphin
Elk
Fayette
Franklin
Greene
Indiana
2,363
1,900
2,409
2,106
2,338
1,568
1,819
1,450
5,747
4,801
2,379
1,042
2,663
2,145
2,132
987
1,464
1,083
2,576
3,514
3,109
2,656
502
276
3,104
2,520
3,186
3,058
2,034
1,000
1,438
2,650
59 Allegheny
111 Beaver
398 Berks
569 Bradford
101 Butler
165 Carbon
35
23
18
80
91
Chester
Clearfield
Columbia
600 Delaware
Erie
Forest
Fulton
26
Huntingdon
Jefferson
6,610
7,687
1.557 
1,999
8,722
2,750
2,082
5,642
2,361
2,831
1.557 
672
5,388
5,269
1,459
725
1,464
1,144
Cumberland 3,078 
2,466
1,598
1,614
1,995
3,305
65
75
817
570
1,749
1,678
1,268
1,125
Hazlehurst 28,132
856
874
47
153
524
235
30
58
609
143
248
54
142
Juniata
Lawrence
Lehigh
Lycoming
Mercer
Monroe
Montour
1,108
1,035
993
1,992
3,805
2,957
2,872
1,701
2,539
2,928
2,254
504
1,080
568
Northumberland 2,821 
974
Philadelphia 27,749 
10,001
Potter
Snyder
Sullivan
Tioga
Venango
Washington
495
957
999
989
494
265
1,193
3,234
1,900
1,790
3,752
3,614
Westmoreland 4,361 
3,448
York 5,314
1,778
20 Lancaster
64 Lebanon
9 Luzerne
348 McKean
49 Mifflin
5 Montgomery
71 Northampton
490 Perry
14,405 Pike
4 Schuylkill
81 Somerset
0 Susquehanna
0 Union
2 Warren
142 Wayne
27 Wyoming
1.332
6,486
7,698
1,990
2,664
5,268
3,536
496
565
1,532
1,217
5,448
2,608
4.097 
1,111
1,965
1,564
758
190
5,950
3.097
1,741
2,277
2,419
3,224
971
1,275
899
1,368
1,992
1,691
1,226
995
1,236
182
214
104
1,386
1,010
161
12
581
16
49
12
143
1858 Congressional
I
Florence-D 6,823
Ryan-P 6,492
Nebg-AL 2,442
II
Morris-P 5,653
Martin-D 4,030
III
Verree-P 6,977
Landy-D 5,834
IV
Millward-P 9,749
Phillips-D 6,451
V .
Wood-P 9,701
O. Jones-D 7,209
VI
Hickman- AL 6,786
Manley-D 5,185
Broomall-P 4,676
vn
Longnecker-P 8,324
Roberts-D 8,076
VIII
Schwartz-P 7,321
J. Jones-D 7,302
IX
Stevens-P 9,513
Hopkins-D 6,341
X
Killinger-P 8,897
Weidle-D 5,589
XI
Campbell-P 7,153
Dewart-D 4,387
Cake-AL 3,614
let Returns
XII
Scranton-P 10,023 
McRenyolds-D 6,186
XII
Dimmick-D 8,009
Shoemaker-P 6,566
XIV
Grow-P 11,165
Parkhurst-D 3,359
XV
Hale-P 9,238
White-D 7,349
XVI
Junkin-P 8,655
Fisher-D 8,600
XVII
McPherson-P 9,348
Reilly-D 9,081
XVIII
Blair-P 9,114
Pershing-D 6,679
XIX
Covode-P 9,257
Foster-D 8,165
XX
Montgomery-AL 9,254 
Knight-D 5,798
XXI
Moorhead-P 6,539
Burke-D
XXII
McKnight-P 5,438
Williams-AT 3,903
Birmingham-D 502
XXIV 
Hall-P 8,905
Gillis-D 8,111
XXV
Babbitt-P 6,306
Marshall-D 4,113
4,879
144
1859 Auditor General Election
Adams
Armstrong
Bedford
Blair
Bucks
Cambria
Centre
Clarion
Clinton
Crawford
Dauphin
Elk
Fayette
Franklin
Greene
Indiana
2,538
2,529
1,943
2,282
2,147
2,011
1,449
2,600
5,159
5,172
1,868
1,593
2,233
2,446
1,216
532
1,600
1,226
2,141
2,766
2,217
3,331
411
317
2,824
2,676
3,267
3,692
1,596
785
827
1,922
Wright-D
Cochran-R
Allegheny
Beaver
Berks
Bradford
Butler
Carbon
Chester
Clearfield
Columbia
Cumberland
Delaware
Erie
Forest
Fulton
Huntingdon
Jefferson
164,544
181,835
4,720
7,934
1,131
1,756
7,444
6,251
1.639 
3,743
1,514
2,075
1.640
1,491
4,044
5,066
1,448
1,129
1,782
1,005
3,224
2,921
1,280
2,097
1,119
2,325
30 
37 .
851
716
1,774
2,264
851
1,071
145
Juniata
Lawrence
Lehigh
Lycoming
Mercer
Monroe
Montour
1,309
1,223
526
1,351
3,856
2,613
2,949
2,599
2,225
2,770
1,777
409
1,154
602
Northumberland 2,159 
1,602
Philadelphia
Potter
Snyder
Sullivan
Tioga
Venango
Washington
26,366
29,525
502
948
737
1,286
525
324
1,042
1,940
1,837
2,622
3,390
3,745
Westmoreland 4,163 
3,803
Lancaster
Lebanon
Luzerne
McKean
Mifflin
Montgomery
Northampton
Perry
Pike
Schuylkill
Somerset
Susquehanna
Union
Warren
Wayne
Wyoming
3,433
1,280
2,451
5,936
5,071
587
600
1,439
1,372
5,056
4,535
4,077
2,797
2,052
2,070
721
135
4,534
4,879
1,190
2,187
2,091
2,807
840
1,363
757
1,139
1,949
1,609
945
751
7,602
York 5,203
4,983
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1860 Governor’s Election
Adams
Armstrong
Bedford
Blair
Bucks
Cambria
Centre
Clarion
Clinton
Crawford
Dauphin
Elk
Fayette
Franklin
Greene
Indiana
2,849
2,773
2,698
3,744
2,561
2,469
2,172
3,051
6,330
6,383
2,583
2,177
2,824
3,165
2,297
1,795
1,703
1,750
3,187
5,277
3,302
4.555
633
421
3.556 
3,382
3,379
4,053
2,669
1,529
1,886
3,672
Foster-D
Curtin-R
Allegheny
Beaver
Berks
Bradford
Butler
Carbon
Chester
Clearfield
Columbia
Cumberland
Delaware
Erie
Forest
Fulton
Huntingdon
Jefferson
230,239
262,353
9,190
15,879
1.715 < 
2,682
10,318
6,833
2,328
6,664
2,548
3,526
1,930
1,722
5,913
7,540
2,040
1,756
2,586
1,848
3.716 
3,625
1,996
3,183
2,469
6,813
69
129
851
716
2,114
3,070
1,493
1,886
147
Juniata 1,465
1,503
Lancaster
Lawrence 959
2,645
Lebanon
Lehigh 4,566
4,166
Luzerne
Lycoming 3,034
3,615
McKean
Mercer 2,794
3,624
Mifflin
Monroe 2,163
822
Montgomery
Montour 1,220
983
Northampton
Northumberland 2,955 
2,429
Perry
Philadelphia 42,119
40,233
Pike
Potter 615
1,410
Schuylkill
Snyder 1,134
1,704
Somerset
Sullivan 543
394
Susquehanna
Tioga 1,331
4,147
Union
Venango 2,142
2,581
Warren
Washington 4,206
4,768
Wayne
Westmoreland 5,276
a  Q ' i n
Wyoming
7,153
13,012
2,234
3,847
6,916
6,682
706
1,048
1,490
1,723
7,392
5,812
5,249
3,507
2,128
2,416
843
324
7,067
7,301
1,372
2,977
2,456
4,110
1,019
1,820
1,172
2,112
2,537
2,610
1,336
1,192
York 6,665
5,322
148
1860 Presidential Election Reading-D 178,871 Douglas 16,765
Lincoln-R 268,030 Bell 12,776
Adams 2,644 36 Allegheny 6,725 523
2,724 38 16,725 570
Armstrong 1,621 5 Beaver 1,621 4
2,824 50 2,842 58
Bedford 2,224 14 Berks 8,846 420
2,505 86 6,709 130
Blair 1,275 239 Bradford 2,188 9
3,050 397 7,091 22
Bucks 5,174 487 Butler 2,332 13
6,443 95 3,646 22
Cambria 1,643 110 Carbon 1,301 369
2,277 124 1,758 21
Centre 2,423 26 Chester 5,008 263
3,021 16 7,771 202
Clarion 2,078 0 Clearfield 1,836 0
1,829 12 1,702 23
Clinton 1,244 72 Columbia 2,366 86
1,736 ' 0 1,873 14
Crawford 2,961 62 Cumberland 3,183 26
5,779 22 3,593 147
Dauphin 2,392 195 Delaware 1,500 195
4,531 169 3,181 169
Elk 523 0 Erie 2,531 17
407 0 6,160 90
Fayette 3,308 24 Forest 47 0
3,454 147 107 0
Franklin 2,515 622 Fulton 911 1
4,151 76 788 49
Greene 2,665 26 Huntingdon 1,622 55
1,614 17 3,089 22
Indiana 1,347 0 Jefferson 1,134 6
3,910 22 1,704 5
149
Juniata 1,147 1
1,494 62
Lawrence 788 16
2,937 31
Lehigh 4,094 145
4,170 52
Lycoming 2,402 187
3,494 91
Mercer 2,546 2
3,855 49
Monroe 1,262 291
844 0
Montour 786 311
1,043 4
Northumberland 2,306 97
2,422 72
Philadelphia 21,619 9,274
39,223 7,131
Potter 521 0
1,545 0
Snyder 910 60
1,678 5
Sullivan 497 0
429 1
Tioga 1,278 11
4,754 9
Venango 1,932 6
2,680 6
Washington 3,975 8
4,724 91
Westmoreland 4,796 13
4,887 13
York 5,497 562
5,128 574
Lancaster 5,135 728
13,352 446
Lebanon 1,917 10
3,868 103
Luzerne 6,803 0
7,300 0
McKean 591 0
1,077 2
Mifflin 1,189 83
1,701 36
Montgomery 5,590 509
5,826 690
Northampton 4,597 115
3,839 171
Perry 1,743 8
2,371 38
Pike 831 0
381 1
Schuylkill 4,968 422
7,568 139
Somerset 1,175 1
3,218 10
Susquehanna 2,548 2
4,470 6
Union 812 28
1,824 6
Warren 1,087 4
2,284 0
Wayne 2,618 0
2,857 2
Wyoming 1,237 8
1,286 0
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